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LOTZE'S 

OUTLINES  OF  Philosophy 

IV 
PSYCHOLOGY 


LOTZE'S  PHILOSOPHICAL  OUTLINES. 


Translated  and  Edited  hj  GEORGE    T.    LAUD,    Prot'esttur  of  PkilOKoph} 

in  Yale  University. 


The  German  from  which  these  translations  are  made  consists  of  the 
dictated  portions  of  Lotze's  latest  lectures  as  formulated  by  himself, 
recorded  in  the  notes  of  his  hearers,  and  subjected  to  the  competent  and 
thorough  revision  of  Professor  Rehnisch  of  Gottingen.  The  "Out- 
lines," therefore,  give,  in  language  chosen  by  himself,  a  condensed, 
orderly,  and  well-elaborated  statement  of  his  final  conclusions  on  a  wide 
range  of  philosophical  questions.  They  furnish  a  valuable  scheme  for  the 
instructor;  and  when  skilfully  used,  they  may  be  made  to  introduce  the 
discussion  <  if  almost  all  the  current  problems  in  philosophy.  The  six 
loUowing  volumes  have  appeared  :  — 

I.  OUTLINES  OF  METAPHYSICS.  This  volume  treats  of  those 
assumptions  which  enter  into  all  our  cognition  of  Reality.  It  consists 
of  three  parts,  —  Ontology,  Cosmology,  Phenomenology. 

II.     OUTLINES    OF    THE     PHILOSOPHY    OF     RELIGION.       In 

this  volume  Lotze  seeks  "  to  ascertain  how  much  of  the  Content  of  Reli- 
gion may  be  discovered,  proved,  or  at  least  confirmed,  agreeably  to  reason." 

III.  OUTLINES     OF    PRACTICAL     PHILOSOPHY.       This    volume 

discusses  Ethical  Principles,  Ethical  Ideals,  and  the  PVeedom  of  the  Will; 
it  also  applies  the  theory  to  the  Individual,  to  Marriage,  and  to  Society. 

IV.  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY.       The   first    part    treats   of    Simple 

Sensations,  the  Course  of  Ideas,  Intuitions  of  Objects  as  in  Space,  Errors 
of  the  Senses,  etc.  The  second  part  discusses  the  nature,  place,  and 
changeable  states  of  the  Soul,  and  the  reciprocal  action  of  Soul  and  Body. 

*.  OUTLINES  OF  ESTHETICS.  This  volume  gives  Lotze's  theory  of 
the  Beautiful  and  of  Phantasy.  Then  follow  brief  chapters  on  Music, 
Architecture,  Plastic  Art,  Painting,  and  Poetry. 

VI.  OUTLINES  OF  LOGIC.  The  Outlines  of  Logic  comprehends  both  the 
pure  and  the  applied  science.  The  same  volume  contains  a  brief  treatise 
on  the  Encyclopaedia  of  Philosophy. 


OUTLINES 


OF 


PSYCHOLOGY 


DICTATED    PORTIONS 


LFXTURES  OF  HERMANN  LOTZE 


/SSI  8 

TRANSLATED   AND    EDITED   BY 

GEORGE    T.    LADD 

PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY  IN  YALE  COLLEGE 


BOSTON,   U.S.A.: 
PUBLISHED    BY   GINN    &   COMPANY. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1886.  by 

GEORGE  T.  LADD, 
in  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


TVPOGRAI'HY    BY  J.    S.    CuSHING    &    Co.,    BOSTON,    U.S.A. 

Presswork  by  Ginn  &  Co.,  Boston,  U.S.A. 


3F 

133 


EDITOR'S    PREFACE. 


The  "  Outlines  of  Psychology  "  was  the  first  to 
appear  of  that  series  of  eight  small  volumes  of  Dic- 
tate from  the  lectures  of  Lotze,  which  followed  each 
other  in  rapid  succession  after  their  author's  death. 
The  present  translation  is  from  the  German  of  the 
third  edition,  published  at  Leipzig,  by  S.  Hirzel,  in 
1884.  The  first  German  edition  was  issued  in  the 
early  Fall  of  188 1.  It  consisted  mainly  of  the  lecture- 
notes  of  Robert  Lotze,  a  son  of  the  philosopher,  who 
attended  his  father's  course  in  Psychology  for  the 
Winter  Semester  of  1880-81,  and  who  testifies  in 
the  Preface  that  he  recorded  them  as  they  were 
formulated  by  the  lecturer  himself.  The  volume 
was,  however,  before  publication,  subjected  to  the 
thorough  revision  of  Professor  Rehnisch,  Lotze's 
colleague  in  Gottingen.  The  third  German  edition 
of  the  "  Outlines  of  Psychology "  is  somewhat 
changed,  in  certain  passages,  from  the  first  ;  in 
particular,  some  difficult  points  —  for  example,  the 
rise  and  nature  of  our  mental  picture  of  ourselves, 
in    Chap,  vi.,   "  The    Feelings  "  —  have    been    more 


VI  EDITOR  S    PREFACE. 


fully  explained.  All  three  editions,  however,  are 
throughout  substantially,  and  for  the  most  part 
even  verbally,  the  same. 

It  is  not  likely  that  any  other  compend  of 
truths  touching  the  science  of  Mind,  at  once  so 
brief  and  so  comprehensive,  is  to  be  found  in  all 
the  literature  of  the  subject.  I  am  sure  that  there 
is  no  other  by  so  mature  and  competent  an  authority. 
By  preference,  native  facility,  training,  and  practice, 
Lotze  was  almost  incomparably  well  fitted  to  deal 
with  the  great  science  of  Psychology.  In  his  bio- 
graphical and  eulogistic  sketch  of  Lotze  (contained 
in  the  appendix  to  the  "Outlines  of  Esthetics"), 
Professor  Rehnisch  speaks  of  this  as  the  "  darling 
lecture-course  "  of  its  lamented  author.  First  and 
last,  directly  and  indirectly,  far  more  of  Lotze's 
published  work  deals  with  the  human  soul  as  its 
subject  than  with  any  other  philosophical  inquiry. 
He  may  fitly  be  called  a  born  psychologist.  He  had 
the  delicate  tact,  the  reflective  insight,  the  subtlety 
in  analysis  of  mental  states,  which  psychology  de- 
mands for  its  successful  cultivation.  Moreover,  his 
training  was  of  that  comprehensive  kind  which  alone 
makes  it  possible  to  look  upon  the  many-sided  human 
mind  from  all  of  its  many  sides.  Like  more  than 
one  other  notable  philosopher  (and  among  them  all 
by  far  most  notable  —  Aristotle),  Lotze  was  the  son 


EDITOR  S    PREFACE.  Vll 

of  a  physician.  He  was  thoroughly  versed  in  the 
sciences  of  human  physiology  and  human  pathology. 
His  early  lecture-courses  included  these  subjects. 
While  a  young  man  at  Leipzig,  we  find  him  offer- 
ing instruction  in  "pastoral  medicine,"  therapeutics, 
general  pathology,  "juridical  medicine,"  and  the 
functions  and  diseases  of  the  nervous  system.  His 
published  works  include  treatises  on  the  Philosoph- 
ical Principles  of  Biology,  on  Life  and  Vital  Force, 
on  General  Physiology  and  Medical  Psychology,  and 
on  Life  and  Mechanism,  etc.  He  was  thoroughly 
acquainted  with  all  that  modern  science  has  done 
for  the  study  of  mind  by  opening  the  approaches 
to  it  from  the  experimental  and  physiological  points 
of  view. 

But  Lotze  was  equally  well  equipped  by  nature 
and  cultivation  to  discuss  the  metaphysical  problems 
which  enter  into  the  study  of  psychology  and  which 
so  largely  impart  to  it  its  peculiar  value  and  charm. 
While  admitting  the  help  of  objective  experimental 
methods,  he  did  not  depreciate  the  instrument  of 
self-consciousness.  While  proposing  a  brilliant  ex- 
position of  nature's  method  of  giving  to  us  our  ideas 
of  the  spatial  qualities  and  relations  of  objects,  in 
his  theory  of  so-called  "local  signs,"  he  detected  the 
fallacies  of  all  attempts  —  \n\\qX\\q.x  a  priori  or  a  poste- 
riori ^  2X  the  so-called  "deduction  of  space."     The 


Vlll  EDITOR  S    PREFACE. 

offences  against  metaphysic  which  are  committed  by 
all  materialistic  views  when  introduced  into  psychol- 
ogy were  patent  to  Lotze. 

The  third  Part  of  his  large  work  on  Metaphysic, 
and  considerable  portions  of  his  Logic  and  of  the 
Microcosmus,  are  treatises  on  psychology.  I  doubt 
whether  any  one  workman  of  the  century  is  entitled 
to  higher  esteem  than  Lotze  for  the  quantity  and 
quality  of  his  teaching  regarding  the  nature  of  Mind. 

The  attention  of  the  reader  is  called  to  the  wide 
range  of  the  subjects  touched  upon  within  the  limits 
of  this  brief  treatise.  The  second  or  theoretical  part 
of  the  "  Outlines  of  Psychology "  includes  chapters 
on  the  Seat  of  the  Soul,  its  reciprocal  Relations  to 
the  Body,  its  Essential  Nature,  and  even  on  the 
Realm  of  Souls.  Accustomed  as  w^e  are  to  see 
almost  all  the  available  space  in  psychological 
treatises  appropriated  to  the  details  of  the  phenom- 
ena of  intellect,  it  may  appear  strange  that  any 
space  can  be  given  in  so  brief  a  compend  to  sub- 
jects such  as  these.  We  shall  do  well  to  remember, 
however,  that  tJiese  are  just  the  subjects  into  which 
we  all  desire  to  look.  It  is  the  teacher's  business 
then  to  try  to  hold  open  —  at  least  wide  enough  for 
a  glimpse  through  —  the  door  between  the  soul's 
self-conscious  activity  and  the  soul's  real  self. 

No  other  one  of  Lotze's  philosophical  Outlines  is 


EDITOR  S    PREFACE,  IX 

more  nearly  complete  and  symmetrical  than  this. 
But  it  is,  of  course,  only  a  brief  presentation  of 
outlines.  It  will  be  a  pleasure  and  a  reward  to  the 
translator,  if  the  perusal  of  this  small  work  shall  re- 
sult in  an  increased  study  of  the  more  voluminous 
psychological  writings  of  its  distinguished  author. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 


Introduction 


PACK 
I 


PART  FIRST.     THE  SINGLE  ELEMENTS  OF  THE 
INNER  LIFE. 

I.     Of  Simple  Sensations     . 
The  Course  of  Ideas 
The  Act  of  Relative  Knowledge  and 

Attention 

The  Intuitions  of  Space    . 
Of  the  Apprehension   of  the  World 
by  the   Senses,  and   of  Errors   of 

Sense  

Chapter    VI.     The  Feelings 

Chapter  VII.    Of  Motions 

PART   SECOND.     THEORETICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


Chapter 

I. 

Chapter 

II. 

Chapter 

III. 

Chapter 

IV. 

Chapter 

V. 

Chapter  I. 

Chapter  II. 

Chapter  III. 

Chapter  IV. 

Chapter  V. 

Chapter  VI. 

Chapter  VII. 


Of  the  Soul 

Of    the    Reciprocal   Action   between 

Soul  and  Body   .... 
The  Seat  of  the  Soul 
The  Time-Relations  of  the  Soul  . 
The  SouPs  Essence  .         .         .         . 
The  Changeable  States  of  the  Soul, 
The  Realm  of  Souls 


5 
28 

40 
47 


66 
73 
83 


91 

98 
105 
112 
119 
129 

145 


INTRODUCTION. 


§  1.  Sensations,  ideas,  feelings,  and  acts  of  will, 
constitute  the  well-known  facts,  the  whole  of  which 
we  are  accustomed  to  designate,  although  with  the 
proviso  of  future  proof,  as  the  life  of  a  peculiar 
entity,  called  '  the  Soul' 

The  requirements  of  science  would  be  perfectly 
satisfied,  — 

(i)  in  case  we  could,  as  exact  observation  directs 
us,  furnish  a  complete  exhibition  of  all  the  single 
elements  of  this  life  and  of  the  general  forms  in 
which  they  are  combined  {Descriptive  or  Empirical 
Psychology) ;  — 

(2)  in  case  we  could  tell  the  nature  of  the  subject 
of  this  entire  life,  as  well  as  the  efficient  forces  and 
conditions  by  which  it  is  produced  and  compelled 
to  keep  within  those  forms  of  its  course  that  are 
known  empirically  {Explanatory,  Mechanical  or 
Metaphysical  Psychology)  •    and,  finally,  — 

(3)  in  case  we  could  specify  what  is  the  rational 
meaning  for  which  all  this  exists,  or  the  vocation 
which  the  life  of   the    soul    in    general  has  to  fulfil 


OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


in  the  totality  of  the  world  {Ideal  or  Speculative 
Psychology). 

Since  the  last  of  the  foregoing  problems  does  not 
admit  of  a  solution  in  strictly  scientific  form,  and  the 
treatment  of  the  first  may  conveniently  be  combined 
with  that  of  the  second,  the  essential  question  with 
which  we  are  to  be  occupied  is  the  following :  Under 
what  conditions,  and  by  means  of  what  forces,  do  the 
individual  processes  of  the  spiritual  life  originate  ; 
and  how  do  they  combine  with  and  modify  each 
other,  and  by  such  cooperation  bring  to  pass  the 
whole  of  the  spiritual  life .'' 

We  choose  our  way,  however,  so  as  to  follow  the 
course  of  the  thing  itself ;  that  is  to  say,  we  speak 
first  of  the  external  impressions  by  which  the  spirit- 
ual activity  is  at  every  moment  aroused  anew,  then 
of  the  manifold  internal  elaboration  which  these 
impressions  undergo,  finally  of  the  reflex  activities, 
motions,  and  other  actions,  which  result  from  them. 
It  is  only  after  passing  in  review  these  single  ele- 
ments of  the  spiritual  life  that  it  is  possible  to  give 
a  comprehensive  exposition  of  the  interior  nature  of 
the  subject  which  leads  this  life. 


Part    First. 


THE    SINGLE    ELEMENTS    OF    THE    INNER 

LIFE. 


Part    First. 


THE    SINGLE    ELEMENTS   OF    THE    INNER 

LIFE. 


CHAPTER    L 

OF    SIMPLE    SENSATIONS. 
/SS/S 

§  2.  By  *  simple  sensations  '  we-  understand,  in  this 
place,  those  in  whose  content  no  composite  structure 
out  of  parts,  whether  dissimilar  or  similar,  is  to  be 
observed  :  and  we  further  conceive  of  such  sensa- 
tions—  for  so  the  case  customarily  is  —  as  induced 
by  external  impressions. 

In  such  a  case  we  distinguish,  as  the  primary 
process  in  the  originating  of  sensations,  the  exter- 
nal sense-stimulus.  Nothing  becomes  an  object  of 
perception  by  means  of  its  bare  existence :  every- 
Mhing  becomes  such  only  by  being  either  itself 
•? brought  near  to  the  point  of  contact  with  our  body, 
as  is  the  case  of  impact ;  or  else  by  imparting  to  a 
medium,  which  surrounds  it,  certain  motions  that 
are  transplanted  from  element  to  element  in  this 
medium,  and    that    finally  reach    our   body,  —  as   is 


OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY, 


the  case  with  waves  of  sound  and  light.  In  all 
cases,  however,  such  external  sense-stimulus  con- 
sists in  some  form  or  other  of  the  motion  of  certain 
masses  of  matter  :  and  it  possesses  in  itself  no  sim- 
ilarity to  the  spiritual  processes  that  are  to  result 
from  it. 

§  3.  The  second  process  which  is  necessary  is  that 
within  the  body  which  the  external  stimulus  excites. 

On  its  entrance  into  the  superficial  parts  of  our 
body,  the  external  stimulus  produces  manifold 
changes  in  the  most  external  layers  of  its  covering, 
—  changes  of  which  we  know  little,  and  which  we  do 
not  need  to  investigate  from  the  psychological  point 
of  view.  For  none  of  them  become  the  occasions 
of  sensations  until  they  reach  the  ends  of  the  nerve- 
fibres  that  are  distributed  everywhere  throughout 
the  body,  and  produce  in  these  fibres  an  excitation 
which  must  be  propagated  along  the  entire  course  of 
the  nerve-thread  up  to  the  brain,  if  a  sensation  is  to 
originate.  Every  injury  to  the  nerve  which  prevents 
such  propagation  of  the  impulse  has,  therefore,  also 
the  effect  of  rendering  all  stimulation  of  the  peri- 
pheral nerve-ending  completely  inoperative  so  far  as 
consciousness  is  concerned.  Now  we  do  not  know 
with  definiteness  in  what  the  aforesaid  excitation, 
the  so-called  '  nerve-process,'  consists ;   and   it  is  of 


THE    SUBJECT    OF    SENSATION. 


importance  for  psychology  merely  to  inquire,  whether 
this  process  is  simply  a  process  of  physical  motion, 
or  whether  it  from  the  beginning  participates  in  the 
character  of  the  spiritual  life. 

Now  a  sensation  cannot  e.xist  in  the  nerve  in  a 
merely  general  form,  but  it  must  be  accurately  speci- 
fied precisely  %v]io  is  to  Jiavc  the  sensation.  The 
nerve  as  a  whole  cannot  be  this  subject ;  because  the 
nerve  is  an  aggregate  of  many  parts,  and  besides,  it 
is  by  no  means  all  at  one  time  in  the  condition  of 
excitation.  On  the  contrary,  one  part  after  the 
other  is  affected  in  succession.  Nothing  more,  there- 
fore, could  possibly  be  asserted  than  that  each  indi- 
visible atom  of  the  nerve  is  a  'sensitive  subject,'  and 
imparts  its  own  sensation  to  its  neighbor  until  finally 
it  arrives  at  the  soul. 

Since,  however,  this  propagation  of  the  excitation 
can  be  prevented  by  altering  the  physical  continuity 
of  the  nerve  —  for  example,  by  section  of  it  —  it  is 
also  undoubtedly  not  the  result  of  an  immediate 
sympathy,  but  of  a  physical  influence  which  one 
nerve-atom  a  exercises  upon  the  next  atom  b,  etc. 
We  should  accordingly  be  compelled  to  say  :  The 
atom  a  acts  physically  upon  b ;  in  consequence  of 
its  suffering  this  influence,  b  is  thrown  into  a  state 
of  sensation  S ;  and,  again,  in  consequence  of  that,  b 
exerts  a  new  physical  impact  upon  c,  which  in  turn 


8  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

is  by  this  means  induced  to  the  sensation  S  and  in 
consequence  thereof  to  the  exercise  of  a  physical  im- 
pact upon  the  atom  d.  The  last  nerve-atom  z  would 
then  act,  in  a  manner  as  yet  quite  obscure,  upon  the 
soul,  and  stir  this,  too,  to  produce  its  sensation  S. 

Now  it  is  obvious  that  this  last  impact  by  means 
of  which  our  sensation  (the  only  one  of  which  we 
actually  know  anything)  originates  in  us,  will  have 
had  its  result  quite  as  truly  if  the  nerve-atoms  should 
exercise  merely  a  physical  influence  upon  each  other, 
and  if  sensations  of  their  own  (which  are  merely 
empty  conjectures  and  not  demonstrated  facts) 
should   be  wholly  dispensed  with. 

Since,  therefore,  these  sensations  peculiar  to  the 
nerves  contribute  nothing  whatever  to  the  explana- 
tion of  otir  ozvn  sensation,  and  besides  are  not  demon- 
strable, while  the  propagation  of  a  physical  impact 
cannot  be  denied  ;  we  shall  in  future  consider  the 
nerve-process  also  as  merely  a  process  of  physical 
motion,  that  is  carried  over  from  one  particle  of  the 
nerve  to  another,  and  as  yet  has  nothing  of  the 
psychical  character  which  belongs  to  the  sensation 
that  follows  it. 

§  4.  The  third  member  of  this  chain  of  pro- 
cesses is,  now,  the  state  of  consciousness  so  well 
known  to  us  all,  the   sensation  itself,  —  the   'seeing' 


TWO    ELEMENTS    OF    SENSATION. 


of  a    light  of   definite  color  or  the  '  hearing '   of  a 
sound. 

Of  the  two  elements  in  the  latter  process  which 
we  can  distinguish  in  our  thinking,  —  namely,  the 
qualitative  content  of  which  we  have  an  experience  [ 
in  sensation  and  the  activity  in  sensation  by  means  ' 
of  which  we  are  conscious  of  this  content,  —  neither  f 
the  one  nor  the  other  is  comparable  with  the  nature 
of  the  external  stimulus  or  of  the  neural  process. 
However  accurately,  too,  we  may  analyze  the  nature 
of  the  waves  of  ether,  we  never  discover  in  it  a  reason 
why  it  must  be  seen  as  brightness  and  not  rather 
heard  as  sound;  and  just  as  little,  why  some  waves 
must  be  experienced  as  the  sensation  red,  and  others 
as  the  sensation  blue, — and  not  the  reverse.  Further  : 
however  we  may  combine  physical  motions  of  nerve- 
atoms  with  one  another,  there  never  comes  a  point 
at  which  it  would  be  comprehensible  as  a  matter  of 
course,  that  the  motion  last  produced  is  bound  to  re- 
main motioji  no  longer,  and  must  rather  pass  over  into 
this  process  of  sensation  so  totally  different  in  kind. 

All  efforts  to  demonstrate  how  it  comes  about 
that  the  merely  physical  motion  gradually  passes 
over  into  sensation  are,  therefore,  wholly  in  vain. 
We  must  rather  be  satisfied  with  asserting  that  a  ne- 
cessity of  nature,  which  has  hitherto  wholly  escaped 
our  knowledge,  has  in  fact  united  these  two  series 


lO  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


of  processes,  —  the  motions  and  the  sensations,  — 
incomparable  and  irreducible  to  each  other  as  the 
two  are ;  and  has  done  this  in  such  a  way  that 
a  definite  member  of  the  one  series  always  has  for 
its  consequent  a  definite  member  of  the  other. 

§  5.  It  is  now,  however,  to  be  assumed  that  these 
two  series  of  processes  will  not  be  concatenated 
wholly  without  some  controlling  principle  ;  that 
rather  similar  sensations  will  correspond  to  similar 
stimuli,  and  different  sensations  to  different  stimuli  ; 
and  that  in  cases  where  a  definite  increase,  inter- 
ference, periodicity,  or  prominent  point  exists  in  the 
series  of  stimuli,  all  these  will  find  expression  in 
some  way  or  other  in  the  series  of  sensations  also. 

Empirically  we  are  able  as  yet  to  establish  the 
foregoing  conjecture  to  only  a  very  limited  extent. 

In  the  first  place,  the  various  classes  of  sensations 
(colors,  tones,  smells)  exist  without  intervening 
terms  and  as  a  bare  matter  of  fact,  side  by  side  with 
each  other  ;  and  they  do  not  constitute  a  closed  sys- 
tem. For  example,  from  the  fact  that  we  experience 
waves  of  ether  as  light,  it  does  not  in  the  least  de- 
gree follow  that  we  must  consequently  experience 
waves  of  air  as  sound. 

The  same  thing  is  true  of  the  single  members  of 
the  particular  classes.     He  who  had  merely  had  the 


DISSIMILARITY    OF    SENSATIONS,  II 

sensation  of  'sour'  or  of  'yellow,'  would  not  thereby 
be  led  to  the  thought  that  there  must  be  also  'bitter' 
and  '  blue.' 

Further,  that  a  definite  increase  in  the  sensations 
corresponds  to  a  definite  increase  in  the  series  of 
stimuli  we  observe  to  be  true  only  in  the  case  of 
tones,  the  pitch  of  which  rises  with  the  number  of 
the  vibrations  of  the  acoustic  waves.  On  this  matter 
it  deserves  to  be  remarked,  that  the  manner  in  which 
the  sensation  renders  these  differences  of  the  stimuli 
is  quite  peculiar  to  itself.  The  difference  in  pitch 
between  two  tones  has  no  similarity  at  all  to  the 
difference  of  two  numbers,  but  expresses  an  alto- 
gether peculiar  increment  of  qualitative  intensity, 
which  by  no  means  admits  of  being  divined  before- 
hand, and  of  which  we  have  elsewhere  no  example. 
Just  so  the  distinguished  instance  of  a  doubling  of  the 
number  of  waves  finds  an  expression  peculiar  to  it,  in 
the  octave,  which  is  not  experienced  in  sensation  as  a 
doubling  of  anything  whatever,  but  as  a  noteworthy 
and  otherwise  unexampled  combination  of  the  iden- 
tity and  difference  of  both  tones.  Colors,  on  the 
contrary,  although  in  their  prismatic  arrangement 
they  originate  from  a  similar  ascending  scale  of  the 
number  of  waves,  do  not  by  any  means  arrange 
themselves  for  the  immediate  impression  into  a 
series  of  increasing  pitch.     This  is  dependent  on  the 


12  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

fact,  that  we  can  rightly  expect  a  proportionality  to 
exist  only  between  the  sensations  and  the  neural 
processes  as  their  proximate  conditions.  But  we 
have  no  acquaintance  with  these  latter ;  and  on  this 
account  we  compare,  without  reaching  any  compre- 
hensive result,  the  sensations  with  the  external  stim- 
uli on  which  they  do  not  immediately  depend. 

Penally,  since  our  sensations  do  not  constitute  a 
closed  system,  the  thought  is  possible  that  the  realm 
of  the  sensible  is  not  exhausted  by  our  senses  ;  on 
the  contrary,  that  there  are  other  animal  souls,  with 
kinds  of  sensation  quite  different  and  yet  —  as  is 
natural  —  wholly  unknown  to  us. 

§  6.  The  duration  of  sensation  can  be  compared 
as  a  gross  magnitude  with  the  duration  of  the 
neural  process  which  excited  it.  For  we  find  that 
under  ordinary  circumstances  it  is  never  longer  than 
the  duration  of  the  external  stimulus,  unless  this 
latter  leaves  behind  permanent  after-effects,  either 
outside  of  or  within  us,  which  themselves  in  turn 
become  stimuli  for  new  sensations. 

Strictly  taken,  an  excitation  of  the  nerve  which 
has  once  originated  can  never  cease  of  itself,  but 
must  be  annulled  by  efficient  counteracting  forces. 
This  customarily  takes  place ;  and,  when  the  vitality 
is  sound,  it  takes  place  by  means  of   the  ceaseless 


ENDURING    EFFECTS    OF    STIMULI. 


activity  of  the  whole  process  of  metabolism,  by  which 
constantly  the  nerve's  normal  condition  of  equilib- 
rium is  re-established,  and  thus  rendered  capable 
of  an  impartial  reception  of  new  impressions. 

Such  recovery,  however,  fails  to  take  place  with 
sufficient  speed,  not  merely  when  the  stimuli  are  of 
very  great  strength,  but  particularly  in  the  sense 
of  sight  as  a  rule  ;  and,  in  such  a  case,  the  well- 
known  after-images  correspond  to  the  excitation 
which  still  continues  to  be  kept  up,  and  which 
sometimes  even  undergoes  again  a  periodical  in- 
crease. By  '  after-images '  is  meant  actual  sensations 
which,  if  they  are  lively  enough,  make  the  organ  of 
sense  incapable  of  the  reception  of  new  impres- 
sions ;  —  as,  for  example,  the  dazzling  images  which 
follow  looking  at  the  sun. 

§  7.  Certain  experiences  of  every-day  occurrence 
—  for  example,  the  observation  of  a  light  approach- 
ing, or  of  a  tone  dying  away  —  prove  that  we  are  in 
general  very  sensitive  to  minute  differences  in  the 
intensity  of  the  stimuli  of  sense.  But  this  remains 
a  mere  matter  of  degree,  greater  or  less ;  and  the 
moment  never  comes  when  we  could  say  that 
according  to  the  measure  afforded  by  immediate 
impression,  one  light  is  half  as  bright,  or  one  tone 
twice  as  loud,  as  another. 


14  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

The  above-mentioned  circumstance  prevents  us 
from  discovering  in  the  shortest  way  the  exact  law 
in  accordance  with  which  the  sensation  depends  on 
the  strength  of  the  stimulus.  It  is  true  that  we  can 
easily  establish  a  series  of  stimuli  whose  different 
intensities  admit  of  accurate  measurement  ;  but  we 
are  unable  to  assign  to  each  of  these  values,  on  the 
ground  of  introspection,  the  strength  of  the  sensation 
that  belongs  to  it,  in  numerical  terms  ;  and,  there- 
fore, we  are  also  unable  to  discover,  from  a  compari- 
son of  these  two  sets  of  values,  the  universal  law 
which  satisfies  them  all.  We  are  therefore  compelled 
to  employ  the  following  circuitous  method. 

That  is  to  say,  it  happens  sometimes,  although 
rarely,  that  we  are  uncertain  whether  two  impres- 
sions, a  and  p,  are  at  all  different  and  not  rather  of 
equal  intensity.  Now  since  in  any  case,  in  order 
that  they  may  appear  different  at  all,  the  stimulus 
which  forms  the  basis  of  one  must  be  greater  or 
less  than  the  stimulus  to  which  the  other  corre- 
sponds, the  question  may  be  raised  in  the  next  place  : 
How  large  must  be  the  difference  between  two  stim- 
uli (a  and  b)  of  the  same  kind,  in  order  that  the  two 
sensations  (a  and  p)  corresponding  to  them  may 
appear  '  just  observably  different ' }  and  further  :  Is 
this  difference  of  the  stimuli  (l)-a),  which  is  the 
necessary  condition  of  such  transition  from  the  sim- 


THE    LAW    OF    WEBER.  1 5 

ilarity  of  the  sensations  to  the  'just  observable  dif- 
ference '  in  their  intensity,  always  the  same,  or  does 
it  alter  with  the  increase  of  the  absolute  magnitude 
of  the  stimulus  ? 

According  to  the  fundamental  investigations  of 
Ernst  Heinrich  Weber,  which  have  since  been  con- 
firmed and  extended  by  many  others,  two  sensations 
are  distinguished  as  two  only  in  case  the  intensities 
of  both  the  stimuli  which  occasion  them  stand  in  a 
definite  geometrical  relation.  In  other  words  :  To 
a  certain  stimulus  a,  in  order  that  the  sensation  a, 
first  excited  by  it,  may  pass  over  into  a  sensation  p, 
whose  difference  from  the  former  is  just  observable, 
there  must  be  joined  an  increment  x  which  is  so 
much  the  greater,  the  greater  a  itself  already  is. 

This  relation  which  a  and  b  (or,  respectively,  a  and 
x)  must  sustain  to  the  result  in  question,  remains 
the  same  for  the  sensations  of  one  and  the  same 
sense ;  but,  of  course,  only  within  the  limits  be- 
tween stimuli  of  too  small  intensity,  which  do  not 
excite  the  nerve,  and  those  of  too  great  intensity, 
which  disturb  its  function.  On  the  contrary,  it  is 
different  for  different  senses  :  —  approximately  about 
3  : 4  for  hearing  and  for  mere  sensations  of  pressure 
on  the  skin  ;  15  :  i6  for  the  latter,  in  case  they  are  sup- 
plemented (when  the  weights  are  lifted)  by  muscular 
feeling  ;  100  :  loi  for  sensations  of  light. 


l6  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

§  8.  This  dependence  of  our  capacity  for  making 
distinctions  upon  the  relation,  in  respect  of  magni- 
tudes, of  the  stimuli,  which  has  been  directly  derived 
from  the  observations,  forms  the  content  of  the  so- 
called  "  Law  of  Weber." 

In  all  the  foregoing  the  question  remains  as  yet 
wholly  undecided,  in  what  way  precisely  this  relation 
in  the  magnitudes  of  the  stimuli  makes  us  capable 
of  distinguishing  the  resulting  impressions  :  that  is 
to  say,  whether  it  is  due  to  the  fact  that  stimuli  of 
different  intensity  produce  an  observably  different 
intensity  of  the  sensation,  while  its  kind  remains 
wholly  unchanged  ;  or  whether  it  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  different  '  intensities '  of  the  same  stimulus  be- 
get qualitatively  different  sensations,  which  are  then 
separated  by  us  just  according  to  their  differences 
of  quality. 

In  itself  considered,  every  sensation  is  a  single 
indivisible  act.  Now  it  is  undoubtedly  permissible 
for  us  to  separate  in  thought,  as  two  constituent 
parts  of  this  act,  the  qualitative  content  and  the 
intensity  with  which  this  content  is  experienced  ;  — 
this,  so  far  as  the  immediate  impression,  which  alone 
can  decide  the  point,  accords  therewith.  Such  is,  for 
example,  the  case  with  tones.  Here  we  may  actually 
convince  ourselves  that  a  tone  of  definite  pitch 
and    color  of  'clang'  can    sound    louder  or  weaker 


DISCUSSION    OF    WEBER's    LAW.  1/ 

without,  on  that  account,  altering  its  nature.  On 
the  contrary,  it  is  very  questionable  whether  the 
sensation  of  a  pressure  of  greater  intensity  is  really 
the  same  sensation  as  that  of  a  smaller  intensity, 
except  that  the  former  is  stronger  than  the  latter  ; 
further,  whether  the  taste  of  a  concentrated  acid  is 
really  the  same  taste  as  that  of  the  dilute  acid.  Much 
more  repugnant  still  is  immediate  feeling  toward  our 
considering  cold  as  merely  a  weaker  intensity  of 
heat.  Both  are  rather  at  opposite  poles,  although 
the  causes  of  their  production  are  similar  processes. 
Finally,  different  intensities  of  light  actually  have 
likewise  different  shades  of  colors ;  a  white  of  a  less 
intensity  of  brightness  is  not  merely  so,  but  it  has 
become  a  gray,  and  this  gray,  as  well  as  the  black, 
which  is  the  last  result,  cannot  possibly  be  regarded 
as  merely  a  feebler  sensation  of  the  white. 

The  foregoing  considerations  have  hitherto  not 
been  sufficiently  regarded ;  and  neither  have  they 
been  refuted.  What  further  is  now  to  be  adduced 
depends  upon  an  assumption  which  is  perhaps  cor- 
rect but  which  is  unproved  :  namely,  that  sensations 
become  distinguishable  because  their  intensities  vary 
according  to  a  fixed  standard. 

§  9.  We  have,  then,  in  the  first  place,  to  recognize 
the  truth  that  there  must  be  a  certain  small  magni- 


l8  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

tilde  of  stimulus  for  each  sense,  below  which  it  can- 
not fall  if  any  sensation  whatever  is  to  originate. 
Naturally  enough,  some  resistance,  by  which  the 
stimuli  of  too  small  intensity  are  kept  from  an  influ- 
ence on  the  soul,  is  assumed  in  order  to  explain  the 
above-mentioned  circumstance,  which  is  by  no  means 
a  matter  of  course.  But  where  such  resistance  is 
achieved,  as  it  were,  is  not  known. 

It  is  further  assumed,  that  the  transition  from  com- 
plete likeness  or  unobservable  difference  between 
two  impressions  to  a  difference  just  observable  is 
always  one  and  the  same  constant  increment  of 
the  intensity  of  the  sensation  (that  is,  of  the  sec- 
ond impression  compared  with  that  of  the  first)  ; 
and,  accordingly,  the  fineness  of  the  distinctions  may 
be  employed  as  a  measure  for  the  intensity  of  the 
sensations. 

The  question  may  then  be  asked :  How  must  the 
stimuli  increase,  in  order  that  the  transition  from 
one  of  its  values  to  another  may  invariably  result  in 
the  same  constant  increment  of  the  intensity  of  the 
sensation  .'* 

According  to  the  investigations  already  referred  to, 
the  foregoing  question  is  answered  as  follows :  If 
the  intensities  of  the  sensation  are  to  increase  by  a 
constant  difference,  and  therefore  in  an  arithmetical 
series,  the  intensities   of   the  stimuli  must  be  aug- 


DISCUSSION    OF    WEBER  S    LAW.  I9 


mented  much  more  rapidly,  that  is,  in  a  geometrical 
series.  Or  —  what  is  the  same  thing  —  the  relation 
of  the  first  to  the  second  is  comparable  to  the  rela- 
tion of  a  logarithm  to  the  number  of  which  it  is  the 
logarithm.  More  simply  expressed  ;  the  sensation 
belongs  to  those  achievements  or  activities  which 
are  always  to  be  raised  to  a  higher  degree  with 
the  more  difficulty  the  greater  the  intensity  with 
which  they  are  already  in  exercise. 

The  following  questions,  however,  still  remain  to 
be  answered  :  — 

(i)  Why  does  this  peculiar  relation  take  place  at 
all ;  and  why  does  not  the  sensation  rather  (a  thin  v 
which  would  be  much  more  natural)  increase  as  a 
simple  proportional  of  the  stimulus  ?  None  of  the 
theories  proposed  on  this  point  is  satisfactory  ;  but 
still  the  most  probable  is  the  assumption  that,  in  the 
transformation  of  the  external  stimulus  into  excita- 
tions of  the  nerves,  something  or  other  occurs  which 
causes  the  latter  to  augment  much  more  slowly  than 
the  external  stimuli  increase. 

(2)  But  how  does  it  come  about  that,  while  the 
stimulus  constantly  augments  in  intensity,  the  inten- 
sity of  the  sensation  increases  not  merely  in  a  much 
smaller  degree  but  also  only  discontinuously  .-'  Why 
are  not,  as  a  rule,  all  the  impressions  distinguished 
as    different }     How   does    it    come    about    that,  for 


20  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGV. 

example,  a  weight  3  must  increase  to  at  least  4  in 
order  to  give  a  new  sensation  of  pressure  ;  that,  on 
the  contrary,  it  gives  no  such  sensation,  if  it  is  only 
3J,  3J,  3|  ?  Something  in  itself  impossible  is  in- 
volved in  the  thought  that  a  force  which  increases 
constantly  should,  nevertheless,  furnish  the  occasion 
for  a  second  kind  of  action  only  by  sudden  incre- 
ments or  discontinuously  ;  and  if  not  thus,  then 
not  at  all.  There  are,  then,  doubtless  contrivances 
conceivable,  by  means  of  which  this  discontinuity 
of  the  sensation  could  be  produced.  But  we  have 
not  the  least  information  as  to  where  or  how,  in 
the  body  or  in  the  soul,  such  contrivances  do  in 
fact  exist. 

Both  these  riddles  are  therefore  wholly  unsolved. 

§  10.  It  may  perhaps  be  asserted  that  a  state  of 
rest,  or  an  excitation  maintained  with  complete  uni- 
formity, is  never  the  proximate  condition  of  a  sen- 
sation ;  but  that  such  condition  is  always  nothing 
but  the  transition  from  one  state  to  another. 

It  would  follow  from  the  foregoing  that  sensa- 
tions, such  as  we  might  have  last  during  a  con- 
siderable time, — for  example,  the  seeing  of  a  light 
or  the  hearing  of  a  tone,  —  must  depend  on  certain 
series  of  single  impulses  with  intervening  pauses  ; 
so  that  in  this  case  also  a  frequent  repetition  of  the 


CHANGE    NECESSARY    TO    SENSATION.  21 

alternation  between  excitation  and  non-excitation 
would  take  place.  For  sensations  of  light  and  sound 
this  admits  of  being  established  by  proof.  In  these 
cases,  to  be  sure,  every  single  flash  of  light,  or 
every  tone  however  brief,  depends  upon  a  consider- 
able number  of  such  discrete  impulses  which  are 
carried  to  the  organ  of  sense.  As  to  the  rest  of 
the  senses  we  lack  information. 

Now  if  the  above-mentioned  fact  is  expressed  as 
follows,  —  that  all  processes  of  excitation  which  are 
to  lead  to  sensations  must  have  this  form  of  oscil- 
lation between  two  opposite  states,  —  then  we  must 
at  least  not  add  the  statement  that  the  sensation 
itself  consists  in  the  recounting,  as  it  were,  of  these 
single  impulses.  In  these  impulses  we  can  never 
see  anything  but  the  matter-of-fact  condition  to 
which  the  originating  of  the  sensation  is  attached 
in  an  incomprehensible  way.  For  in  the  content  of 
the  sensation  itself,  in  the  red  or  the  warm,  we  per- 
ceive nothing  of  motions  whatever ;  and  still  less  of 
the  number  of  their  oscillations,  by  means  of  which 
they  become  the  causes  of  sensation. 

§  11.  If  the  same  excitation  a,  which  is  customarily 
effected  in  a  nerve  by  an  external  stimulus,  and  upon 
which  the  sensation  a  follows,  is  exceptionally  pro- 
duced by  a  stimulus  originated  in  the  interior  of  the 


22  OUTLINES    OF    FSVCHOLOGY. 

body  ;  then  the  same  sensation  a  follows  as  well. 
In  such  a  case  the  sensation  is  called  subjective. 
Common  examples  are  ringing  in  the  ears,  flashes 
of  light  before  the  eyes,  the  chill  and  flush  of  fever. 

In  connection  with  this,  the  so-called  principle 
of  the  "  Specific  Energy  of  the  Nerves  "  has  been 
laid  down,  according  to  which  every  individual  nerve 
of  sense,  by  whatsoever  means  it  may  have  been 
excited,  always  produces  the  same  sensation. 

If  the  fact  were  such,  it  would  not  be  very  won- 
derful. For  every  coherent  system  of  parts,  which 
is  disturbed  but  not  destroyed,  enters  upon  efforts 
at  the  re-establishment  of  its  equilibrium,  the  form 
of  which  depends  solely  upon  its  own  structure 
and  upon  the  connection  of  the  forces  effective  in 
it ;  and  such  system  is  not  altered  according  to 
the  variety  of  the  disturbing  stimuli.  But  in  order 
that  these  efforts  in  the  one  nerve  may  be  dis- 
tinguished from  those  in  every  other,  each  nerve 
must  have  its  own  special  structure,  —  a  matter  of 
which  we  as  yet  know  nothing. 

There  are  no  facts,  however,  such  as  it  is  intended 
to  explain  in  this  way.  We  merely  know  that 
the  stimulus  of  light,  impact  and  pressure,  the  pas- 
sage of  a  current  of  electricity  through  the  eye, 
awaken  the  sensation  of  light ;  and  perhaps  that 
impact    and    electricity  produce   also   the  sensation 


SPECIFIC    STIMULI    OF    SENSE.  23 


of  sound  ;  and  the  latter  also  the  sensation  of  taste. 
Now  a  motion  of  the  ponderable  parts  by  means 
of  impact  can  scarcely  take  place  in  the  tense 
eye-ball  without  a  part  of  this  motion  being  also 
converted  into  motions  of  the  ether  that  exists 
in  the  eye,  and  so  producing  a  motion  of  light, 
which  acts  as  adequate  stimulus  upon  the  nerve  of 
sight  in  precisely  the  same  way  as  if  it  came  from 
without.  Just  so  the  imparted  shocks  may  be 
changed  into  oscillations  of  the  tense  parts  and 
membranes,  which  are  then  normal  stimuli  for  the 
nerve  of  hearing  just  as  well  as  are  the  acoustic 
waves  that  come  from  without.  Finally,  it  is  quite 
certain  that  the  electrical  current  excites  chemical 
decomposition  of  the  fluids  of  the  mouth,  and  that 
the  adequate  stimulus  for  the  nerve  of  taste  consists 
in  this  directly.  It  is  still  possible  to  make  the 
following  assertion  :  In  order  that  a  nerve  may  be 
thrown  into  the  state  a,  upon  which  the  sensation 
a  follows,  a  definite  adequate  stimulus  is  always 
necessary ;  but  very  many  inadequate  stimuli,  in 
case  of  their  being  of  influence,  divide  into  dif- 
ferent components :  one  of  these  components  is 
then  the  adequate  stimulus  which  is  the  condition 
of  the  sensation  a;  and  the  others  become  objects 
of  perception  through  other  sensations  (for  example, 
the  pain  contemporaneous  with  the  impact). 


24  OUTLINES    OF    I'SYCHOLOGY. 

§  12.  The  influence  of  the  external  stimuli  does 
not  take  place  in  so  simple  a  manner  as  was  for- 
merly supposed  ;  in  such  manner,  for  example,  that 
the  waves  of  light  immediately  as  such  act  upon 
the  nerve  of  sight  and,  in  accordance  with  their 
nature,  awaken  all  possible  sensations  of  color  and 
light.  Instead  of  this  we  find  in  the  eye  certain 
layers  of  a  peculiar,  and  still  in  many  respects 
mysterious,  structure  (layers  of  rods  and  cones), 
which  seem  designed  to  transform  the  motion  of 
light  that  reaches  them  into  a  chemical  altera- 
tion of  a  special  substance  (visual  purple)  which, 
in  turn,  acts  as  the  primary  stimulus  upon  the 
nerve  of  sight.  Just  so  do  we  find  in  the  skin, 
and  in  the  tongue,  peculiarly  constructed  corpus- 
cles of  touch  and  corpuscles  of  taste,  which  first 
give  to  the  stimulus,  in  a  manner  as  yet  unknown, 
the  form  in  which  it  is  to  act  upon  the  nerves 
contained  in  them. 

In  the  organ  of  hearing  we  do  not  know  of  any- 
thing similar.  For  its  purpose,  however,  another 
form  of  contrivance  seems  to  have  been  hit  upon,  so 
that  each  single  nerve-fibre  is  susceptible  only  for  a 
single  tone.  The  entire  expansion  of  the  fibres  (upon 
the  organ  of  Corti)  would  therefore  be  comparable  to 
the  key-board  of  a  piano,  and  each  fibre  accessible 
only  to  a  definite  rate  of  the  vibration  of  the  waves. 


FUNDAMENTAL    COLORS.  2? 

^ : -^ 

The  phenomena  of  *  color-blindness  '  have  led  to 
a  similar  hypothesis  in  relation  to  the  eye.  It  is 
supposed  that  there  are  three  species  of  fibres,  each 
of  which,  when  stimulated  by  itself  alone,  causes 
the  sensation  of  one  of  the  three  fundamental  colors, 
—  green,  red,  and  violet.  From  the  synchronous 
excitation  of  the  fibres  of  different  species  the  other 
colors  are  then  supposed  to  arise.  This  hypoth- 
esis is  not  invented  gratuitously;  but,  as  was  just 
said,  it  has  a  reference  to  the  facts  of  color-blindness, 
which  it  is  designed  to  explain.  The  further  demand, 
however,  must  not  be  made,  —  namely,  to  see  into 
the  reason  why  a  definite  mixture  of  synchronous 
excitations  from  red,  green,  and  violet,  causes  the 
other  colors,  like  blue  and  yellow,  to  originate ; 
when  the  latter,  so  far  as  the  mere  immediate 
impression  of  sensation  is  concerned,  do  not  in  the 
least  degree  appear  deducible  from  the  former.      / 

§  13.  In  another  meaning  of  the  words,  a//  our 
sensations  are  only  'subjective';  that  is  to  say, 
only  phenomena  in  our  consciousness,  to  which 
nothing  in  the  external  world  corresponds.  Even  in 
antiquity  this  assertion  was  made ;  modern  physics 
further  completes  the  picture.  The  world  outside 
of  us  is  neither  still  nor  resonant,  neither  bright 
nor  dark ;  but    it  is    as    utterly  incomparable  to  all 


26  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

that  as  sweetness  is,  for  example,  to  a  line.  Noth- 
ing happens  outside  of  us  but  motions  of  various 
forms.  Finally,  physiology  often  expresses  the  fact 
in  the  following  inapt  terms  .  Sensations  are  merely 
perceptions  of  our  own  states.  But  what  takes  place 
in  the  nerves  while  we  are  seeing,  we  do  not  at  all 
perceive  ;  and  a  state  which,  within  our  own  soul, 
precedes  the  sensation  in  such  a  way  that  the  latter 
could  be  designated  as  the  perception  of  it,  is  also 
unknown  to  us.  We  can  therefore  simply  say : 
Sensations  are  phenomena  in  us  which,  although 
they  are  the  consequences  of  external  stimuli,  are 
not  copies  of  them. 

The  proofs,  however,  by  means  of  which  the 
effort  is  ordinarily  made  to  establish  the  foregoing 
principle,  all  admit  of  still  other  subterfuges.  It 
would  still  always  be  possible  to  assume,  that 
'  Things '  are  actually  red  or  sweet,  but  that  we 
could  of  course  only  know  this  in  case  they  caused 
motions  to  act  upon  us ;  which  motions  —  to 
be  sure  —  are  neither  red  nor  sweet,  and  yet  in 
the  last  result  cause  to  originate  in  our  soul,  as 
sensations,  the  same  redness  and  sweetness  which 
belong  as  properties  to  the  Things.  The  only  proof, 
in  the  last  analysis,  consists  in  this,  that  such  objec- 
tive properties  are  in  themselves  inconceivable.  In 
what  the  shining  of  a  light  which  absolutely  no  one 


SENSATIONS  AS  ATTRIBUTES.  2/ 

were  to  see,  or  the  sounding  of  a  tone  which  no  one 
were  to  hear,  could  consist,  is  just  as  impossible 
to  tell,  as  what  a  tooth-ache,  which  no  one  were  to 
have,  would  be. 

It  is  therefore  involved  in  the  nature  of  colors, 
tones,  smells,  etc.,  that  they  always  have  only 
one  place  and  one  way  where  and  how  they  can  by 
any  possibility  exist,  —  namely,  the  consciousness 
of  a  soul ;  and,  of  course,  only  at  the  moment  when 
they  are  experienced  by  this  soul. 


CHAPTER   II. 

THE    COURSE    OF    IDEAS, 

§  14.  'Ideas,'  in  contrast  to  'sensations,'  is  the 
name  primarily  given  to  those  images  of  memory 
arising  from  previous  sensations,  with  which  we  meet 
in  consciousness.  This  accords  with  the  usage  of 
speech ;  we  form  an  idea  of  what  is  absent,  of  what 
we  do  not  perceive  by  sense ;  but  we  perceive  by 
sense  what  is  present, — that  of  which,  on  just  that 
very  account,  we  do  not  need  to  form  an  idea. 
Ideas  have  their  peculiar  differences  from  sensa- 
tions. The  idea  of  the  brightest  radiance  does  not 
shine,  that  of  the  intensest  noise  does  not  sound, 
that  of  the  greatest  torture  produces  no  pain  ;  while 
all  this  is  true,  however,  the  idea  quite  accurately 
represents  the  radiance,  the  sound,  or  the  pain, 
which  it  does  not  actually  reproduce. 

§  15.  Even  in  the  aforesaid  form  the  images  of 
memory  derived  from  earlier  impressions  are  not 
always  present  in  consciousness,  but  only  tempo- 
rarily return  in  it ;  and  then  in  such  manner  that 
no  external  stimulus  was  necessary  in  order  to 
produce  them  anew. 


GROUND    OF    FORGETFULNESS,  29 

From  the  foregoing  facts  we  conclude,  that 
meantime  our  ideas  have  not  been  wholly  lost  to 
us,  but  have  been  transformed  into  some  kind  of 
'  unconscious  states,'  of  which  we,  of  course,  can 
give  no  description,  and  for  which  we  employ  the 
self-contradictory  but  convenient  name  of  'uncon- 
scious ideas,'  in  order  to  indicate  that  they  have 
originated  from  ideas  and,  under  certain  conditions, 
can  become  such  again.  A  theory  of  the  so-called 
'  course  of  ideas '  would  have  to  explain  both  the 
above-mentioned  events. 

§  16.  The  vanishing  of  ideas  out  of  conscious- 
ness no  one  can  observe :  concerning  this  matter 
we  can  speak  only  on  the  ground  of  conclusions 
from  what  we  subsequently  find  in  consciousness, 
or  on  the  ground  of  very  general  principles. 

Here  two  views  stand  opposed  to  each  other.  It 
was  formerly  held  that  the  vanishing  of  the  ideas 
is  natural,  and  the  opposite  of  this,  memory,  was 
believed  to  need  explanation.  The  analogy  of  the 
physical  law  of  inertia  is  now  followed,  and  forget- 
fulness  is  believed  to  need  explanation,  because  of 
itself  the  eternal  continuance  of  a  state  once  excited 
is  a  self-evident  affair. 

The  foregoing  analogy  is  not  without  weight.  It 
is  true  of  the  motion  of  bodies.     But  motion  is  only 


30  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


a  change  of  external  relations,  from  which  the  body 
moved  suffers  nothing,  for  it  exists  in  one  place 
exactly  as  well  as  in  another ;  and  it  has  therefore 
neither  a  reason  nor  a  standard  for  offering  resist- 
ance to  the  motion.  The  soul,  on  the  contrary, 
exists  in  different  inner  states,  according  as  it  has 
the  idea  a,  or  the  idea  b,  or  no  idea  at  all.  It  would 
therefore  be  conceivable  that  it  should  react  against 
each  impression  that  is  obtruded  upon  it,  and  should 
by  this  means  ])erhaps  have  the  power  to  transform 
this  impression  from  a  conscious  sensation  into 
an  unconscious  state,  although  never,  of  course, 
the  power  of  annulling  it. 

The  other  principle,  too,  which  in  itself  considered 
is  certainly  to  be  recognized,  —  namely,  that  it  is 
the  unity  of  the  soul,  which  necessitates  the  many 
ideas  to  reciprocal  action  in  such  manner  that  some 
of  them  supplant  the  others,  —  does  not  lead  us  to 
the  desired  end.  For  if  the  question  is  raised,  In 
what  way  then  shall  this  unity  of  the  soul  make 
itself  felt  upon  the  manifoldness  of  the  ideas.'  — 
then  the  most  probable  conjecture  would  be  this, 
that  it  fuses  all  the  qualitatively  different  sensations 
or  ideas  into  a  single  homogeneous  intermediate 
state.  This  does  not  happen,  however ;  but  the 
ideas,  —  for  example,  *  gold  '  and  '  blue  '  or  '  large  ' 
and  'small,'  —  which  have    once  arisen  as  different 


OPPOSITION    OF    IDEAS.  3I 

in  consciousness,  are  never  afterward  intermingled. 
It  is  also  obvious  that  every  higher  spiritual  produc- 
tion, which  consists  essentially  in  relations  between 
different  points  of  relation,  would  be  impossible,  if 
the  difference  in  the  points  to  be  related  were  made 
to  vanish  through  being  thus  thrown  together  into  a 
single  mixed  state. 

Nothing  else  is  therefore  left  for  us  but  to  con- 
sider the  following  thoughts  as  mere  hypotheses 
which  are  not  deducible  from  first  principles. 

§  17.  In  accordance  with  the  analogy  of  physi- 
cal mechanics,  the  ideas  are  considered  as  'forces' 
which  act  on  each  other  according  to  the  measure 
of  their  'opposition'  and  their  'intensity.'  Both 
parts  of  this  hypothesis  are  scarcely  to  be  estab- 
lished on  grounds  of  experience. 

In  the  first  place,  as  to  what  concerns  the  inten- 
sity, this  conception  is  certainly  applicable  to  sen- 
sations;  and,  indeed,  in  such  a  manner  that  the 
greater  content  of  the  sensation  is  at  all  times  a 
greater  achievement  of  the  activity  of  sensation, 
or  a  greater  commotion  and  affection  of  the  sentient 
subject.  But  the  bare  idea  of  a  bright  lustre  is  no 
greater  achievement  of  the  ideating  activity  than 
that  of  a  dull  glimmer  ;  and  that  of  thunder  demands 
no   greater    exertion    of  .this    activity  than    that    of 


32  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


the  slightest  whisper.  The  ideating  activity  there- 
fore appears  in  general  to  admit  of  no  differences 
in  intensity,  but  such  differences  appertain  wholly 
to  the  content  of  the  idea. 

Even  the  more  or  less  '  obscure '  ideas,  which 
we  think  we  have  of  one  and  the  same  content, 
produce  no  different  intensity  in  the  ideating  act. 
Simple  ideas,  which  we  believe  we  have  only  '  ob- 
scurely,'■ —  for  example,  that  of  the  taste  of  a  rare 
fruit,  —  we  do  not  have  at  all  ;  but  we  merely  know 
from  another  source  that  the  fruit  has  some  taste. 
Now  the  greater  the  scope  within  the  limits  of 
which  we  are  able  to  choose  between  different 
tastes,  yet  without  knowing  how  to  make  a  deci- 
sion, the  more  obscure  does  the  idea  of  the  actual 
taste  appear  to  us,  which  we  are  merely  seeking  for, 
but  do  not  possess.  Composite  ideas,  such  as  images 
of  external  objects  or  scientific  principles,  do  not 
become  '  obscure '  by  their  entire  content  being 
gradually  more  weakly  illuminated  ;  but  they  thus 
become  incomplete.  Single  factors  fail  wholly  ;  but 
especially  are  those  definite  combinations  forgotten, 
in  which  the  yet  remaining  factors  or  points  of  rela- 
tion stand.  Again,  the  greater  is  the  throng  of  pos- 
sible connections  between  which  we  are  wavering 
in  our  uncertainty ;  so  much  the  greater  is  the  so- 
called  obscurity  of  the  aforesaid  ideas.     Conversely, 


OPPOSITION    OF    IDEAS.  33 

arf  soon  as  an  idea  is  thought  of  completely,  with 
all  its  content  and  all  the  combinations  of  its  parts, 
it  is  then  no  longer  possible  mentally  to  represent 
it  with  a  greater  or  less  degree  of  intensity.  Only 
it  appears  to  receive  a  further  increment  of  clear- 
ness, —  for  example,  the  idea  of  a  triangle,  —  in  case 
a  throng  of  other  thoughts  are  connected  therewith 
in  the  experience  of  an  expert,  which  are  still  un- 
known to  the  beginner. 

§  18.  The  other  conception  applicable  in  this 
place,  that  of  opposition,  also  awakens  the  inquiry, 
whether  it  is  to  be  referred  to  the  content  of  the 
ideas  or  to  the  activities  by  which  they  are  mentally 
represented. 

The  two  things  are  not  coincident.  Ideas  in  gen- 
eral, never  are,  of  themselves,  that  which  they  sig- 
nify:  the  idea  of  what  is  red  is  not  a  red  idea;  the 
idea  of  what  is  triangular  is  not  triangular  ;  the  idea 
of  what  is  choleric  is  not  choleric.  If,  therefore, 
the  contents  of  two  ideas,  —  like  'right'  and  'left,' 
'plus'  and  'minus,'  'white'  and  'black,'  —  are  op- 
posed to  each  other,  it  does  not  in  the  least  degree 
follow  from  this,  that  the  ideating  activities  by 
which  they  are  produced  as  ideas  are  opposed  to 
each  other  in  the  same  way ;  and  that  they  must 
on  this  account,  as  a  matter  of  course,  hinder  each 


34  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

Other,  after  the  analogy  of  opposed  physical  motions 
or  forces. 

§  19.  Moreover,  the  conceptions  of  intensity  and 
opposition  could  serve  as  a  foundation  for  a  'psy- 
chical mechanics,'  in  a  self-evident  way,  only  in 
case  they  should  have  reference  to  the  ideating 
activities.     This  is  not  the  case. 

If  therefore  the  intensity  and  opposition  of  the 
content  ideated  were  the  decisive  conditions  for 
the  reciprocal  action  of  the  ideas,  we  should  be 
compelled  to  recognize  it  as  a  bare  fact.  Experi- 
ence does  not  establish  this.  The  idea  of  a  greater 
content  by  no  means  always  supplants  that  of  the 
smaller ;  on  the  contrary,  the  latter  itself  is  some- 
times in  a  position  to  suppress  the  sensation  from 
external  stimuli. 

But  ideas  never  make  their  appearance  in  a  soul 
which  does  nothing  else  besides  ;  on  the  contrary, 
there  is  also  connected  with  every  impression,  a 
somewhat  that  is  represented  in  idea  in  consequence 
of  this,  —  namely,  a  feeling  of  the  value  which 
the  impression  has  for  the  bodily  and  spiritual  well- 
being  of  the  percipient.  Such  feelings  of  pleasure 
and  pain  are  just  as  obviously  capable  of  a  grada- 
tion of  degrees  as  the  bare  act  of  mental  represen- 
tation is  incapable  of  this.     Now  according  to  the 


ASSOCIATION    OF    IDEAS.  35 

magnitude  of  this  proportion  of  feeling,  which  is 
moreover  extraordinarily  changeable  according  to 
the  variety  of  the  total  condition  in  which  the  soul 
is  at  the  time,  —  or,  briefly  said,  according  to  the 
degree  of  the  interest  which  an  idea  is,  for  mani- 
fold reasons,  able  to  awaken  at  each  moment,  —  its 
greater  or  less  power  is  directed  toward  the  sup- 
planting of  other  ideas.  And  it  is  only  in  this,  and 
not  in  an  original  property  which  it  might  be  sup- 
posed to  possess  as  a  mere  idea,  that  what  may 
be  called  its  '  iiitetisity  '  consists. 

§  20.  The  second  question  (§  15)  was  this:  How 
'  do  ideas  return  in  consciousness  t 

On  this  point  we  merely  know  that  an  idea  b 
very  often  returns  in  case  another  idea  a  has  been 
produced  in  consciousness. 

Now  however,  since  it  is  not  every  b  that  returns 
in  consequence  of  any  a  we  please,  there  must  be 
a  closer  connection  between  those  which  do  in  this 
way  recall  each  other,  than  between  those  which 
do  not.  Such  connection  is  called  'Association  ';  — 
a  mere  name  which  does  not  in  the  least  express 
by  what  means  the  connection  is  established.  In 
the  same  way  '  Reproduction '  is  a  mere  name  for 
the  fact  that  a  definite  a  brings  back  again  into 
consciousness  some  b  associated  with  it. 


36  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

But,  nevertheless,  the  conditions  can  be  studied 
under  which  both,  association  and  reproduction,  as 
a  matter  of  fact  take  place. 

The  two  classes  customarily  adduced  first,  accord- 
ing to  which  similar  ideas  on  the  one  hand,  and 
opposed  ideas  on  the  other  hand,  recall  each  other, 
it  is  found  difficult  to  establish  by  experience.  For 
it  cannot  well  be  said,  that  a  tone  or  a  color  recalls 
to  remembrance  all  other  tones  and  colors  in  a  more 
lively  way  than  it  recalls  any  other  ideas  whatever. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  things  opposed,  —  like  darkness 
to  light,  night  to  day,  plus  to  minus, — cause  each 
other  to  be  thought  of,  the  reason  does  not  lie  in 
such  opposition  alone,  but  in  the  special  value  which" 
it  has  for  our  life  or  for  particular  employments,  so 
that  we  are  on  this  account  reminded  by  one  of  the 
other. 

On  the  contrary,  it  is  quite  certain  that  the  third 
and  fourth  cases  do  occur ;  according  to  which,  on 
the  one  hand,  each  part  of  a  space-whole  reproduces 
the  remaining  parts  and  the  whole,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  parts  of  a  successive  whole  —  for  example, 
a  melody  —  recall  each  other  following  their  original 
order.  Examples  are  unnecessary.  It  also  appears 
unnecessary  to  reduce  the  third  case,  as  is  frequently 
done,  to  the  fourth,  because  (as  is  said)  even  the  per- 


ASSOCIATION    OF    IDEAS.  37 


ception  of  a  simultaneous  whole  happens  after  all  in 
the  way  of  a  succession ;  since  the  eye  with  its 
glance  runs  over  the  forms  and  gradually  becomes 
conscious  of  the  connection  of  each  point  with  the 
next.  We  certainly  do  attain  accurate  mental  images 
only  in  the  aforesaid  manner ;  still  it  is  not  to  be 
denied  that  even  an  instantaneous  apprehension  of 
mental  images  can  be  left  behind,  the  single  parts 
of  which  will  reproduce  each  other. 

We  may  therefore  summarize  all  the  facts  in  the 
following  way  :  Every  two  ideas,  whatever  their  con- 
tent may  be,  become  associated  in  case  they  are 
produced  either  simultaneously  or  immediately  (that 
is,  without  any  intermediate  member)  following  each 
other.  And  upon  this  fact  would  be  founded  with 
out  further  technicality  the  special  facility  with 
which  we  repeat  a  number  of  ideas  according  to 
their  series  but  not  outside  of  the  series. 

Finally,  if  we  designate  as  a  special  case  the 
'  immediate '  reproduction  with  which  a  is  again 
awakened  by  the  influence  of  a  new  stimulus  that 
produces  the  same  a,  then  we  are  to  consider  that 
the  second  a  could  not  be  distinguished  at  all 
from  the  first  as  a  repetition  of  it,  if  both  were 
completely  alike.  But  the  first,  which  is  re-awakened 
by  the   second,  reproduces  in   its  turn   the   idea   of 


38  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

the  concomitant  circumstances  under  which  it  was 
previously  perceived ;  and  these  are  different  from 
the  circumstances  of  the  present  moment.  There- 
fore the  recognition  of  the  same  a  depends  after 
all  on  '  mediated  '  reproduction,  —  that  is,  reproduc- 
tion of  other  ideas  tJirongJi  a. 

§  21.  In  the  case  of  most  ideas,  each  has  become 
associated  in  the  course  of  life  with  very  many  others 
in  the  same  way.  If,  therefore,  a  definite  f  has 
returned  again  in  consciousness,  it  still  remains  quite 
undecided  which  of  the  many  other  ideas,  g,  h,  i,  k, 
has  just  now  reproduced  it,  since  it  was  previously 
connected  with  them  all.  The  grounds  for  the  deci- 
sion of  this  point  will  generally  lie,  partly  in  the 
course  which  the  ideas  before  f  have  taken,  and  into 
the  connection  of  which  g,  h,  i,  k,  do  not  all  fit  equally 
well ;  partly  in  our  common  feeling  or  the  mood 
in  which  we  are  at  each  moment  as  respects  the 
vitality  or  the  restraints  of  our  whole  existence ; 
and  finally,  partly  in  special  conditions  of  our  cor- 
poreal life,  that  are  to  be  altogether  excluded  from 
this  part  of  the  discussion,  but  of  which  we  shall 
speak  later  on. 

The  foregoing  points  of  view  only  admit  of  being 
brought  forward  in  a  general  way.     On  the  contrary, 


ASSOCIATION    OF    IDEAS.  39 

it  is  impossible  to  form  a  theory  from  them  which 
enters  into  particulars ;  and  just  as  impossible  in 
any  single  case  really  to  demonstrate  the  reasons 
which  have  in  fact  led  to  the  course  of  our  thoughts, 
appearing  often  so  capricious  as  it  does. 


CHAPTER    III. 

THE    ACT    OF    RELATIVE    KNOWLEDGE    AND 
ATTENTION. 

§  22.  Thus  far  wc  have  spoken  of  the  relations 
and  interchange  of  ideas.  There  is  in  our  interior 
Hfe,  however,  besides  this,  a  mental  representation 
of  these  relations  and  of  this  interchange. 

The  two  are  very  different  things.  We  know  that 
if  the  idea  of  'blue,'  and  at  the  same  time  that  of 
red,  originates  within  us,  the  two  by  no  means  min- 
gle and  produce  'violet.'  Were  this,  however,  to 
happen,  then  a  third  simple  idea  would  merely  have 
taken  the  place  of  the  two  others,  and  a  compar- 
ison of  these  two  would  have  been  made  impos- 
sible by  their  vanishing.  Every  comparison,  and  in 
general  every  relation  between  two  elements  (in  this 
case,  red  and  blue),  presupposes  that  both  points 
of  relation  remain  separate,  and  that  an  ideating 
activity  passes  over  from  the  one  a  to  the  other 
b,  and  at  the  same  time  becomes  conscious  of  that 
alteration  which  it  has  experienced  in  this  transi- 
tion from  the  act  of  forming  the  idea  of  a  to  that 
of  forming  b. 


THE    IDEA    OF    "LIKENESS.  4I 


Such  an  activity  do  we  exercise  in  case  we  com- 
pare red  and  blue  ;  and  thereupon  there  originates 
in  us  the  new  idea  of  a  qualitative  similarity  which 
we  ascribe  to  both. 

If  at  the  same  time  a  strong  and  a  weak  light 
are  perceived,  then  the  sensation  therefrom  is  not 
that  of  a  single  light  which  might  be  the  sum  of 
both  ;  both  rather  remain  separate ;  and  again  on 
passing  from  one  to  the  other,  we  become  conscious 
of  another  alteration  in  our  state,  —  namely,  that 
of  the  merely  quantitative  more  or  less  of  one  and 
the  same  impression. 

Finally,  if  two  quite  similar  impressions  have 
been  able  to  originate  as  distinct  ideas  within  us, 
then  they  no  longer  fuse  into  a  third  ;  but  when 
we  compare  them  in  the  foregoing  way  and,  on  the 
transition  from  one  to  the  other,  become  conscious 
of  no  alteration  of  our  mental  representation,  the 
new  idea  of  '  Likeness  '  originates  in  our  minds. 

§  23.  It  is  important  to  make  it  obvious  that  all 
these  new  ideas,  which  we  may  designate  as  ideas 
of  a  higher  order,  by  no  means  arise  as  result- 
ants from  a  mere  reciprocal  action  of  the  original 
simple  ideas,  in  the  same  way  as  a  third  motion  is 
constructed  in  mechanics  from  the  coincidence  of 
two  others. 


42  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

The  foregoing  analogy  by  no  means  holds  good  in 
the  spiritual  domain.  The  rather  are  both  the  im- 
pressions a  and  b  always  to  be  regarded  merely 
as  stimuli,  that  act  upon  the  entire  peculiar  and 
'  monadic  '  nature  of  an  ideating  subject,  and  stir 
up  as  a  reaction  in  this  subject  the  activity  by 
means  of  which  the  new  ideas,  —  for  example,  of 
similarity,  likeness,  contrast,  etc.,  —  originate  ;  nor 
would  such  ideas,  without  the  excitation  of  this 
new  spiritual  activity,  originate  from  the  mere 
co-working   of    the    single   impressions. 

§  24.  In  the  same  manner  as  the  aforesaid  new 
ideas  does  all  that  originate  which  we  designate  as 
'  general  notions.' 

It  is  customary  to  assert  that  those  factors  of  the 
ideas  compared,  which  arc  of  unlike  kind,  annul  each 
other  by  their  opposition,  and  that  the  remainder 
which  is  of  like  kind  then,  of  itself  alone,  exhibits 
the  so-called  "general  "  factor. 

But  the  single  examples  from  which  we  form  a 
general  notion  by  no  means  perish  thereupon  ;  on 
the  contrary,  their  ideas  continue  to  maintain  them- 
selves side  by  side  with  the  general  one,  which  is 
merely  added  to  them  as  a  new  product.  The  gen- 
eral notion  also  never  constitutes  anything  which 
admits  of    being    mentally  represented    in    intuitive 


NATURE  OF  GENERAL  NOTIONS.         43 

form,  as  a  definite  image,  in  the  same  way  as  do  the 
individual  examples  from  which  it  originated.  Thus 
'  color  in  general '  is  not  representable  by  an  idea ; 
it  looks  neither  green  nor  red,  but  has  no  look 
whatever.  And  just  so  there  is  no  definite  and 
fixed  mental  image  whatever  of  animal  in  general, 
having  an  intuitive  character  similar  to  the  image 
of  each  individual  species  of   animal. 

All  such  general  notions,  therefore,  are  not  prod- 
ucts of  a  cooperation  of  many  individual  ideas ;  for 
in  that  case  they  would  have  the  same  character  as 
do  these  their  components.  The  names  by  which 
we  designate  them  —  for  example,  '  colors  '  —  are, 
strictly  speaking,  nothing  more  than  demands  made 
upon  us  mentally  to  represent  a  series  of  different 
individual  impressions  ;  though  with  the  adjunct 
thought  that  what  is  contained  in  them  belongs  not 
to  them,  but  to  what  they  have  in  common,  and  yet 
does  not  admit  of  being  separated  from  them  as  an 
idea  of  like  kind. 

§  25.  The  different  narrower  and  broader  mean- 
ings of  the  term  Cousciousjiess  are  connected  with 
the  foregoing  subject. 

It  often  happens  that  we  perceive  a  multiplicity  of 
elements,  but  still  do  not  at  the  instant  know  how 
to  specify  the  definite  relations  between  them.     On 


44  OUTLINKS    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

the  other  hand,  it  is  {possible  subsequently  to  become 
conscious  of  the  relations,  after  the  aforesaid  sen- 
suous impressions  are  already  past.  It  follows  from 
this  that  these  impressions  themselves  are  by  no 
means  uncojisciotts  ;  otherwise  they  would  not  sub- 
sequently be  remembered.  On  the  contrary,  the 
relating  activity  of  the  mind,  which  enumerates 
them  and  also  mentally  represents  the  relations 
that  actually  exist  between  them,  has  not  been 
exercised. 

We  see  from  this  that  the  two  operations  are 
separable  from  each  other :  the  relating  activity 
can  never  originate  as  a  higher  form  without  the 
simple  conscious  sensation  to  which  it  is  related  ; 
but  the  latter,  as  the  lower  form,  does  not  need  to 
be  accompanied  by  the  former. 

Ordinary  experiences  show  that  there  are  ver} 
many  circumstances  which  hinder  the  appearance 
of  this  higher  activity.  In  the  case  of  manifold 
movements  of  the  mind,  we  hear  the  tones  but  do 
not  understand  the  words  ;  or  understand  the  words 
but  not  their  meaning ;  or,  finally,  this  too,  but 
nothing  of  the  significance  which  it  has  for  our 
interests.  Even  bodily  conditions,  of  which  we  yet 
know  almost  nothing,  bring  it  about  that  the  matter 
stops  with  the  mere  sensation  of  impressions  :  and 
neither    their    external     and     intuitive,    nor     their 


DEGREES    OF    ATTENTION.  45 


interior,  connection  comes  into  consciousness  (^  sonl- 
blindncss '). 

§  26.  What  we  have  here  depicted  is,  funda- 
mentally considered,  nothing  else  but  the  series  of 
different  degrees  of  Attention. 

This  was  formerly  considered  as  an  activity  exer- 
cised by  the  spirit,  which,  like  a  light  waxing  and 
waning,  illumines  to  greater  clearness  the  of  them- 
selves unconscious  impressions.  Later  (Herbart) 
this  thought  of  an  activity  has  been  wholly  aban- 
doned :  and  it  has  been  supposed  that  the  sentence, 
"we  are  attentive  to  something,"  only  signifies: 
The  idea  of  this  something  rises  into  our  conscious- 
ness by  its  own  strength. 

We  cannot  accede  to  this  latter  assumption  ;  but 
just  as  little  do  we  understand  attention  to  be 
merely  a  stronger  illumination  of  a  given  content. 
By  attention  we  gain  something  merely  in  case  the 
content  mentally  represented  gives  occasion  for  its 
work  to  our  relating  and  comparing  faculty  of 
knowledge.  Even  an  altogether  simple  content  is 
at  least  compared  by  us  with  other  simple  contents, 
or  with  itself  at  different  moments  of  its  duration. 
If  we  disregard  this  fact,  then  the  mere  persistence 
of  the  content,  with  whatever  intensity  it  may 
occur,  is  of   absolutely  no  help  to  us. 


46  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

It  is  understood,  finally,  that  this  relation  of  one 
content  to  another  can  be  carried  further  at  pleas- 
ure. We  can  therefore  certainly  distinguish  yet 
other  different  degrees  of  consciousness  concerning 
the  content  of  an  idea  ;  —  and  this  according  as  we 
mentally  represent  merely  the  idea  itself  and  its 
own  nature,  or  its  connection  with  other  ideas,  or, 
finally,  its  value  and  significance  for  the  totality  of 
our  personal  life. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

THE    INTUITIONS    OF    SPACE. 

§  27.  Metaphysic  raises  the  doubt,  whether  space 
is  actually  extended  and  we,  together  with  '  Things,' 
are  contained  in  it;  whether  —  just  the  reverse  — 
the  whole  spatial  world  is  not  rather  only  a  form 
of  intuition  in  us. 

This  question  we  for  the  present  leave  one  side, 
and  in  the  meantime  take  our  point  of  departure 
from  the  assumption,  previously  alluded  to,  with 
which  we  are  all  conversant.  But  since  Things  in 
space  can  never  become  the  object  of  our  per- 
ception by  virtue  of  their  bare  existence,  and,  on 
the  contrary,  become  such  solely  through  the 
effects  which  they  exercise  upon  us,  the  question 
arises :  How  do  the  Things  by  their  influence 
upon  us  bring  it  to  pass,  that  we  are  compelled 
mentally  to  represent  them  in  the  same  reciprocal 
position  in  space,  in  which  they  actually  exist 
outside  of  us .-' 

§  28.  In  the  case  of  the  eye,  nature  has  devised  a 
painstaking  structure,  such  that  the  rays  of  light 
which    come   from    a   luminous    point   are    collected 


48  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY, 

again  at  one  point  on  the  retina,  and  that  the  differ- 
ent points  of  the  image,  which  originate  here,  assume 
the  same  reciprocal  relation  toward  one  another  as 
the  points  of  the  object  outside  of  us,  to  which  they 
correspond.  Without  doubt,  this  so-called  '  image  of 
the  object,'  so  carefully  prepared,  is  an  indispensable 
condition  of  our  being  able  mentally  to  present  the 
object  in  its  true  form  and  position.  But  it  is  the 
source  of  all  the  errors  in  this  matter,  to  believe  that 
the  bare  existence  of  this  image,  without  anything 
else,  explains  our  idea  of  the  position  of  its  parts. 
The  entire  image  is  essentially  nothing  but  a  repre- 
sentative of  the  external  object,  transposed  into  the 
interior  of  the  organ  of  sense  ;  and  how  we  know 
and  experience  aught  of  it,  is  now  just  as  much  the 
question  as  the  question  previously  was,  —  How  can 
we  perceive  the  external  object .'' 

§  29.  If  one  wished  to  conceive  of  the  soul  itself 
as  an  extended  being,  then  the  impressions  on  the 
retina  would,  of  course,  be  able  to  transplant  them- 
selves, with  all  their  geometrical  regularity,  to  the 
soul.  One  point  of  the  soul  would  be  excited  as 
green,  the  other  red,  a  third  yellow  ;  and  these  three 
would  lie  at  the  corners  of  a  triangle  precisely  in  the 
same  way  as  the  three  corresponding  excitations  on 
the  retina. 


EXTENSION    IN    THE    SOUL.  49 


It  is  also  obvious,  however,  that  there  is  no  real 
eain  in  all  this.  The  bare  fact  that  three  differ- 
ent  points  of  the  soul  are  excited  is,  primarily,  a  dis- 
connected three-fold  fact.  A  knowledge  thereof, 
however,  and  therefore  a  knowledge  of  this  three-fold- 
ness,  and  of  the  reciprocal  positions  of  the  three 
points,  is,  nevertheless,  by  no  means  given  in  this 
way  :  but  such  knowledge  could  be  brought  about 
only  by  means  of  a  uniting  and  relating  activity; 
and  this  itself,  like  every  activity,  would  be  per- 
fectly foreign  to  all  predicates  of  extension  and 
magnitudes  in  space. 

§  30.  The  same  thought  is  more  immediately  obvi- 
ous if  we  surrender  this  useless  notion  of  the  soul 
being  extended,  and  consider  it  as  a  supersensible 
essence,  which,  in  case  we  wish  to  bring  it  at  all 
into  connection  with  spatial  determinations,  could 
be  represented  only  as  an  indivisible  point. 

On  making  the  transition  into  this  indivisible 
point,  the  manifold  impressions  must  obviously  lose 
all  the  geometrical  relations  which  they  might  still 
have  upon  the  extended  retina, — just  in  the  same 
way  as  the  rays  of  light,  which  converge  at  the 
single  focus  of  a  lens,  are  not  side  by  side  with  one 
another,  but  only  all  together,  in  this  point.  Beyond 
the  focus,  the  rays  diverge  in  the  same  order  as  that 


50  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

in  which  they  entered  it.  Nothing  analogous  to 
this,  however,  happens  in  our  consciousness  ;  that 
is  to  say,  the  many  impressions,  which  were  pre- 
viously side  by  side  with  one  another,  do  not  actually 
again  separate  from  each  other ;  but,  instead  of  this, 
the  aforesaid  activity  of  mental  presentation  simply 
occurs,  and  it  transposes  their  images  to  different 
places  in  the  space  that  is  only  '  intuited  '  by  it. 

Here,  too,  the  previous  observation  holds  good : 
The  mental  presentation  is  not  that  which  it  pre- 
sents ;  and  the  idea  of  a  point  on  the  left  does  not  lie 
on  the  left  of  the  idea  of  a  point  on  the  right ;  but  of 
one  mental  presentation,  which  in  itself  has  no  spa- 
tial properties  whatever,  both  points  are  merely 
themselves  so  presented  before  the  mind,  as  though 
one  lay  to  the  left,  the  other  to  the  right. 

§  31.  The  following  result  now  stands  before  us  : 
Many  impressions  exist  conjointly  in  the  soul,  al- 
though not  spatially  side  by  side  with  one  another; 
but  they  are  merely  together  in  the  same  way  as  the 
synchronous  tones  of  a  chord  ;  that  is  to  say,  quali- 
tatively different,  but  not  side  by  side  with,  above 
or  below,  one  another.  Notwithstanding,  the  mental 
presentation  of  a  spatial  order  must  be  produced 
again  from  these  impressions.  The  question  is, 
therefore,  in  the  first  place,  to  be   raised  :   How  in 


ORIGIN    OF    SPATIAL    CONCEPTS.  5 1 

general  does  the  soul  come  to  apprehend  these 
impressions,  not  in  the  form  in  which  they  actually 
are,  —  to  wit,  non-spatial,  —  but  as  they  are  not,  in 
a  spatial  juxtaposition? 

The  satisfactory  reason  obviously  cannot  lie  in  the 
impressions  themselves,  but  must  lie  solely  in  the 
nature  of  the  soul  in  which  they  appear,  and  upon 
which  they  themselves  act  simply  as  stimuli. 

On  this  account,  it  is  customary  to  ascribe  to  the 
soul  this  tendency  to  form  an  intuition  of  space,  as 
an  originally  inborn  capacity.  And  indeed  we  are 
compelled  to  rest  satisfied  with  this.  All  the  '  deduc- 
tions '  of  space,  hitherto  attempted,  which  have  tried 
to  show  on  what  ground  it  is  necessary  to  the  nature 
of  the  soul  to  develop  this  intuition  of  space,  have 
utterly  failed  of  success.  Nor  is  there  any  reason  to 
complain  over  this  matter  ;  for  the  simplest  modes  of 
the  experience  of  the  soul  must  always  merely  be 
recognized  as  given  facts, — just  as,  for  example, 
no  one  seriously  asks  why  we  only  hear,  and  do 
not  rather  taste,  the  waves  of  air. 

§  32.  The  second  question  is  much  more  impor- 
tant. Let  it  be  assumed  that  the  soul  once  for  all 
lies  under  the  necessity  of  mentally  presenting  a 
certain  manifold  as  in  juxtaposition  in  space ;  How 
does  it  come  to  localize  every  individual  impression 


52  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

at  a  definite  j^lacc  in  the  space  intuited  by  it,  in  such 
manner  that  the  entire  image  thus  intuited  is  similar 
to  the  external  object  which  acted  on  the  eye? 

Obviously,  such  a  clue  must  lie  in  the  impressions 
themselves.  The  simple  quality  of  the  sensation 
'  green  '  or  '  red  '  does  not,  however,  contain  it ;  for 
every  such  color  can  in  turn  appear  at  every  point  in 
space,  and  on  this  account  does  not,  of  itself,  require 
always  to  be  referred  to  the  one  definite  point. 

We  now  remind  ourselves,  however,  that  the  care- 
fulness with  which  the  regular  position  on  the  retina 
of  the  particular  excitations  is  secured,  cannot  be 
without  a  purpose.  To  be  sure,  an  impression  is 
not  scat  at  a  definite  point  on  account  of  its  being 
situated  at  such  point  ;  but  it  may  perhaps  by 
means  of  this  definite  situation  act  on  the  soul 
otherwise  than  if  it  were  elsewhere  situated. 

Accordingly  we  conceive  of  this  in  the  follow- 
ing way  :  Every  impression  of  color  r  —  for  exam- 
ple, red  —  produces  on  all  places  of  the  retina, 
which  it  reaches,  the  same  sensation  of  redness. 
In  addition  to  this,  however,  it  produces  on  each 
of  these  different  places,  a,  b,  c,  a  certain  accessory 
impression,  a,  p,  7,  which  is  independent  of  the 
nature  of  the  color  seen,  and  dependent  merely 
on  the  nature  of  the  place  excited.  This  second 
local  impression  would  therefore  be  associated  with 


THEORY    OF    LOCAL    SIGNS.  53 

every  impression  of  color  r,  in  such  manner  that 
ra  signifies  a  red  that  acts  on  the  point  a,  rp  sig- 
nifies the  same  red  in  case  it  acts  on  the  point  b. 
These  associated  accessory  impressions  would,  ac- 
cordingly, render  for  the  soul  the  clue,  by  following 
which  it  transposes  the  same  red,  now  to  one,  now 
to  another  spot,  or  simultaneously  to  different  spots 
in  the  space  intuited  by  it. 

In  order,  however,  that  this  may  take  place  in  a 
methodical  way,  these  accessory  impressions  must 
be  completely  different  from  the  main  impressions, 
the  colors,  and  must  not  disturb  the  latter.  They 
must  be,  however,  not  merely  of  the  same  kind 
among  themselves,  but  wholly  definite  members  of 
a  series  or  a  system  of  series  ;  so  that  for  every 
impression  r  there  may  be  assigned,  by  the  aid  of 
this  adjoined  'local  sign,'  not  merely  a  particular, 
but  a  quite  definite  spot  among  all  the  rest  of  the 
impressions. 

§  33.  The  foregoing  is  the  theory  of  'Local 
Signs'  Their  fundamental  thought  consists  in  this, 
that  all  spatial  differences  and  relations  among  the 
impressions  on  the  retina  must  be  compensated  for 
by  corresponding  non-spatial  and  merely  intensive 
relations  among  the  impressions  which  exist  to- 
gether without    space-form    in    the    soul  ;    and    that 


54  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

from  them  in  reverse  order  there  must  arise,  not 
a  new  actual  arrangement  of  these  impressions 
in  extension,  but  only  the  mental  presentation  of 
such  an  arrangement  in  us.  To  such  an  extent  do 
we  hold  this  principle  to  be  a  necessary  one. 

On  the  contrary,  only  hypotheses  are  possible  in 
order  to  answer  the  question.  In  what  do  those 
accessory  impressions  requisite  consist,  so  far  as 
the  sense  of  sight  is  concerned  ?  We  propose  the 
following  conjecture  :  — 

In  case  a  bright  light  falls  upon  a  lateral  part 
of  the  retina,  on  which — as  is  well  known — the 
sensitiveness  to  impressions  is  more  obtuse  than 
in  the  middle  of  the  retina,  then  there  follows  a 
rotation  of  the  eye  until  the  most  sensitive  middle 
part  of  the  retina,  as  the  receptive  organ,  is  brought 
beneath  this  light :  we  are  accustomed  to  style 
this  the  "fixation  of  vision"  upon  the  aforesaid 
light.  Such  motion  happens  involuntarily,  without 
any  original  cognition  of  its  purpose,  and  uniformly 
without  cognition  of  the  means  by  which  it  is 
brought  about.  We  may  therefore  reckon  it  among 
the  so-called  reflex  motions,  which  originate  by 
means  of  an  excitation  of  one  nerve,  that  serves  at 
other  times  for  sensation,  being  transplanted  to 
motor  nerves  without  any  further  assistance  from 
the  soul  and  in  accordance  with  the  pre-existing  ana- 


THEORY    OF    LOCAL    SIGNS.  55 

tomical  connections  ;  and  these  latter  nerves  being 
therefore  stimulated  to  execute  a  definite  motion  in 
a  perfectly  mechanical  way.  Now  in  order  to 
execute  such  a  rotation  of  the  eye  as  serves  the 
purpose  previously  alluded  to,  every  single  spot 
in  the  retina,  in  case  it  is  stimulated,  must  occasion 
a  magnitude  and  direction  of  the  aforesaid  rota- 
tion peculiar  to  it  alone.  But  at  the  same  time  all 
these  rotations  of  the  eye  would  be  perfectly  com- 
parable motions,  and,  of  course,  members  of  a 
system  of  series  that  are  graded  according  to  mag- 
nitude and  direction. 

§  34.  The  application  of  the  foregoing  hypothesis 
(many  more  minute  particular  questions  being  dis- 
regarded) we  conceive  of  as  follows  :  —  In  case  a 
bright  light  falls  upon  a  lateral  point  P  of  a  retina, 
which  has  not  yet  had  any  sensation  of  light  what- 
ever, then  there  arises,  in  consequence  of  the  con- 
nection in  the  excitation  of  the  nerves,  such  a  rota- 
tion of  the  eye  as  that,  instead  of  the  place  P, 
the  place  E  of  clearest  vision  is  brought  beneath 
the  approaching  stimulus  of  the  light.  Now  while 
the  eye  is  passing  through  the  arc  PE,  the  soul 
receives  at  each  instant  a  feeling  of  its  momentary 
position,  —  a  feeling  of  the  same  kind  as  that  by 
which  we   are,  when  in  the  dark,  informed  of  the 


56  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

position  of  our  limbs.  To  the  arc  PE  there  corre- 
sponds then  a  series  of  constantly  changing  feelings 
of  position,  the  first  member  of  which  we  call  ir, 
and  the  last  of  which  we  call  i. 

If  now,  in  a  second  instance,  the  place  P  is  again 
stimulated  by  the  light,  then  there  originates  not 
simply  the  rotation  PE  for  a  second  time,  but  the 
initial  member  of  the  series  of  feelings  of  position, 
IT,  reproduces  in  memory  the  entire  series  asso- 
ciated with  it,  irt;  and  this  series  of  mental  pre- 
sentations is  independent  of  the  fact  that  at  the 
same  time  also  the  rotation  of  the  eye  PE  actually 
follows. 

Exactly  the  same  thing  would  hold  good  of 
another  point  R ;  only  the  arc  RE,  the  series  of 
feelings  pe,  and  also  the  initial  member  of  the  series, 
P,  would  have  other  values. 

Now  finally,  in  case  it  came  about  that  both 
places,  P  and  R,  were  simultaneously  stimulated 
with  an  equal  intensity,  and  that  the  arcs  PE  and 
RE  were  equal  but  in  opposite  directions  to  each 
other,  then  the  actual  rotation  of  the  eye  PE  and 
RE  could  not  take  place  ;  on  the  other  hand,  the 
excitation  upon  the  places  P  and  R  is  nevertheless 
not  without  effect ;  each  reproduces  the  series  of 
feelings  of  position  belonging  to  it,  —  respectively, 
w€   and    p€.     Although    therefore    the   eye   does   not 


THEORY    OF    LOCAL    SIGNS.  $7 

now  move,  yet  there  is  connected  with  every  exci- 
tation of  the  places  P  and  R  the  mental  presen- 
tation  of  the  magnitude  and  of  the  qualitative 
peculiarity  of  a  series  of  changes,  which  conscious- 
ness or  the  common  feeling  would  have  to  expe- 
rience, in  order  that  these  excitations  may  fall  upon 
the  place  of  clearest  vision,  or,  according  to  the 
customary  expression,  in  the  line  of  vision. 

And  now  we  assert  that  to  see  anything  'to  the 
right  'or  'to  the  left '  of  this  line  of  vision  means 
nothing  more  than  this,  to  be  conscious  of  the 
magnitude  of  the  achievement  which  would  be 
necessary  to  bring  the  object  into  this  line. 

§  35.  By  the  foregoing  considerations  nothing 
further  would  be  established  than  the  relative 
position  of  the  single  colored  points  in  the  field  of 
vision.  The  entire  image,  on  the  contrary,  would 
still  have  no  place  at  all  in  a  yet  larger  space  ; 
indeed,  even  the  mental  presentation  of  such  a 
place  would  as  yet  have  no  existence. 

Now  this  image  first  attains  a  place  with  refer- 
ence to  the  eye,  the  repeated  opening  and  clos- 
ing of  which,  since  it  can  become  known  to  us  in 
another  way,  is  the  condition  of  its  existence  or 
non-existence.  That  is  to  say,  the  visible  world 
is   in  front  before    our   eyes.     What   is    behind    us 


58  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

not  merely  has  no  existence  whatever  for  us,  but 
we  do  not  once  know  that  there  is  anything  which 
should  be  called  '  behind.' 

The  motions  of  the  body  lead  us  further.  If  the 
field  of  vision  in  a  position  of  rest  contains  from 
left  to  right  the  images  a  be,  and  we  then  turn 
ourselves  to  the  right  upon  our  axis,  a  vanishes, 
but  d  appears  on  the  right,  and  therefore  the  images 
bed,  ede,  def,  .  .  .  xyz,  yza,  zab,  a  be,  succeed  in 
order.  As  a  result  of  such  recurrence  of  the  images 
with  which  we  began,  the  two  following  thoughts 
originate  ;  namely,  that  the  visible  world  of  objects 
exists  in  a  closed  circuit  of  extension  about  us,  and 
that  the  alteration  of  our  own  position,  which 
we  perceive  by  means  of  the  changing  feelings  of 
position  while  turning,  depends  upon  an  alteration 
of  our  relation  to  this  immovable  world  of  objects, — 
that  is  to  say,  upon  a  motion. 

It  is  easily  understood  that  the  mental  picture 
of  a  spherical  extension  originates  from  the  afore- 
said mental  picture  of  a  closed  horizon  by  means 
of  repeatedly  turning  in  a  similar  way  in  various 
other  directions. 

§  36.  But,  nevertheless,  this  spl^erical  surface  also 
would  always  have  only  a  superficial  extension ; 
no  intimation  would  as  yet  exist  of  a  deptJi  to  space. 


KNOWLEDGE    OF    A    THIRD    DIMExNSION.  59 


Now  the  mental  presentation,  to  the  effect  that 
something  like  a  third  dimension  of  space  in  general 
exists,  cannot  originate  of  itself,  but  only  through 
the  experience  which  we  have  in  case  we  move 
about  among  the  visible  objects.  From  the  manifold 
displacements  which  the  particular  visual  images 
experience,  in  a  manner  that  is  tedious  to  describe 
but  very  easy  to  imagine,  we  gain  the  impression, 
that  each  line  in  an  image  originally  seen  is  the 
beginning  of  new  surfaces  which  do  not  coincide 
with  that  previously  seen,  but  which  lead  out  into 
this  space,  now  extended  on  all  sides,  to  greater 
or  less  distances  from  the  line. 

Another  question  to  be  treated  subsequently  is 
this:  By  what  means  do  we  estimate  the  different 
magnitudes  of  the  distance  into  this  depth  of 
space } 

§  37.  The  crossing  of  the  rays  of  light  in  the  nar- 
row opening  of  the  pupil  is  the  cause  of  the  image  of 
the  upper  points  of  the  object  being  formed  beneath, 
that  of  the  lower  points  above  on  the  retina ;  and  of 
the  whole  picture  having  therefore  a  position  the 
reverse  of  the  object.  But  it  is  a  prejudice  on  this 
account  to  consider  seeing  in  inverse  position  to  be 
natural,  and  seeing  in  upright  position  to  be  mysteri- 
ous.    Like  every  geometrical  property  of  the  image, 


60  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

SO  this  one  of  its  position,  too,  on  passing  into  con- 
sciousness, is  completely  lost ;  and  the  position  in 
which  we  see  things  is  in  no  way  prejudiced  by  the 
aforesaid  position  of  the  image  on  the  retina. 

Now,  however,  in  order  that  we  may  be  able  to 
ascribe  to  objects  a  position  at  all,  in  order  therefore 
that  the  expressions  '  above,'  '  below,'  '  upright,'  and 
'  inverted,'  may  have  a  meaning,  we  must  have,  inde- 
pendent of  all  sensation  by  sight,  a  mental  picture  of 
a  space  in  which  the  entire  content  of  the  field  of 
vision  shall  be  arranged,  and  in  which  '  above  '  and 
'  below '  are  two  qualitatively  opposite  and,  on  this 
account,  not  exchangeable  directions. 

The  muscular  feeling  affords  us  such  a  mental 
presentation.  '  Below '  is  the  place  toward  which 
the  direction  of  gravity  moves;  'above,'  the  opposite. 
Both  directions  are  distinguished  perfectly  for  us  by 
means  of  an  immediate  feeling  ;  and,  on  this  account, 
we  are  never  deceived  even  in  the  dark  about  the 
position  and  situation  of  our  body. 

Accordingly  we  see  objects  'upright'  in  case  the 
lower  points  of  the  object  are  reached  by  one  and 
the  same  movement  of  the  eyes  simultaneously 
with  those  points  of  our  own  body  which  are 
'below'  according  to  the  testimony  of  the  aforesaid 
muscular  feeling  ;  and  the  upper  points  by  a  move- 
ment   which,    according    to    the    same     testimony, 


CAUSE    OF    SINGLE    VISION.  6 1 

renders  visible  simultaneously  the  upper  parts  of  our 
own  selves. 

Now  it  is  exactly  such  agreement  that  is  secured 
in  our  eye,  in  which  the  axis  lies  in  front  of  the 
sensitive  retina,  by  means  of  the  inverted  position  of 
the  retinal  image.  In  an  other  eye,  in  which  the 
sensitive  surface  should  be  placed  in  front  of  the 
axis,  and  yet  the  greatest  sensitiveness  also  should 
appear  in  the  middle  portion  of  that  surface,  the 
retinal  image  would  have  to  stand  upright  to  serve 
the  same  purpose. 

§  38.  The  final  and  valid  answer  to  the  question, 
why  we  have  single  vision  with  two  eyes,  is  not  to  be 
given.  As  is  well  known,  it  does  not  always  happen. 
The  rather  must  two  impressions  fall  on  two  quite 
definite  points  of  the  retina  in  order  to  coalesce. 
We  see  double,  on  the  contrary,  if  they  fall  on  other 
points.  Naturally,  we  shall  say:  The  two  places  which 
belong  together  would  have  to  impart  like  local  signs 
to  their  impressions,  and  thereby  render  them  indis- 
tinguishable ;  but  we  are  not  able  to  demonstrate  in 
what  manner  this  postulate  is  fulfilled.  Physiology, 
too,  in  the  last  analysis,  satisfies  itself  with  a  mere 
term  for  the  fact ;  it  calls  *  identical '  those  places  in 
both  retinas  which  give  one  simple  impression,  and 
'non-identical '  those  which  give  a  double  impression. 


62  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


§  39.  Irritations  of  the  skin  wc  naturally  refer  at 
once  to  the  place  of  the  skin  on  which  we  see  them 
acting.  But  in  case  of  their  repetition,  when  we  are 
not  able  to  see  them,  we  have  no  assistance  from  re- 
membering them  ;  for  the  most  ordinary  stimuli  have 
already  in  the  course  of  our  life  touched  all  possible 
places  of  the  skin,  and  could  therefore  now  as  well  be 
referred  to  one  place  as  to  another.  In  order  that  they 
may  be  correctly  localized,  they  would  have  at  every 
instant  to  tell  us  anew  where  they  belong ;  that  is  to 
say,  there  must  be  attached  to  the  main  impression 
(impact,  pressure,  heat  or  cold)  an  au.xiliary  impres- 
sion which  is  independent  of  the  latter  and,  on  the 
contrary,  dependent  on  the  place  of  the  skin  that  is 
irritated. 

The  skin  can  supply  such  local  signs  ;  for  since  it 
is  connected  without  interruption,  a  single  point  of 
it  cannot  be  irritated  at  all,  without  the  surrounding 
portion  experiencing  a  displacement,  pulling,  stretch- 
ing, or  concussion  of  some  kind.  But,  further,  since 
the  skin  possesses  at  different  places  a  different  thick- 
ness, different  tension  or  liability  to  displacement,  — 
extends  sometimes  above  the  firm  surfaces  of  the 
bones,  sometimes  over  the  flesh  of  the  muscles,  som.e- 
times  over  cavities  ;  since,  moreover,  the  members 
being  manifold,  these  relations  change  frojii  one 
stretch  of  skin  to  another ;  therefore   the  aforesaid 


THE    FINENESS    OF    TOUCH.  63 

sum  of  secondary  effects  around  the  point  irritated 
will  be  different  for  each  one  from  the  remainder ; 
and  such  effects,  if  they  are  taken  up  by  the  nerve- 
endings  and  act  on  consciousness,  may  occasion  the 
feelings  so  difficult  to  describe,  according  to  which 
we  distinguish  a  contact  at  one  place  from  the  same 
contact  at  another. 

It  cannot  be  said,  however,  that  each  point  of  the 
skin  has  its  special  local  sign.  It  is  known  from  the 
investigations  of  E.  H.  Weber,  that  on  the  margin  of 
the  lips,  the  tip  of  the  tongue,  the  tips  of  the  fingers, 
being  touched  in  two  places  (by  the  points  of  a  pair 
of  compasses)  can  be  distinguished  as  two  at  an 
interval  of  only  |  line  ;  while  there  are  places  on 
the  arms,  legs,  and  on  the  back,  which  require  for 
making  the  distinction  a  distance  between  them  of 
as  much  as  20  lines.  We  interpret  this  in  the 
following  way.  Where  the  structure  of  the  skin 
changes  little  for  long  stretches,  the  local  signs  also 
alter  only  a  little  from  point  to  point.  And  if  two 
stimuli  act  simultaneously,  and  accordingly  a  recipro- 
cal disturbance  of  these  secondary  effects  occurs,  they 
will  be  undistinguishable  ;  on  the  contrary,  in  cases 
where  both  stimuli  act  successively,  and  therefore  the 
aforesaid  disturbance  ceases,  both  are  still  frequently 
distinguishable.  On  the  other  hand,  we  know  nothing 
further  to  allege  as  to  how  the  extraordinary  sensitive- 
ness—  for  example  —  of  the  lips  is  occasioned. 


64  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


§  40.  The  preceding  statement  merely  explains 
the  possibility  of  distinguishing  impressions  made 
at  different  places  ;  but  each  impression  must  also 
be  referred  to  the  definite  place  at  which  it  acts. 

This  is  easy  for  one  who  sees,  since  he  already 
possesses  a  picture  of  the  surface  of  his  own  body  ; 
and,  on  this  account,  he  now  by  means  of  the 
unchanging  local  sign,  even  in  the  dark,  translates 
each  stimulus  which  he  has  once  seen  act  on  a 
definite  place,  to  the  same  place  in  this  picture 
of  the  body  that  is  mentally  presented  before  him. 
One  born  blind  would  be  compelled  to  construct 
such  a  picture  first  by  means  of  the  sense  of  touch  ; 
and  this  naturally  is  accomplished  through  motions 
of  the  tactual  members  and  by  estimating  the  dis- 
tances which  they  would  have  to  travel  in  order  to 
reach  from  contact  at  the  point  a  to  contact  at  the 
other  point  h.  It  is  to  be  considered,  however, 
that  these  motions  —  which  in  this  case  are  not 
seen  —  are  perceivable  only  by  so-called  muscular 
feelings ;  —  that  is  to  say,  by  feelings  which  in 
themselves  are  merely  certain  species  of  the  way 
we  feci,  and  do  not  of  themselves  at  all  indicate  the 
motions  which  are  in  fact  the  causes  of  them. 

Now  it  cannot  be  described,  how  it  is  that  this 
interpretation  of  the  muscular  feelings  actually 
originates  in  the  case  of  those  born  blind  ;  but  the 


SPACE    IN    ONE    BORN    BLIND.  6$ 

helps  which  lead  to  it  are  very  probably  found  in 
the  fact,  that  the  sense  of  touch  as  well  as  the  eye 
can  receive  many  impressions  simultaneously,  and 
that,  in  case  of  a  movement,  the  previous  impres- 
sion does  not  vanish  without  trace  and  have  its 
place  taken  by  a  wholly  new  one  ;  but  that,  in  the 
manner  previously  alleged,  the  combinations  a  be, 
bed,  etc.,  follow  one  another,  and  therefore  some 
part  in  common  is  always  left  over  for  the  next  two 
impressions.  By  this  alone  does  it  seem  possible  to 
awaken  the  idea  that  the  same  occurrence,  from 
which  the  series  of  changeable  muscular  feelings 
originates  for  us,  consists  in  an  alteration  of  our 
relation  to  a  series  of  objects  previously  existent 
side  by  side  and  to  be  found  arranged  in  a  definite 
order ;  it  consists,  therefore,  in  a  motion. 

§  41.  It  is  questionable  whether  the  mental  pic- 
ture of  space  which  one  born  blind  attains  solely  by 
the  sense  of  touch  will  be  altogether  like  that  of 
one  who  sees  ;  it  is  rather  to  be  assumed  that  a 
much  less  intuitable  system  of  mental  presenta- 
tions of  time,  of  the  magnitude  of  motion,  and  of 
the  exertion  which  is  needed  in  order  to  reach 
from  contact  at  one  point  to  that  at  another,  takes 
the  place  of  the  clear,  easy,  and  at  once  all-com- 
prehending intuition,  with  which  he  who  sees  is 
endowed. 


CHAPTER  V. 

OF  THE  APPREHENSION  OF  THE  WORLD  BY  THE 

SENSES,  AND  OF  ERRORS  OF  SENSE. 

§  42.  A  simple  impression  of  sense  represents 
only  itself,  and  tells  nothing  concerning  the  '  Things  ' 
to  which  it  belongs,  —  either  as  property,  state,  or 
action.  This  further  interpretation  is  certainly,  as 
the  saying  is,  an  affair  of  the  Understanding ;  and 
it  is  the  understanding  that  is  deceived  in  case  it 
permits  itself  to  be  led  astray  by  means  of  a  mental 
presentation  a,  which  it  previously,  under  secondary 
conditions  (c)  imperfectly  apprehended,  found  com- 
bined with  a  presentation  b,  so  as  to  think  an  a, 
when  repeated  under  other  conditions  d,  to  be 
connected  with  the  same  b. 

But  the  senses  are  not  always  so  innocent.  The 
eye,  for  example,  when  it  pictures  the  world  as 
extended  in  three  dimensions  on  a  plane,  gives  us 
absolutely  false  relations  between  the  images  of  the 
single  objects.  In  this  case,  therefore,  in  which 
sense  yields  what  is  false,  while  the  intellect  must 
furnish  the  corrections,  we  have  a  right  to  speak  of 
"errors    of    sense."       Under    this    class    belong,  for 


WRONG    ESTIMATES    OF    MAGNITUDE.  6/ 

example,  the  incorrect  diminishing  of  remote  objects, 
the  convergence  of  parallel  lines  in  the  distance,  the 
elevation  of  the  level  of  the  sea  above  the  coast,  — 
pure  phenomena  which  persist  for  the  intuitions  of 
sense,  even  after  the  intellect  is  no  longer  uncer- 
tain concerning  the  true  state  of  affairs. 

§  43.  The  same  magnitudes  of  space  we  estimate 
as  greater  when  they  are  bright-colored  ;  smaller, 
when  they  are  dark.  The  surface  filled  with  mani- 
fold objects  appears  larger  to  the  eye  ;  the  empty 
one,  smaller.  To  the  sense  of  touch  the  rough 
surface  appears  larger  than  the  smooth.  In  that 
direction  which  is  made  prominent  by  a  manifold 
repetition  of  lines,  things  appear  to  extend  farther 
than  they  actually  do.  All  this  is  made  use  of  in 
manifold  ways  by  the  decorative  arts. 

Distances  we  estimate  (very  indefinitely)  as  smaller 
for  bright  objects,  larger  for  the  dark  ones ;  (much 
more  accurately)  as  smaller  so  long  as  the  interior 
delineation  of  things  continues  to  be  clear,  larger 
in  case  it  makes  a  confused  impression  as  a  whole. 

We  principally  employ,  however,  three  factors ; 
the  actual  magnitude  of  a  thing,  its  apparent  mag- 
nitude, and  the  distance,  in  order  from  two  of  them 
to  ascertain  the  third.  If  the  true  magnitude  is 
given  (for  example,  by  our  knowing  that  the  object 


68  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

in  question  is  a  man  or  a  child)  and  likewise  the 
apparent  magnitude,  then  we  estimate  the  distance 
as  so  much  the  greater  the  smaller  the  second  is 
in  comparison  with  the  first.  If  we  know,  besides 
the  apparent  magnitude,  the  distance,  then  we 
can  reckon  the  actual  magnitude  in  the  same  way. 
Finally,  if  we  know  the  true  magnitude  and  the 
distance,  then  we  can  find  the  apparent  magnitude, 
which  —  for  example  —  painting  must  give  to  the 
picture  of  an  object,  in  order  to  make  it  appear  at 
this  distance.  But  where  objects  —  for  example, 
mountains  and  watercourses  —  have  no  natural 
measure,  and  therefore  merely  the  apparent  magni- 
tude is  given,  we  can  make  a  conclusion  with  some 
accuracy  to  the  actual  magnitude  and  the  distance 
directly,  only  by  separating  the  latter  into  parts,  and 
estimating  each  one  of  them  according  to  the  rela- 
tion of  the  apparent  magnitude  of  some  well-known 
object  found  in  them,  to  its  true  magnitude. 

A  very  important  means,  finally,  is  the  parallax, 
—  that  is  to  say,  the  magnitude  of  the  displacement 
which  the  image  of  an  object  C  experiences  as  seen 
against  points  definitely  marked,  P,  Q,  R,  on  an  im- 
movable background,  in  case  we  consider  it  from 
the  two  terminal  points,  A  and  B,  of  a  line  AB.  It 
is  greater  for  nearer,  and  smaller  for  more  remote 
objects.     We  daily  employ  this  means  of  assistance, 


COMPARISON    OF    SENSATIONS  69 

since  we  fixate  the  object  alternately  with  one  eye 
or  the  other,  or  incline  the  head  to  the  right  and 
left,  or  actually  move  hither  and  thither.  Science 
has  made  manifold  use  of  this  means,  since  it  per- 
forms this  experiment  carefully  and  with  the  addi- 
tional help  of  finer  instruments  of  measurement. 

§  44.  The  comparison  of  sensible  qualities  (colors, 
tones,  tastes,  degrees  of  heat)  requires  a  certain  mod- 
erateness of  the  impression,  whether  it  be  intensity, 
or  extension  in  space,  or  duration  in  time.  It  requires, 
besides,  that  the  testing  organ  be  the  same  through- 
out, in  order  that  the  different  local  signs  of  different 
organs  may  not  modify  the  impressions.  Accord- 
ingly, we  do  not  test  the  heat  of  two  bodies  of  water 
with  two  fingers  simultaneously,  but  successively 
with  the  same  finger,  etc.  In  such  cases  the  other 
snare  is  to  be  shunned,  —  that  of  taking  the  interval 
too  great  to  leave  both  impressions  still  lively  enough 
in  consciousness,  or  too  small,  so  that  the  after-effects 
of  the  first  impression  are  mingled  with  the  second. 

These  after-effects  are  of  a  two-fold  kind.  If  they 
are  strong  and  recent,  they  obscure  the  second 
impicssion.  But  very  frequently,  and  in  different 
sen!^)^s,  the  other  result  also  occurs,  —  namely, 
that  a  nerve  which  has  been  for  a  considerable  time 
thrown    into    the    same   one-sided   excitation    by   an 


70  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


impression  a,  after  the  cessation  of  this  stimulus, 
assumes  of  itself  another  form  of  excitation  through 
which  it  returns  to  its  impartial  condition  of  equi- 
librium. These  counter-excitations  also  produce 
sensations.  Thus,  for  example,  an  eye  that  has 
been  a  long  time  busy  with  green,  red,  or  yellow, 
subsequently  sees  the  complementary  colors,  —  red, 
green,  and  violet.  In  the  domain  of  the  sense  of 
touch  and  of  the  muscular  feeling,  as  well,  these 
'  sensations  of  contrast '  occur. 

§  45.  We  hold  an  object  to  be  moved,  the  image 
of  which  tra\-els  over  our  retina.  And  such  an 
appearance  takes  place,  not  merely  in  case  we  are 
moving  through  the  objects  with  a  perfectly  passive 
motion  (for  example,  sailing  on  a  vessel),  but  also 
in  case  we  are  moving  through  them  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  our  actual  motion  and  in  the  convic- 
tion that  they  are  unmoved.  Naturally  the  apparent 
aiotion  of  the  objects  has  then  the  opposite  direction 
io  our  own. 

The  well-known  rotating  motion,  with  which 
objects  hasten  by  us  after  we  have  been  for  a  long 
iime  rotating  on  the  axis  of  our  body  and  then 
immediately  stand  still,  appears  to  have  its  basis  in 
this,  that  the  eyes  unconsciously  to  ourselves  still 
follow  for  some  time  the  direction  in  which  the  body 


FEELINGS    OF    DOUBLE    CONTACT.  "Jl 

previously  turned,  and  when  they  have  reached  the 
extreme  angle  of  vision  immediately  turn  back  to 
begin  anew  the  same  course.  Therefore  it  is  always 
the  same  objects  which  ceaselessly  pass  by  before 
us  without  vanishing  from  sight. 

§  46.  In  case  some  object  or  other  (for  example,  a 
stick)  is  brought  into  a  rather  loose  connection  with 
our  body  (for  example,  the  hand),  such  as  admits  of 
displacements  of  its  position,  then  at  each  momen- 
tary position  a  new  and  special  combination  of  sen- 
sations of  pressure  (for  example,  on  the  different 
fingers)  is  occasioned.  In  accordance  with  earlier 
experiences  which  we  have  had,  we  form  for  ourselves 
out  of  each  such  combination  a  mental  picture  of  the 
position  which  the  object  (the  stick)  has  at  the  mo- 
ment. Now  if  it  discovers  in  all  positions  the  same 
resistance  to  an  external  object,  and  if  also  this 
pressure  by  the  stick  acts  constantly  on  our  hand, 
then  we  not  only  transfer  the  seat  of  this  resistance 
to  the  common  point  of  intersection  of  all  these  suc- 
cessive positions,  but  we  believe  with  an  altogether 
immediate  perspicuity  that  we  have  a  direct  sensa- 
tion of  it  at  the  spot  where  the  resistance  is  accom- 
plished, exactly  as  though  we  were  just  as  much 
present,  with  our  capacity  for  sensation,  at  the  end 
of  this  stick,  as  in  the  surface  of  the  hand  where 
the  other  end  of  the  stick  is  pressing. 


72  OUTLINES    OF    I'SYCHOLOGY. 

These  feelings  of  'double  contact,'  which  occur 
in  almost  innumerable  examples,  introduce  into  our 
mental  presentations  uf  external  things  a  very  pecu- 
liar life-likeness.  Above  all  do  they  alone  avail  to 
make  possible  the  serviceable  use  of  many  tools,  — 
for  example,  j:) robes,  knifes,  forks,  pens ;  since  we 
believe  that  by  means  of  them  we  perceive  the 
resistances  or  hinderances  which  these  instruments 
find  at  the  surface  of  their  objects,  quite  directly 
ill  loco ;  and  since  we  are  able  to  apply  the  counter 
means  that  are  each  moment  appropriate.  They  are 
further  instructive  concerning  many  properties  of 
things,  —  for  example,  concerning  the  length  of 
a  balanced  i)ole,  concerning  the  breadth  of  a  ladder- 
rung  when  stepped  on,  concerning  the  length  of  the 
thread  fastened  to  which  a  ball  is  swung  round  in 
a  circle.  Finally,  they  give  us  in  general  the  agree- 
able feeling  of  our  spiritual  presence  being  ex- 
tended beyond  the  real  limits  of  our  body ;  and 
this  is  the  reason  for  the  many,  in  part  elegant, 
and  in  part  bizarre,  movable  additions  or  appendages 
lo  our  bodies,  of  which  the  passion  for  dress  is  wont 
to  avail  itself. 


CHAPTER   VI. 


THE    FEELINGS. 


§  47.  We  apply  the  name  '  Feelings  '  exclusively 
to  states  of  pleasure  and  pain,  in  contrast  with 
sensations  as  indifferent  perceptions  of  a  certain 
content. 

We  do  not  thereby  assert  that  these  two  spiritual 
performances  occur  separate  from  each  other  ;  we 
find  it  much  more  probable  that  primarily  no  mental 
presentation  is  completely  indifferent,  and  that  rather 
the  value  of  pleasure  or  pain  attached  to  it  only 
escapes  our  attention,  because,  in  educated  life  the 
meaning,  and  the  significance,  which  the  impres- 
sions have  for  our  purposes  in  life,  has  become  more 
important  to  us  than  the  consideration  of  the  im- 
pression  itself. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  adhere  to  the  statement 
that,  judged  by  the  very  notion  of  them,  sensations 
and  feelings  are  two  different  performances  which, 
although  always  connected,  are  nevertheless,  not  de- 
ducible  from  each  other.  A  mere  relation  of  some 
sort  between  different  simultaneous  impressions  or 
states  does  not,   therefore,   of  itself  produce  a  feel- 


74  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


ing  ;  this  is  done  only  by  means  of  the  relation  act- 
in";  as  a  stimulus  on  the  entire  nature  of  the  soul, 
and,  since  it  cncites  a  capacity  of  the  soul  of  which 
\vc  have  not  previously  taken  account,  inducing  the 
soul  to  a  reaction,  —  namely,  to  the  production  of 
the  feeling. 

§  48.  It  is  not  demonstrable,  but  a  natural  pre- 
judgment, and  a  probable  hypothesis,  that  feelings 
arc  the  results  and  tokens  of  the  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement between  the  excitations  produced  in  us, 
and  the  conditions  of  our  permanent  well-being. 
Pleasure  would  therefore  depend  upon  every  encite- 
ment  to  the  use  of  our  natural  capacities  within  the 
limits  of  these  conditions,  and  it  would  rise  in  de- 
gree with  the  intensity  of  these  cncitements  ;  on 
the  contrary,  pain  would  depend  upon  the  fact  that 
the  excitations  suffered  are  at  strife  with  the 
aforesaid  conditions,  in  part  as  respects  their 
strength,  and  in  part  also,  as  respects  their  form 
(a  thing  commonly  overlooked). 

The  foregoing  statement  does  not  mean  that 
the  soul  first  observes  the  excitations,  and  then  their 
relation  with  respect  to  these  conditions  ;  and  finally, 
according  to  its  view  of  these  acts,  decides  whether 
to  experience  pleasure  or  pain.  The  rather,  just  as 
sensation  —  for  example,  that  of  red  —  is  merely 
the  result    of   a   series    of   processes  in  the  nerves, 


THE    FEELINGS    OF    SENSE.  75 

but  tells  US  nothing  whatever  concerning  these 
processes  ;  so  is  feeling  simply  the  last  result  of 
the  aforesaid  strife  or  concord,  and  it  only  makes 
its  appearance  in  consciousness  after  these  uncon- 
scious processes. 

§  49.  Pleasure  and  pain  are  general  designations, 
which,  in  this  form  of  generality  (exactly  as,  for 
example,  '  color,'  too)  express  nothing  actual.  The 
rather  has  every  actual  pleasure  or  pain  its  own 
entirely  specific  character,  and  it  can  by  no  means 
be  made  up  out  of  various  component  parts  of  a 
general  pleasure  and  pain  ;  just  as  the  different 
colors  are  not  produced  by  different  mixtures  of 
bright  and  dark. 

Concerning  the  conditions,  under  which  the  feel- 
ings, in  general,  or  definite  forms  of  them,  originate, 
we  know  almost  nothing. 

The  first  group  which  we  are  able  to  distinguish, 
the  feelings  of  sense,  —  that  is  to  say,  those  directly 
dependent  on  sense-stimuli,  —  are  in  the  case  of 
the  different  senses  so  much  the  more  intensive, 
the  less  these  senses  are  capable  of  fine  objective 
perceptions.  Colors  and  their  contrasts  merely 
excite  satisfaction  or  dissatisfaction  ;  dissonances  of 
tones  cause  suffering  to  the  hearer  personally  ;  the 
pleasure  and  pain  of  smell  and  taste  are  much  more 


76  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


intensive  ;  but  it  is  only  in  the  skin,  which  of  itself 
alone  furnishes  little  cognition,  and  in  the  interior 
parts,  which  contribute  to  cognition  nothing  what- 
ever, that  the  pain  assumes  the  character  of  physi- 
cal suffering.  The  purposeful  nature  of  this  arrange- 
ment is  manifest  ;  its  mechanical  basis  is  unknown. 

§  50.  These  less  intense  feelings  of  the  higher 
senses  form  the  transition  to  a  second  class,  tJic 
(EstJietic  feelings,  which  are  not  quite  exclusively, 
but  in  the  main,  attached  to  a  simultaneous  mul- 
tiplicity of  impressions,  and  in  the  simplest  cases, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  depend  on  the  simplicity  or 
difficulty  of  the  relations  which  obtain  between 
them.  The  precise  reason,  however,  on  account 
of  which  this  simplicity  —  for  example,  in  the  case 
of  consonant  tones  —  acts  favorably  upon  us  is 
unknown  ;  for  as  a  rule  we  do  not  perceive  these 
relations  of  fact  as  such.  The  character  of  these 
aesthetic  feelings  of  satisfaction  and  dissatisfaction 
can  be  expressed,  in  contrast  to  sensuous  comfort 
or  discomfort,  by  saying  that  only  the  universal 
spirit  in  us,  and  not  our  merely  personal  well-being, 
is  furthered   or  disturbed  by  these    impressions. 

In  this  class  are  included  tJic  ethical  feelings,  of 
which  we  are  compelled  to  speak  on  this  account, 
because    moral    approbation    or    disapprobation     is 


AFFECTIONS    AND    SENTIMENTS.  JJ 

nothing  else  but  the  expression  of  a  value,  or 
absence  of  value,  which  we  perceive  only  in  feel- 
ing, and  which  is,  on  this  account,  totally  distinct 
from  a  merely  theoretical  judgment  concerning  the 
truth  or  untruth  of  a  proposition. 

§  51,  A  further  description  of  the  feelings  is 
useless  ;  it  is  of  use,  on  the  other  hand,  to  distin- 
guish two  states  thereof. 

That  is  frequently  called  feeling  which  is  more 
precisely  to  be  called  '  Affection,'  and  which  does 
not  consist  in  a  quiet  state  or  a  mere  disposition  of 
the  mind,  but  in  a  movement  (as  in  the  case  of 
rage  and  terror)  that  also  produces  disorder  in  the 
train  of  ideas,  and  besides  ordinarily  includes  un- 
conscious movements,  partly  mere  gestures,  and 
partly  the  beginnings  of  actions  which  would  pro- 
ceed from  the  inducement  given,  unless  they 
should  be  restrained. 

In  like  manner  must  we  distinguish  the  '  Sen- 
timents,'—  that  is  to  say,  permanent  species  of 
mental  constitution,  which  proceed  from  this,  that 
a  definite  value  is  once  for  all  placed  upon  certain 
contents  of  ideas ;  they  are,  therefore,  —  for  ex- 
ample, piety  or  patriotism,  —  not  themselves  simple 
definite  feelings,  but  causes  from  which  the  differ- 
ent species  of  feelings  can  originate  according  to 
the  nature  of  circumstances. 


y8  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


§  52.  More  important  still  is  the  connection  of 
feeling  with  '  Self-consciousness.' 

The  latter  includes  two  things:  —  first,  that  we 
form  some  picture  or  other  of  us  (similar  or  dissimi- 
lar) ;  and,  secondly,  that  we  recognize  this  picture  as 
the  picture  of  ourselves. 

As  far  as  the  first  point  is  concerned,  we  under- 
stand how  the  picture  of  our  body,  because  it  intrudes 
into  the  recollection  of  all  our  experiences,  appears 
as  the  point  of  issue  for  our  entire  spiritual  life  ;  and 
that  other  experiences  likewise  incite  us  to  con- 
ceive of  ourselves  as  not,  to  be  sure,  identical  with 
the  body,  but  as  in  an  obscure  manner  connected 
with  it.  Beyond  this  point  of  standing  we  do  not 
get  in  ordinary  life.  It  is  science  which  first 
attempts  further  to  explain  (and  such,  too,  will  be 
the  task  we  set  ourselves  later  on)  this  essential 
being  of  the  soul  itself  as  well  as  also  the  manner 
of  its  connection  with  the  body. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  are  here  met  by  the  second 
question,  —  namely:  How  do  we  come  to  hold  such 
a  mental  picture  when  attained,  not  as  the  picture 
of  some  object  or  other,  but  as  the  picture  of  our 
otvn  selves,  and  to  separate  this  'ego'  of  ours  from 
all  the  rest  of  the  world  by  an  absolute  distinction 
which  has  quite  another  value  than  the  distinction 
of  any  other  Thing  from  a  second  or  a  third  ? 


DEFINITION    OF    THE    EGO.  JC) 


It  is  obvious  that  the  foregoing  question  cannot  be 
answered  by  a  definition  of  the  general  character 
of  ' egohood\- — for  example,  by  the  following:  The 
'Ego'  is  that  subject  which  is  at  the  same  time  its 
own  object.  For  such  a  general  notion  corresponds 
to  every  'ego,'  and  therefore  to  'thee'  and  to  'him  ' 
just  as  well  as  to  'me.'  Self-consciousness,  however, 
ought  to  set  forth,  not  merely  the  general  spiritual 
property  —  which  is  common  to  all  persons,  but  it 
ought  to  distinguish  '  me '  from  every  other  person. 

And  now  it  may  be  said  :  I  am  the  subject  of  my 
world  of  thought,  and  thou  art  the  subject  of  thine. 

But  to  say  this  would  be  useless,  as  long  as  we 
were  not  to  possess  an  immediate  perspicuity  con- 
cerning the  distinction  of  what  is  vivie  from  that 
which  is  not  mine. 

No  merely  theoretical  consideration  can  teach  the 
aforesaid  distinction.  We  should  be  betrayed  into 
an  endless  circle  if  we  should  wish  to  say,  for  exam- 
ple :  Mine  is  what  I  have,  and  thine  is  what  thou 
hast. 

Nothing  else  remains,  therefore,  but  to  recognize 
the  fact,  that  that  which  is  my  state  announces 
itself,  —  in  a  manner  wholly  immediate  and  admit- 
ting of  no  further  deduction,  —  as  something  in 
itself  altogether  special;  —  as  something,  that  is  to 
say,  which  is  distinguished  from  that  which   is  not 


So  OUTLINES    UK    I'bVLHULOGV. 

my  state,  not  merely  as  this  state  foreign  to  me  is 
from  a  third,  but  in  such  manner  that  we  have  ample 
reason  for  separatin<;  this  state  of  our  own  from  all 
else  that  occurs  in  the  world,  by  an  incomparable 
distinction. 

Now  what  is  referred  to  above  happens  in  real- 
ity in  a  very  simple  way,  just  by  means  of  feeling. 
Each  of  our  own  states,  everything  which  we  our- 
selves actually  suffer,  are  sensible  of,  or  do,  is  desig- 
nated by  means  of  a  feeling  being  immediately 
attached  to  it  (of  pleasure,  of  pain,  of  interest,  etc.)  ; 
while  this  accompaniment  is  wanting  to  that  which 
we  merely  represent  mentally  as  the  states,  the 
doing,  sensation,  suffering,  of  other  beings,  but  do 
not  ourselves  experience  or  suffer. 

Accordingly,  no  difficult  intermediation  whatever  is 
necessary,  in  order  to  answer  the  second  of  the  ques- 
tions proposed  above.  It  amounts  only  to  affirming 
that  a  bare  knozving  in  general  cannot  furnish  the 
impulse  for  this  altogether  unexampled  distinction 
by  means  of  which  every  being  with  a  soul  sets  itself 
over  opposite  to  all  the  rest  of  the  world. 

§  53.  In  the  way  described  above,  as  we  believe, 
does  the  meaning  of  the  }^ossessive  pronoun  'mine' 
first  become  perspicuous.  It  is  not  until  afterward, 
when  we  direct  our  reflective  thought  to  these  cir- 


SELF-FEELING    OF    THE    EGO.  8l 

cumstances,  that  we  also  form  the  substantive  name 
of  the  '  ego '  as  the  being  to  which  that  belongs 
which  is  called  '  mine.' 

And  here  a  two-fold  distinction  must  be  made. 
The  mental  picture  which  we  form  for  ourselves  of 
our  own  being  may  be  more  or  less  apt  or  errone- 
ous ;  that  depends  upon  the  elevation  of  the  power 
of  cognition  by  means  of  which  every  being  endeav- 
ors theoretically  to  render  to  itself  an  explanation 
concerning  this  centre  of  its  own  mental  states. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  perspicuity  and  intimateness 
with  which  each  being  that  has  feeling  distinguishes 
itself  from  the  entire  world  does  not  at  all  depend  on 
the  aptness  of  this  insight  of  it  into  its  own  being, 
but  is  expressed  in  the  case  of  the  lowest  animals,  in 
so  far  as  they  recognize  their  states  as  their  own  by 
means  of  physical  pain  or  of  pleasure,  in  just  as 
lively  fashion  as  is  the  case  with  the  most  intelligent 
spirit,  A  spirit,  however,  which  should  penetrate 
everything,  but  have  no  interest  of  pleasurable  or 
painful  sort  in  anything,  would  surely  neither  be 
capable  of  opposing  itself  as  an  '  ego '  to  the  rest  of 
the  world,  nor  would  it  have  any  inducement  so  to  do. 
It  would  only  appear  to  itself  as  one,  but  not  as  one 
in  any  way  to  be  preferred,  of  the  many  examples  of 
a  being  which  is  at  the  same  time  subject  and 
object  of  thought. 


S2  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

And  these  two  achievements,  of  knowing  its  own 
bein^-  and  of  feehng  itself  as  a  '  self,'  are  therefore 
not  necessarily  connected  with  each  other.  But  the 
first  of  the  two  we  have  to  consider  as  being 
just  that  immediate  self-fccling,  whose  presence  as 
well  as  its  liveliness  is  altogether  independent  of  the 
degree  of  the  self-cognition  which  we  ordinarily 
think  of,  under  the  name  of  '  self-consciousness.' 
The  latter  is  rather  nothing  more  than  the  interpre- 
tation which  thought,  as  it  progresses  in  the  further 
course  of  our  spiritual  development,  gives  to  that 
inner  experience  which  is  originally  possible  only  in 
the  form  of  feeling. 


CHAPTER   VII. 


OF    MOTIONS. 


§  54.  We  execute  our  bodily  movements  without 
knowledge  of  the  means  necessary  to  them,  — 
the  muscles  and  their  contractility  ;  and  in  particular, 
without  knowing  how  we  must  set  about  to  induce 
thereto  a  definite  motor  nerve,  that  it  may  throw 
the  muscles  necessary  for  a  definite  motion  into 
a  fitting  state  of  excitation.  It  follows  from  this, 
that  in  no  case  does  the  soul  bring,  the  move- 
ments about,  and  execute  them  in  particular,  by  its 
own  laying  hand  to  it,  as  it  were.  The  rather 
does  it,  without  exception,  beget  nothing  more 
than  a  certain  inner  state  confined  to  itself  (as 
of  wishing,  willing,  desiring).  With  such  state,  an 
order  of  nature,  unapproachable  to  our  conscious- 
ness and  wholly  independent  of  our  will,  has  there- 
upon connected  the  originating  of  a  bodily  movement 
as  a  result  in  fact.  Primarily,  therefore,  we  have 
nothing  to  do  but  to  learn  to  know  the  different 
psychical  states  which  are  in  this  manner  the 
occasion  of   the   bodily   movements. 


84  OUTLINES    OF    I'SVCHOLOGY. 


§  55.  In  a  livini;-  body  changes  are  ceaselessly 
happening'  that  also  have  an  influence  upon  the 
motor  nerves,  and  occasion  motions  in  the  produc- 
tion of  which  the  soul  does  not  participate  at  all. 
Nevertheless  they  are  important.  For  only  by 
means  of  the  fact  that  motions  happen  of  them- 
selves, and  then  become  objects  of  its  observa- 
tion, does  the  soul  of  an  animal  arrive  at  the 
thought  that  its  body  is  movable,  and  that  its 
motions  stand  in  connection  with  its  own  inner 
states  ;  —  a  thought,  at  which  it  would  not  arrive, 
if  it  were  dwelling  in  a  body  which  was  never  of 
itself,  or   by  external    causes,  thrown    into    motion. 

§  56.  Of  the  before-mentioned  motions  we  may 
bring  forward,  as  a  special  class,  the  njlcx  luotions. 
These  are  such  as  originate  through  the  excitation 
of  a  sensory  nerve  by  external  or  internal  stimuli 
being  transferred,  without  the  soul's  cooperation, 
in  the  central  organ,  to  the  motor  nerves,  in  such 
a  manner  that  it  arouses  to  motion  with  a  single 
shock  a  group  of  muscles  coordinated  for  some 
purposeful  action.  In  this  case  a  conscious  sen- 
sation may  originate  at  the  same  time  ;  but  the 
excitation  may  also,  without  begetting  any  such  sen- 
sation, bend  aside,  as  it  were,  and  produce  the  same 
motions    without    consciousness    having   any    share 


THE    MIMETIC    MOTIONS.  85 

in  them.  Many  of  these  motions  —  like  coughing, 
sneezing,  the  changes  of  the  pupils  of  the  eye  when 
stimulated  by  light  —  admit  of  being  apprehended 
as  reactions  which  nature  has  arranged  for  in  the 
structure  of  the  body  as  a  means  of  guarding  it 
against  injuries.  They  are  shown  to  be  purely 
mechanical  results  of  the  excitations,  by  the  fact 
that  they  not  only  proceed  involuntarily,  but  cannot 
even  be  inhibited  by  a  mere  will  to  the  contrary ; 
for  this  they  rather  require  some  artificial  counter- 
acting agency. 

§  57.  In  the  mimetic  and  physiognomic  motions 
—  laughing,  weeping,  sobbing,  and  the  like  —  the 
point  of  starting  in  the  first  instance  is  a  psychical 
state,  —  a  state,  that  is,  of  the  mind.  As  a  whole, 
they  do  not  admit  of  being  counterfeited  artificially 
except  in  a  very  imperfect  way  ;  even  such  an 
imperfect  counterfeit  is  brought  about  only  by 
artificially  transposing  one's  self  through  fancy 
into  the  same  mood  of  mind  as  that  which  is  the 
actual  cause  of  them.  All  these  motions  like- 
wise take  place  without  knowledge  of  their  reason 
and  their  use  ;  for  we  cannot  tell  exactly  why 
we  are  compelled  to  laugh  at  joy  and  to  weep 
at  pain,  and  not  rather  the  reverse.  They  are 
therefore,  too,  motions  which  an  order  of  nature,  not 


86  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


contrived,    and    also    not     understood    by    us,    has 
attached  as  results   in  fact  to  our    states   of   mind. 

§  58.  Another  class  is  composed  of  the  imita- 
tive motions  with  which,  for  example,  the  observer 
undesignedly  accompanies  the  thrusts  of  the  fencer 
or  of  the  player  at  nine-pins  ;  and  with  which  the 
uneducated  narrator  imitates  the  motions  that  he 
describes.  In  this  case  it  is  the  mental  picture, 
and  of  course  that  of  a  definite  motion,  which, 
without  further  knowledge  and  volition,  of  itself 
passes  over  into  the   execution   of  the  movement. 

In  this  class  are  to  be  reckoned  the  most  of 
our  every-day  motions,  such  as  we  frequently  call 
'  actions.'  As  soon  as,  at  the  end  of  a  series  of 
thoughts,  the  idea  of  a  motion  based  upon  them 
emerges  in  us,  and  no  resistance  from  any  quarter 
is  brought  to  bear  against  it,  this  idea  passes 
over  into  motion  of  itself  and  without  our  having 
to  assume,  or  being  able  to  demonstrate,  an  impulse 
of  the  will  expressly  directed  toward  the  motion. 
This  is  true  in  a  very  special  manner  of  dexterities 
previously  acquired,  —  for  example,  writing,  or  play- 
ing the  piano,  —  where  the  mere  idea  of  a  sound, 
to  be  fixed  upon  or  brought  forth,  immediately 
induces  the  necessary  motions,  without  a  clear  idea 
of  the  latter  needing  to  be  previously  developed  in 
consciousness. 


THE    VOLUNTAKV    MOTIONS.  87 

§  59.  The  foregoing  considerations  appear  to 
annul  a  distinction  between  voluntary  and  involun- 
tary motions.     In  fact  they  do  not. 

Whatever  may  be  our  conviction  (subsequently  to 
be  developed),  concerning  the  nature  of  the  will,  we 
can  in  no  case  impute  to  it  the  power  to  do  more 
than  to  zvill.  That  an  accomplishment  of  the  thing 
willed  follows  thereupon,  docs  not  depend  on  it  at 
all,  but  only  on  the  fact  that  with  it,  in  so  far  as  it 
is  a  definite  state  of  the  soul  different  from  other 
states,  an  order  of  nature  entirely  independent  of 
it  has  connected  a  definite  change,  different  from 
other  changes,  in  the  state  of  the  motor  nerves. 
Where  this  is  not  the  case,  the  will,  which  is  then 
no  more  than  a  futile  wish,  remains  without  any 
results. 

An  action  is  therefore  '  voluntary '  in  case  the 
interior  initial  state,  from  which  a  motion  would 
originate  as  a  result,  does  not  merely  take  place  but 
is  approbated  or  adopted  or  endorsed  by  the  will. 
Every  action  is  '  involuntary '  which,  mechanically 
considered,  issues  from  the  same  initial  point,  and 
wholly  in  the  same  manner,  but  without  having 
experienced   such   approbation. 

The  control  of  the  will  over  the  motions  of  the 
body  may,  accordingly,  be  compared  perhaps  to  our 
use  of  the  alphabet.     New  sounds  or  letters  we  are 


88  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


not  able  to  fabricate,  but  are  bound  to  those  which 
our  instruments  of  speech  make  possible  for  us. 
We  can  combine  them,  however,  in  innumerable 
ways.  And  just  so  the  soul,  when  it  combines 
according  to  its  designs  those  inner  initial  states,  in 
whatever  series  it  prefers,  can  also  compound  these 
elements  of  motions,  corporeally  made  ready  as  they 
are  beforehand,  into  the  most  varied  actions  for 
the  expression  of  its  will. 


Part    S 


ECOND. 


THEORETICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


r  ART      bECOND. 
THEORETICAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 


CHAPTER    L 

OF  THE  SOUL. 

§  60.  After  the  foregoing  complete  review  of  the 
individual  elements  of  the  inner  life,  we  inquire 
concerning  the  Nature  of  the  Subject  in  which  they 
all  occur,  or  are  possible.  Our  final  conviction  on 
this  point  will  be  made  clear  in  the  simplest  way 
if,  for  the  present,  we  let  the  current  views  hold,  — 
such  views,  that  is,  as  are  wont  in  the  first  in- 
stance to  be  formed  on  the  inducement  of  experi- 
ence; and  then  gradually  transform  them,  in  order 
to  adapt  them  to  the  solution  of  difficulties  which 
they  could  not  solve  in  their  earlier  form.  It 
must  therefore  be  considered  that  everything  can- 
not be  said  at  once,  and  that  only  the  final  form 
which  our  view  will  assume,  is  our  permanent 
conviction. 

§  61.  The  constant  connection  of  the  spiritual  life 
with  that  of  the  body,  in  which  alone  it  is  the  sub- 


92  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

ject  of  observation,  makes  the  attempt  natural  to 
apprehend  it,  too,  as  simply  the  product  of  the 
bodily  functions. 

Nevertheless  it  is  an  ancient  truth,  which  has  no 
need  whatever  of  a  modern  re-discovery,  that  the 
origin  of  a  spiritual  condition  is  never  analytically 
comprehensible  from  all  possible  combinations  of 
material  conditions.  Or,  more  simply  said  :  If  we 
conceive  of  material  elements  in  such  a  way  that 
we  presuppose  nothing  in  them  which  does  not 
strictly  belong  to  the  conception  of  matter ;  if  we 
therefore  apprehend  them  merely  as  space-filling 
realities,  which  are  movable  and  can  produce 
motions  in  each  other  by  means  of  the  forces 
belonging  to  them  ;  if,  finally,  we  conceive  of  these 
motions,  whether  of  one  or  of  many  elements,  as 
no  matter  how  much  varied  or  combined ;  still  the 
moment  never  comes  when  we  should  be  able  to 
say  :  Now  it  is  self-evident  that  this  motion  last 
produced  can  no  longer  remain  motion,  but  must 
pass  over  into  sensation. 

A  Materialism,  therefore,  which  should  neverthe- 
less assert  that  the  spiritual  life  could  proceed  from 
bare  physical  states  or  motions  of  corporeal  atoms, 
would  be  a  perfectly  barren  assumption ;  and  in 
this  form,  too,  materialism  has  hardly  ever  been 
proposed  in  earnest.     The  materialistic  views  which 


THE    ASSUMPTIONS    OF    MATERIALISM.  93 

have  actually  had  faith  in  their  own  principles,  have 
always  taken  their  point  of  departure  from  the  other 
presupposition,  —  namely,  that  what  they  proceed 
to  style  '  matter '  is  actually  something  much  better 
than  the  name  tells,  and  than  what  it  appears  to  be 
from  the  outside.  It  is  assumed  to  contain  in  itself 
a  fundamental  property,  from  which  the  spiritual 
states  would  be  able  to  develop  in  just  the  same 
way  as  the  physical  predicates  of  extension,  impene- 
trability, etc.,  develop  from  another  fundamental 
property    which    it    likewise    possesses. 

Accordingly  the  new  form  of  the  attempt  arose  ; 
—  exactly  as  physiology  deduces  the  corporeal  life 
from  the  reciprocal  actions  of  the  physical  forces  of 
all  the  corporeal  elements,  exactly  so  has  psychology 
to  explain  the  spiritual  life  from  the  joint  action  of 
the,  psychical  iorcQS  of  these  elements. 

§  62.  The  foregoing  view  —  not  inconceivable  pre- 
vious to  investigation  —  nevertheless  goes  to  wreck 
upon  the  fact  that,  it  is  impossible  for  it  to  compre- 
hend the  origin  of  that  Unity  of  Consciousness, 
which  is  a  fact  of  experience,  and  from  which  we 
are  not  at  liberty  arbitrarily  to  withdraw  our  atten- 
tion, simply  because  it  is  very  enigmatical,  in  order 
then  more  conveniently  to  explain  the  remainder  of 
the  content  of  experience. 


94  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

It  is  an  error  for  one  to  think  that  it  is  pos- 
sible to  construe  this  "  unity  of  consciousness  " 
according  to  the  analogy  of  the  composition  of 
physical  forces.  For  if  it  is  said,  that  just  as  a 
single  resultant  originates  from  two  different  mo- 
tions, and  no  further  regard  is  paid  to  the  duality 
of  the  causes  from  which  it  sprung,  so  also,  can 
a  perfect  unity  of  consciousness  proceed  from  a 
multiplicity  of  psychical  motions  when  united;  — 
then  this  analogy  derived  from  mechanics  has  been 
only  inaccurately  expressed.  In  truth,  the  assertion 
amounts  to  this  :  If  two  motions  act  upon  one 
and  the  same  indivisible  point,  or  on  the  same 
real  element,  they  produce  a  single  resultant,  which 
does  not  then  hover  in  mid-air,  but  exists  only  as 
a  state  of  the  very  same  simple  clement  on  which 
the  components  act. 

Thus  completed,  the  analogy  by  no  means  leads 
to  the  result  wished  for,  but  directly  back  to  the 
ordinary  view.  That  is  to  say,  the  many  elements, 
even  in  case  they  should  possess  psychical  capacity, 
would  produce  the  unity  of  consciousness  only  if 
there  were  some  one  indivisible  '  unit-element,' 
into  which  all  their  influences  might  discharge,  as 
it  were,  and  which  by  its  own  nature  would  be 
capable  of  focusing  all  these  impressions  in  its  own 
consciousness. 


UNITY    OF    CONSCIOUSNESS.  95 

§  63.  If  we  call  a,  b  .  .  .  z,  the  single  corporeal 
elements,  each  of  which  may  be  at  the  same  time 
physically  and  psychically  endowed,  then  the  ques- 
tion arises,  What  result,  at  a  given  time,  can  the 
reciprocal  action  of    each    with    every  other    have  ? 

Were  they  all  of  like  species,  and  under  like 
conditions,  then  scarcely  anything  else  could  happen 
but  that,  at  the  end  of  the  time,  all  would  be  in  the 
same  terminal  state  Z.  Were  this  Z,  therefore,  a 
consciousness,  then  it  would  be  such,  and  of  course 
with  the  same  content,  repeated  as  many  times 
over  as  there  are  elements  which  act  on  each 
other.  On  the  contrary,  a  unity  of  consciousness 
apart  from  this  similarity  of  all  the  exemplars  of 
consciousness,  would  not  originate. 

In  reality,  however,  the  elements  a,  b  .  .  .  z,  are 
not  of  like  species  ;  but  they  certainly  are  sub- 
ject, in  the  structure  of  the  organism,  to  very 
diverse  conditions.  Some  of  them,  on  account  of 
their  inferior  nature,  and  their  unfavorable  situ- 
ation, can  only  receive  a  few  influences  from 
without  in  an  immediate  and  lively  way ;  others, 
in  themselves  superior  or  more  favorably  placed, 
develop  a  much  richer  consciousness  representing 
in  itself  all  possible  states  of  the  others.  Which 
now  of  these  many  dissimilar  examples  of  con- 
sciousness is  our  own,  —  the  one  we  know  through 
inner  experience } 


96  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

We  should  naturally  assume  it  would  be  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  most  preeminent  element  of  all,  — 
the  central  monad  of  our  body  according  to  Leibnitz. 
For  we  find  that  the  changes  of  our  body  are 
most  intimately  connected  with  the  states  of  our 
ego,  and  that  very  little  happens  in  it  which  we 
should  have  reason  to  ascribe  to  the  activity  of 
other  centres   of   consciousness. 

§  64.  According  to  the  foregoing  it  follows,  there- 
fore, that  we  can  in  no  way  get  rid  of  regarding 
the  one  and  indivisible  subject  of  our  conscious- 
ness as  a  party  separate  by  itself ;  while  the  other 
party  consists  in  the  body,  —  that  is,  in  an  aggre- 
gate or  ordered  multiplicity  of  elements  which, 
taken  singly,  are  perhaps  kindred  to  the  nature 
of  the  soul,  and  yet  are  in  no  case  identical  with 
it,   but  of  a  different  essence. 

This  assumption  —  in  itself  conceivable  —  of  a 
psychical  life  in  every  element  of  the  body,  remains 
otherwise  wholly  useless  for  the  explanation  of  our 
soul-life  ;  for  if  we  can  never  transport  ourselves 
into  these  states  of  the  elements,  they  have  a 
value  for  us  merely  in  so  far  as  they  act  upon 
our  soul  as  stimuli,  and  cause  the  latter  to  pro- 
duce its  oivn  inner  states,  which  are  the  only 
ones   known  to  us.     On  this  account,   the  material 


ESSENCE    OF    THE    SOUL.  97 


elements  also  can  be  further  considered  merely  as 
being  material. 

The  other  assumption,  intimately  connected  with 
the  foregoing,  that  the  soul  also  on  its  side  has 
physical  properties,  perhaps  answers  to  some  use  ; 
but  the  ordinary  mode  of  conception  has  not  main- 
tained it,  but  has  set  the  soul  as  an  immaterial 
essence,  in  opposition  to  the  material  elements,  and 
has  thus  at  once  produced  the  difficulties  of  the 
following  chapter. 


CHAPTER   II. 

OF    THE    RECIPROCAL    ACTION    BETWEEN    SOUL    AND 

BODY, 

§  65.  If  the  possibility  of  an  immaterial  essence 
is  conceded  (on  which  point,  see  later),  it  is  custo- 
mary to  object  further,  —  in  that  case  a  reciprocal 
action  between  it  and  the  body  is  at  least  impos- 
sible. 

The  latter,  it  is  said,  would  find  no  point  of  at- 
tachment for  its  physical  forces  to  the  compara- 
tively phantom-like  soul  ;  the  soul  would  exercise 
no  motor  force  by  means  of  its  inner  states  upon 
the  masses  of  the  body ;  the  perfect  incompara- 
bility  of  the  two  therefore  abolishes  all  action  be- 
tween them. 

§  66.  To  this  it  is  to  be  replied  :  We  deceive 
ourselves  if  we  believe  we  are  able  in  any  case  to 
comprehend  how  it  is  that  a  reciprocal  action  takes 
place ;  and  if  we  then  regard  the  relation  between 
body  and  soul  as  an  incoiivenient  exception  in  which 
this  effort  at  explanation  does  not  succeed. 

If  we  observe  the  motive  power  of  a  machine  and 
the  way  in  which  its  component  parts  work  on  each 


THE    MYSTERY    OF    MECHANISM.  99 

Other,  we  believe  we  understand  its  action  ;  because 
our  intuition  has  in  this  case  attained  a  view  of 
various  things  about  it.  On  further  reflection,  how- 
ever, we  discover  that  we  do  not  understand  the 
two  conditions  on  which  the  action  of  all  machines 
depends,  —  namely,  the  cohesion  of  the  solid  parts 
and  the  communication  of  motion.  We  can  of 
course  multiply  words  about  the  matter :  but,  in  the 
last  result,  we  are  still  in  ignorance  how  one  part  of 
a  solid  body  manages  to  hold  its  neighbor  firmly 
attached  to  itself ;  or  how  it  manages  to  cause  a 
motion,  in  which  it  is  itself  caught,  to  cease  and 
to  reappear  in  another  place.  What  we  therefore 
actually  observe  in  such  cases  is  merely  the  exter- 
nal scenery  which  a  series  of  processes  runs  through, 
every  single  one  of  which  is  connected  with  its 
successor  in  a  perfectly  invisible  and  incomprehen- 
sible manner. 

In  the  relation  between  body  and  soul  we  are  not 
able  to  follow  this  series  of  processes  quite  so  far 
as  we  might  wish.  But  if  we  could  follow  it,  for 
example,  up  to  the  point  where  the  physical  excita- 
tions act  on  the  soul,  this  last  transition  would,  of 
course,  be  in  no  respects  a  matter  of  intuitive  knowl- 
edge ;  but  still  it  would  not  be  in  the  least  degree 
more  incomprehensible  than  the  transition  of  a 
motion  from  one  material  element  to  the  other. 


lOO  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


§  67.  The  reason  that  awakens  the  doubt  to  which 
we  alluded  is  the  false  assertion  —  frequently  to  be 
met  with  even  in  antiquity  —  that  only  like  things 
(or  what  is  of  like  species)  can  act  on  each  other  and 
be  acted  on  by  each  other. 

One  can  be  tempted  to  make  the  foregoing  asser- 
tion only  in  case  one  regards  the  effect  to  be  pro- 
duced as  a  state  which  is  pre-existent  ready-made  in 
the  efficient  cause  a,  and  is  assumed  to  be  trans- 
ferred unchanged  to  b,  and  on  this  account  naturally 
requires  in  b  a  lodgement  similar  to  that  which  it 
has  in  a,  and  therefore  a  comparability  in  general  of 
b  with  a. 

In  opposition  to  such  a  view  we  derive  from  meta- 
physic  the  conviction,  that  such  a  loosing  of  a  state 
from  that  of  which  it  is  a  state,  and  a  transition  of  it 
to  another  subject,  is  wholly  inconceivable.  With- 
out any  exception  the  action  of  an  a  upon  a  b  con- 
sists in  this,  that,  according  to  a  general  order  of 
the  world  (about  which  nothing  is  to  be  said  in  this 
connection)  a  state  a  of  a  is  for  b  the  compelling 
occasion,  on  which  this  b  produces  from  its  own 
nature  a  new  state  p,  which  as  a  rule  need  have 
no  similarity  whatever  to  the  state  a  of  a  ;  for,  as 
even  the  most  ordinary  experience  teaches,  one  and 
the  same  influence  a  has  very  different  results  ac- 
cording as  the  objects  b,  c,  d  are  different,  on  which 
-t  falls. 


BONDS  BETWEEN  BODY  AND  SOUL.       lOI 

We  have  therefore  no  justification  at  all  for  setting 
up  conditions,  which  must  be  fulfilled,  if  an  a  is  to 
have  any  effect  whatever  on  a  b.  The  likeness  or 
similarity  of  the  two  imparts  to  the  possibility  of 
their  action  no  greater  comprehensibility  or  proba- 
bility ;  and  their  unlikeness,  or  even  their  perfect 
incomparability,  no  less. 

§  68.  The  demand  is  frequently  made  for  3ome 
bond  between  body  and  soul,  in  order  to  comprehend 
the  possibility  of  their  reciprocal  action. 

But  '  bonds '  are  needed  only  to  unite  those  things 
which  do  not  of  themselves  act  on  each  other,  but 
are  indifferent  to  each  other.  The  binding  power 
of  the  bond  depends,  however,  upon  this,  that  its 
single  parts  are  attached  to  each  other ;  and  this 
fact  we  cannot  always  be  explaining  over  and  over 
by  new  bonds  between  ;  but  in  the  last  result  it 
depends  upon  a  perfectly  immediate  reciprocal  ac- 
tion of  the  single  elements  which  hold  each  other 
fast  without  any  conceivable  machinery  intervening. 

We  should  therefore  make  use  of  a  bond  between 
body  and  soul  only  in  case  we  regarded  them  as 
wholly  indifferent  to  each  other.  But  even  if  we 
had  such  a  bond,  it  would  be  of  no  service  to  us  ; 
for  the  definite  forms  in  which  the  body  would  ac- 
cordingly act  on  the  soul,  and  the  soul  on  it,  would 


I02  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


by  no  means  proceed  from  the  bare  conception  of  the 
aforesaid  bond,  but  only  from  the  specific  natures  of 
the  two  elements  bound  together,  and  of  their  obli- 
gation to  reciprocal  action. 

Instead,  therefore,  of  otc  such  vain  bond,  we  assert 
that  the  two  arc  connected  by  very  many  peculiarly 
constituted  bonds  ;  each  single  reciprocal  action,  to 
which  they  are  by  their  natures  necessitated,  is  such 
a  bond,  which  holds  them  together,  not  in  a  merely 
general  but  in  a  definite  way. 

§  69.  We  proceeded  upon  the  concession  that  the 
conception  of  the  soul  as  an  immaterial  essence  is 
possible.  But  now  even  this  is  denied.  Only 
things  of  sense,  it  is  said,  are  accredited  by  imme- 
diate observation ;  supersensible  matters  are  invari- 
ably products  of  phantasy. 

But  only  the  most  elementary  view  of  nature  would 
believe  in  the  sensible  properties  of  colors,  taste, 
hardness,  etc.,  as  directly  constituting  the  real  being 
of  the  'Thing'  apparent.  It  is  now  a  long  time  since 
the  conviction  gained  ground  that  all  these  predi- 
cates are  only  phenomena  which  arise  in  our  con- 
sciousness at  the  excitation  of  an  external  some- 
what. What,  on  the  other  hand,  this  external 
reality  is,  through  whose  influence  these  predicates 
come  to  be,  they  do  not  inform  us. 


THE    REAL    AS    SUPERSENSIBLE.  IO3 

The  science  of  nature  therefore  very  early  re- 
nounced the  pretence  of  having  actual  intuitions 
through  the  senses  of  the  simplest  elements  of  real- 
ity. But  in  its  conception  of  the  atoms,  it  still  for 
a  long  time  thought  of  them  as  formally  similar  to 
bodies  perceivable  by  the  senses,  such  as  might  be 
supposed  to  spring  from  compounding  the  atoms  ; 
that  is  to  say,  as  being  of  a  very  minute  and  yet  of 
a  certain  extension,  and  of  an  unknown  and  yet 
definite  shape,  and  as  filling  this  small  volume  with 
a  perfect  impenetrability. 

Manifold  difhculties,  in  which  this  conception  is 
involved,  have  also  led  to  the  attempt  in  physics  to 
apprehend  the  atoms  as  absolutely  without  extension 
or  as  points  that  are  distinguished  from  empty  points 
of  space  merely  by  their  being  centres  of  forces 
which  act  outward,  as  well  as  real  points  of  seizure, 
as  it  were,  for  forces  that  come  from  without.  Such 
a  thought  has  no  other  meaning  than  this,  that  the 
atoms,  too,  are  in  themselves  supersensible  beings  :  — 
that  is  to  say,  such  beings  as  are  not  merely  in  fact, 
on  account  of  their  minuteness,  perfectly  unapproach- 
able to  ^?/;' perception  by  the  senses,  but  on  account 
of  their  nature  are  so  to  every  such  perception  ;  and 
that  all  the  intuitions  of  sense,  which  at  first  appear 
to  set  before  us  with  exactness  what  is  in  itself  real, 
are  merely  secondary  phenomena  in  which  the  re- 


104         OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 

suits  of  the  reciprocal  actions  of  elements,  in  them- 
selves wholly  supersensible,  reach  our  perception. 

Accordingly  it  is  not  the  conception  of  iuiviaterial, 
but  that  of  material  being,  which  is  to  be  scrupled  at ; 
and  the  gap  does  not  exist,  which  appears  to  us  at 
first  to  separate  body  and  soul  as  two  perfectly 
heterogeneous  elements,  and  to  render  their  recipro- 
cal action  impossible. 


CHAPTER    III. 

THE    SEAT    OF    THE    SOUL. 

§  70.  An  immaterial  real  being  can  have  no  exten- 
sion  in  space :  it  may,  however,  have  a  position  ;  and 
this  we  define  as  the  point  up  to  which  all  influences 
from  without  must  be  transplanted,  in  order  to  make 
an  impression  on  this  being,  and  from  which  alone 
outward  this  being  exercises  immediate  effects  upon 
its  environment-  In  reference  to  the  soul  no  one 
doubts  that  it  is  present  only  within  its  own  body ; 
for  it  is  only  here  that  it  acts  immediately  upon 
the  whole  external  world,  although  solely  through 
the  mediation  of  the  body. 

§  71.  Now  the  attempt  has  been  made  to  conceive 
of  the  spatial  relation  of  the  soul  to  the  body,  in  the 
first  place,  according  to  the  analogy  of  our  ideas  con- 
cerning the  omnipresence  of  God. 

By  this  we  mean  that  God  is  alike  near  to  every 
point  of  the  world  with  his  immediate  activity  ;  that 
consequently,  his  will  is  neither  compelled  to  traverse 
any  way  whatever  in  order  to  reach  an  element  of 
the  universe  z ;  nor  does  it  need  any  intermediate 
agency,  in  order  to  act  on  z.     But  we  by  no  means 


I06  OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


intend  by  this  that  the  infinite  extension  of  the 
arena  which  God  thus  controls  belongs  as  a  spatial 
property  to  God  himself. 

Now  in  just  the  same  way  is  the  soul  assumed  to 
be  present  everywhere  in  its  body  without  being 
itself  a  space-magnitude. 

The  foregoing  analogy  is,  however,  wholly  unser- 
viceable. We  have  already  (to  wit,  on  the  occasion 
of  considering  the  "  feelings  of  double  contact ") 
seen,  by  how  complicated  means  it  is  that  nature 
succeeds  in  producing  this  illusion,  so  indispensable 
to  the  beauty  of  our  life,  as  though  we  were  present 
immediately  sensitive  and  moving  about  in  every  part 
of  our  body.  On  the  contrary,  physiological  experi- 
ments show  that  the  soul  stands  in  immediate  reci- 
procity with  absolutely  no  more  than  tlie  central 
organs  of  the  nervous  system  ;  and  with  all  the 
rest  of  the  body  only  mediately  through  the  nerves 
themselves. 

§  72.  Just  as  inapplicable  is  the  analogy  involved 
in  a  second  way  of  representation,  to  which  natural 
science  accustoms  us  ;  to  wit,  that  of  a  physical  force 
which  acts  immediately,  and  without  any  intervening 
mechanism,  in  all  infinitely  remote  regions,  but  with 
a  graded  intensity,  that  is,  one  that  diminishes  with 
the  distance.     On  account  of  the  first  circumstance 


CONNECTION  OF  SOUL  AND  BODY.       IQ^ 

we  should  be  able  to  say  of  that  body  which  is  the 
conveyer  of  the  force,  —  It  is  in  space  everywhere ; 
on  account  of  the  second,  we  still  ascribe  to  it  a 
limited  situation  in  space,  namely,  there  where  its 
action  is  greatest. 

But  the  smallest  interruption  in  the  continuity  of 
a  nerve,  even  in  the  closest  proximity  to  the  brain, 
abolishes  the  reciprocal  action  of  the  soul  with  that 
region  of  the  body  over  which  the  same  nerve  is 
expanded.  It  has  therefore  no  power  which  acts  at 
a  distance,  such  as  would  be  able  to  stretch  itself 
over  and  beyond  this  interruption. 

Nothing  remains  for  us  then  but  the  third  analogy, 
namely,  that  of  effects  which  follow  upon  contact  by 
communication  of  motions. 

§  73.  The  last  analogy  has  been  chiefly  followed, 
and  search  has  been  made  for  such  a  point  in  the 
central  organs,  in  which  all  the  sensory  nerves  unite, 
in  order  there  to  render  their  messages,  and  from 
which  all  the  motor  nerves  issue  forth,  in  order  to 
conduct  the  excitations  there  received  over  to  the 
body. 

The  above-mentioned  idea  not  only  has  certain 
inner  difficulties,  but  is  essentially  out  of  accord 
with  our  empirical  cognition.  Not  merely  is  it  true 
that  no  such  terminal  point  for  the  entire  net-work 


nam 


I08  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGV. 

of  nerves  has  hitherto  been  discovered  ;  but  there 
is  even  the  most  well-founded  cause  for  the  asser- 
tion that  it  never  will  be  found. 

The  question  now  arises,  how  we  can  ever  still 
maintain  under  these  circumstances  the  conception 
of  a  seat  for  the  soul. 

§  74.  We  recur  to  our  original  definition  of  such  a 
seat,  but  we  interpret  it  still  further  by  the  following 
means. 

We  are  in  error  if  we  say  that  a  being  is  first  in  a 
place,  and  then  in  consequence  thereof  is  able  to  act 
on  its  environment.  As  long  as  we  continue  to 
abstract  from  the  effects,  it  can  by  no  means  be 
made  clear,  precisely  in  what  the  Thing's  being  at 
this  place  consists  ;  and  whereby  this  is  distinguished 
from  its  being  at  another  place,  at  which  the  Thing 
would  exist  exactly  as  w-ell  as  at  the  former  place. 
We  believe  rather  that  the  order  of  the  thoughts 
must  be  reversed,  and  wc  must  say :  If  it  is  in- 
volved in  tlie  nature  of  a  being  a,  in  general  to  in- 
terchange actions  and  reactions  with  b,  c,  <1,  then  its 
systematic  position  in  the  coherency  of  things  is 
determined  thereby,  and  in  the  spatial  arrangement 
of  the  world  it  is  that  point  whose  immediate  envi- 
ronment is  constituted  by  b,  c,  and  d. 

Now  in  general,  the  connection  of  all  things  may 


POSITION    AND    THE    SOUL. 


109 


be  so  many-sided  that  an  element  a  is  not  merely- 
destined  to  enter  into  reciprocal  action  with  the 
group  b,  c,  d,  but  also  just  as  immediately  with 
another  group  p,  q,  r;  while,  nevertheless,  p,  q,  r  on 
account  of  other  different  relations  do  not  possess 
their  systematic  position  with  b,  c,  d,  and  therefore 
do  not  have  their  spatial  position  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  the  latter,  but  separated  by  a  distance  from 
them.  In  this  case  the  active  element  a  will  have 
not  one  but,  with  equal  right,  several  special  positions 
without  on  this  account  itself  falling  into  a  multitude 
of  pieces  ;  precisely  as  we  should  think  of  God  as 
present  everywhere  and  still  not  in  Himself  ex- 
tended. Omnipresence  would,  of  course,  compre- 
hend all  space :  in  this  case,  on  the  contrary,  we 
should  be  compelled  to  require  in  particular  that 
several  positions  separated  in  space  should  be  as- 
cribed to  the  immaterial  being  ;  and  that  these 
positions  should  be  separated  from  each  other  by 
intervening  spaces  in  which  its  presence  would  not 
be  found  in  the  same  way.  But  no  special  difficulty 
is  involved  in  this.  We  have  merely  to  overcome 
the  customary  propensity  of  our  power  of  imagina- 
tion, which  might  persist  in  apprehending  the  im- 
material being  after  the  model  of  a  corporeal  atom, 
and  in  ascribing  to  it,  on  this  account,  a  visible 
circumscribed  magnitude  and  form,  and  accordingly 
also  only  one  position  in  space. 


IIO  OUTLlNIiS    OF    I'SVCllOLUC.V 


^  75.  The  question  still  remains  unanswered,  Why 
then  should  single  parts  of  the  brain  have  the 
preference  of  being  '  seats  '  of  the  soul,  and  other 
parts,  on  the  contrary,  not  be  thus  preferred ; 
although  still,  so  far  as  we  know,  there  exist  no 
significant  differences  in  their  structure  or  compo- 
sition ? 

On  this  point,  too,  we  are  compelled  to  alter  a 
customary  representation.  An  element  a  is  not 
destined  to  stand  at  all  times  in  reciprocal  rela- 
tions with  a  certain  other  sort  of  element  1>,  and 
not  with  a  third  sort  c  ;  the  rather  is  every  being 
a  interested,  or  excited  to  action,  only  through  what 
happens  in  other  beings.  If  this  X,  on  occurring, 
is,  according  to  the  plan  of  the  whole  arrangement 
of  the  world,  the  conditioning  premise  from  which 
the  new  state  is  to  originate  in  a,  then  it,  too,  docs 
originate ;  and  in  such  case  a  experiences  the  in- 
fluence of  this  X,  whether  this  came  about  in  b  or 
in  c.  If,  on  the  contrary,  X  is  not  such  premise, 
then  a  remains  in  equilibrium  and  unaltered,  whether 
now  X  takes  place  in  a  b  or  in  a  c. 

Now  just  so  will  the  soul  enter  into  reciprocal 
action  only  with  those  points  of  the  central  organs 
in  which  all  the  combinations,  equilibrations,  and 
elaborations  of  the  physical  excitations  are  executed ; 
and  only  after  the  perfecting  of  the  former  do  the 


THE    BRAIN    AND    THE    MIND.  Ill 

latter,   it  is  assumed,  reach   the  soul's  cognition  or 
become  legitimate  encitements  of  its  activity. 

§  76.  If  therefore  any  one  should  be  able  to 
observe  with  a  microscope  what  goes  on  in  the 
interior  of  the  brain,  just  as  accurately  as  the  ana- 
tomical structure  admits  of  being  observed,  super- 
ficially everything  would  appear  precisely  as  mate- 
rialism asserts.  That  is  to  say,  at  different  points 
of  the  brain  individual  psychical  processes  would 
be  set  up  on  occasion  of  the  physical  processes 
taking  their  course  thither ;  and  nowhere  would  a 
being  of  the  soul  in  its  unity  show  itself  as  the 
object  of  such  contemplation. 

But  the  interpretation,  which  materialism  gives  of 
this  matter  of  fact,  we  do  not  share.  These  psychi- 
cal functions  do  not  originate  from  those  physical 
processes  as  an  addendum,  or  a  product,  that  carries 
its  own  explanation  with  it  :  they  are  invariably 
possible  only  in  case  we  apprehend  these  latter  as 
mere  stimuli  which  act  upon  the  peculiar  nature 
of  the  soul's  essential  being, — everywhere  present 
here  and  not  bound  to  one  seat  of  the  form  of  a 
mathematical  point,  —  and  which  cause  it  to  exer- 
cise its  own  capacities. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

THE    TIME-RELATIONS    OF    THE    SOUL. 

§  77.  Mere  experience  could  only  lead  us  to  the 
thought: — The  soul  originates  with  the  body,  and 
with  it  perishes  as  well.  Necessities  of  quite  an- 
other order,  which  are  foreign  to  this  theoretical 
investigation,  have  excited  the  wish  to  make  sure 
of  its  immortality ;  and  the  attempt  has  been  made 
to  do  this  by  subordinating  it  under  a  conception 
of  '  Substance,'  which  would  per  se  contain  the 
predicate  of  indestructibility. 

Such  subordination  leads,  in  the  first  place,  to  two 
inconvenient  consequences,  which  one  would  gladly 
avoid.  That  is  to  say,  the  reasons  on  account  of 
which  the  Jininan  soul  might  be  subordinated  under 
this  conception  of  substance  would  also  hold  good 
for  every  animal  soul.  On  the  other  hand,  inde- 
structibility would  include,  not  merely  immortality 
after  death,  but  also  unending  pre-existence  before 
the  present  life ;  and  with  the  latter  we  neither 
know  how  to  make  a  beginning,  nor  do  we  find  in 
our  experience  any  evidence  for  such  a  previous  life. 

Finally,  moreover,  the  question  would  be  asked : 


THE    SOUL    AS    SUBSTANCE.  II3 

Whether,  in  case  the  conception  of  substance  in- 
cludes such  an  impossibility  of  ceasing  to  be,  it  is 
of  any  use  whatever,  and  not  a  mere  figment  of  the 
brain  ;  and  whether,  in  the  former  case,  the  soul  cer- 
tainly belongs  to  what  must  be  included  under  the 
conception. 

§  78.  Now  'Substance'  is  in  fact  nothing  but  a 
title  which  is  attached  to  everything  that  has  the 
power  to  act  on  something  else,  and  be  acted  upon 
by  something  else,  to  experience  different  states, 
and  in  the  interchange  of  such  states  to  do  work 
as  a  permanent  unity. 

On  the  contrary,  it  is  a  figment  of  the  brain  to 
believe  we  can  discover  yet  further  explanations  on 
the  point,  how  the  capacity  for  such  mode  of  behav- 
ior is  brought  to  pass ;  and  to  seek  for  such  expla- 
nation in  thinking  of  a  bit  of  rigid  and  indestructible 
substance  as  being  included  in  everything,  and  of 
all  the  rest  of  the  properties  or  states,  by  which  one 
such  thing  is  distinguished  from  another,  as  being 
grouped  about  this  firm  kernel.  If  one  attempts 
actually  to  make  use  of  such  a  conception,  it  uni- 
formly shows  itself  completely  useless  in  explain- 
ing the  phenomena  for  the  sake  of  which  it  was 
assumed.  It  does  not  admit  of  being  shown  how 
such    a    substantial    kernel    could    consist    with    the 


114  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

nianiloldness  and  changeableness  of  the  properties 
of  which  it  is  asserted  (and  this,  too,  again  with  a 
word  devoid  of  meaning)  that  they  'inhere'  in  it. 

Briefly  expressed,  then  :  Things  are  not  '  things ' 
by  means  of  a  so-called  substance  being  concealed 
in  them  ;  but,  because  they  are  such  as  they  are, 
and  behave  themselves  in  the  manner  in  which  they 
do  behave  themselves,  they  produce  for  our  imagina- 
tion the  false  appearance,  as  though  such  a  substance 
existed  in   them  as  the  basis  of  their  behavior. 

Now  the  soul,  so  long  as  it  does  not  merely 
exhibit  itself  to  others  as  a  "  unit-subject "  of  its 
interior  states,  but  is  itself  conscious  there  of,  de- 
serves in  the  fullest  measure  this  title  of  a  "  sub- 
stance "  or  real  being.  ' 

On  the  other  hand,  nothing  whatever  justices  us 
in  making  the  assertion  that  just  this  capacity,  if  it 
is  once  exercised,  must  then  eternally  be  exercised, 
and  cannot  in  the  course  of  things  be  originated  or 
perish  again. 

§  79.  To  reach  a  decision  on  this  point,  we  bor- 
row from  Metaphysic  a  conviction  that  sta'ads  in 
opposition  to  the  ideas  to  which  the  investigation 
of  nature  has  accustomed  us. 

For  the  latter  believes  that  the  course  of  the 
world  admits  of  being  explained  by  the  assumption 


THE    SOUL    AS    SUBSTANCE.  II5 


of  a  multiplicity  of  original  elements,  which  are  held 
to  be  independent  of  each  other  in  such  manner  that 
each  could  exist  alone  even  if  all  the  others  were 
not ;  which,  further,  have  in  themselves  no  necessary 
relation  to  one  another,  but  in  fact  have  either  been 
subsequently  drawn  into  such  relations  or  have  stood 
in  them  even  from  eternity ;  and  which,  finally,  are 
compelled  by  general  laws  to  exercise  this  reciprocal 
action  in  this  relation,  and  another  action  in  a  differ- 
ent relation. 

On  the  contrary,  we  affirm  briefly  this  :  No  influ- 
ence whatever  of  one  element  on  another  is  really 
conceivable  without  self-contradiction,  as  long  as 
these  elements  are  thought  of  as  originally  inde- 
pendent of  each  other  and  devoid  of  relation  toward 
each  other.  Such  influence  is  only  possible  in  case 
we  consider  them  all  simply  as  modifications,  de- 
pendent and  constantly  related  to  each  other,  of 
One  single  truly  existent  Being,  which  is  in  them 
all  as  the  ground  of  their  existence;  —  the  ground, 
further,  on  account  of  which  they  are  compelled  to 
effectuate  somewhat  definite  under  fixed  conditions, 
and  the  ground,  finally,  of  this  also,  that  these  pre- 
scribed obligations  are  able  to  attain  to  accomplish- 
ment. 

Or,  to  express  the  same  truth  in  another  way, 
all  '  Things  '  are  what  they  are,  and  accomplish  what 


Il6  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

they  do  accomplish,  not  by  means  of  a  natural  right 
which  became  theirs  previous  to  the  existence  of  the 
world,  so  that  subsequently  the  world  was  compelled 
to  govern  itself  accordingly,  and  could  only  actualize 
that  which  these  privileged  ones  allowed.  Tlie  rather 
is  it  true  that  Things  are  and  accomplish  all,  only 
on  the  commission,  as  it  were,  of  this  One  true 
Being ;  and  all  which  we  commonly  regard  as 
ultimate  unchangeable  elements  and  laws  of  the 
world's  course,  has  this  unchangeableness  and  this 
value,  too,  only  on  commission  of  the  plan  for  the 
actualization  of  which  it  is  bound  to  serve. 

§  80.  The  foregoing  way  of  apprehending  the 
matter  has  not  been  devised,  for  the  first  time,  in 
favor  of  our  present  inquiry.  It  is  rather  necessary, 
in  order  to  comprehend  even  the  most  insignificant 
action  of  one  element  on  another.  But  it  admits  of 
an  application  to  the  case  we  are  now  considering. 

It  may  even  be  a  part  of  the  plan  of  actuality, 
that  over  a  wide  domain  all  its  changing  phenomena 
are  effectuated  by  means  of  combinations  of  unalter- 
able elements  and  according  to  the  rule  of  universal 
laws.  Accordingly,  there  exist  in  the  world  these 
constant  masses,  the  activity  of  which  always  results 
in  like  manner,  and  which  are  nothing  else  but 
^^ actions'''  uniformly  maintained  or  exercised  by  the 
aforesaid  sole  Existence. 


THE    ORIGIN    OF    THE    SOUL.  llj 


But  in  the  same  way  it  may  be  a  part  of  the  be- 
fore-mentioned plan,  that  other  elements  make  their 
appearance  only  at  definite  points  of  time  in  the 
world's  course,  —  that  is  to  say,  when  all  the  prelim- 
inary conditions  are  actualized,  which,  according  to 
the  plan  of  the  whole,  may  form  the  basis  of  their 
existence.  But  nothing  hinders  these  elements,  too, 
in  case  they  have  originated,  from  maintaining  them- 
selves as  real  units,  indivisible  and  independent 
centres  of  ingoing  and  outgoing  effects. 

Among  SKc/i  elements  do  we  reckon  the  Soul. 
But  a  further  inquiry,  as  to  how  this  its  independence 
is  brought  about,  we  dismiss  as  quite  out  of  place. 
We  should  just  as  little  be  able  to  specify  how  it  is 
reached,  or  brought  about,  that  one  of  those  con- 
stant elemental  masses  can  exist  and  maintain  itself 
forever. 

§  81.  At  the  place  where,  and  at  the  moment 
when,  the  germ  of  an  organic  being  is  formed  amid 
the  coherent  system  of  the  physical  course  of  nature, 
this  fact  furnishes  the  encitement  or  the  moving 
reason,  which  induces  that  all-comprehending  One 
Being,  —  present  not  otherwheres,  but  even  here,  — 
to  beget  from  himself,  besides,  as  a  consistent  sup- 
plement to  such  physical  fact,  the  soul  belonging  to 
this  organism. 


Il8  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


Superficially  regarded,  therefore,  Materialism  has 
the  right  of  it  here  also  ;  that  is  to  say,  the  soul  also 
originates  /;/  and  with  the  body,  but,  in  sooth,  not  of 
and  thi'oiigh  it.  And  all  inquiries  are  useless  con- 
cerning the  manner  in  which  it  is,  as  it  were,  joined 
from  the  outside  with  the  body. 

Touching  Immortality,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
no  subject  for  theoretical  decision.  In  general  we 
simply  hold  the  principle  to  be  valid,  that  everything 
which  has  once  originated  will  endure  forever,  as 
soon  as  it  possesses  an  unalterable  value  for  the 
coherent  system  of  the  world  ;  but  it  will,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  in  turn  cease  to  be,  if  this  is  not 
the  case.  However,  this  principle  is  wholly  inappli- 
cable in  our  human  hands  ;  we  cannot  presume  to 
tell  in  what  the  merits  might  consist  which  justify 
such  duration  ;  or  in  what  the  deficiency  which 
makes  it  impossible. 


CHAPTER   V. 


THE    SOUL  S    ESSENCE. 


§  82.  In  investigating  the  '  Essence '  of  a  Thing 
we  may  wish  to  know,  in  the  first  place  :  whereby 
this  thing  is  distinguished  from  others  ;  and  second  : 
how  it  is  possible  for  the  content  thus  designated  to 
exist  as  real  Thiwr. 

The  second  inquiry  admits  of  being  answered  in 
the  case  of  objects  whose  distinguishing  character 
consists  simply  in  the  shaping  of  a  previously  ex- 
isting material ;  wc  are  then  wont  to  consider  just 
this  material  as  the  essence  and  the  aforesaid  form 
as  only  unessential.  But  a  simple  material  itself, 
like  every  simple  essence,  can  never  consist  of  some- 
what other  than  it  is  itself. 

On  the  other  hand,  to  specify  how  it  is  brought 
about  that  any  so-called  '  content '  whatever  can  be, 
act,  and  be  acted  upon,  as  a  '  Thing,'  we  have  already 
often  declined  to  consider,  as  an  unanswerable 
inquiry.  Accordingly,  our  discourse  can  only  be 
of    this  :  by  what    peculiar    character,   which    consti- 


I20  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


tutes    its    essence,    the    soul    is    distinguished    from 
other  substances. 

§  83.  We  liave  no  other  way  of  learning  what 
is  the  nature  of  any  Thing,  even  that  of  matter, 
except  by  its  achievements  and  its  effects.  It  is 
therefore  no  fault  of  psychology,  but  the  most  nat- 
ural way  of  procedure,  to  determine  in  this  manner, 
by  reasoning  backward,  the  nature   of  the  soul. 

The  first  systematic  attempt  at  this,  the  doctrine 
of  the  soul's  faculties,  has  certainly  remained  without 
result.  The  various  psychical  achievements  were 
classified  according  to  their  similarity  ;  and  it  was 
then  of  course  correct  to  assume,  besides,  a  '  faculty ' 
for  every  such  group  of  actual  achievements.  But 
this  conception  was  not  so  fruitful  as  that  of  'force' 
for  the  science  of  physics.  For  the  physicist  does 
not  speak  of  force  seriously  until  the  time  when 
he  is  able  to  specify,  not  merely  a  form  of  action, 
but  also  a  law  according  to  which  the  magnitude 
of  the  action  alters  in  proportion  to  the  alteration 
of  certain  conditions. 

The  faculties  of  the  soul,  on  the  contrary,  were 
merely  abstracted  from  the  form  of  the  achievements 
themselves,  and  no  law  for  them  was  known ;  it 
amounted,  accordingly,  merely  to  the  tautology  that, 
for  example,  the  faculty  of  sensation  produces  sen- 


THE  THEORY  OF  FACULTIES.  121 

sations  ;  but  nothing  was  known  as  to  what  sensa- 
tions under  what  conditions. 

On  the  other  hand,  physics  is  only  so  far  perfected 
as  it  is  possible  to  reduce  all  natural  processes  to 
mere  motions  of  masses.  By  means  of  such  specific 
likeness  in  what  happens,  it  is  possible  accurately 
to  determine  the  result  which  originates  from 
the  simultaneous  co-operation  of  different  forces 
upon  the  same  object.  On  the  contrary,  the  psychi- 
cal states  could  be  reduced  to  no  such  common 
measure.  What  must  originate,  therefore,  in  case 
an  act  of  the  faculty  of  feeling  coincides  with  an 
act  of  the  faculty  of  representation,  does  not  admit 
in  the  least  of  being  conjectured  on  grounds  of  this 
theory.  What  is  known  on  that  point  is  known 
independently  of  the  theory,  —  on  grounds  of  expe- 
rience and  knowledge  of  men. 

Neither  of  these  two  deficiencies  is  to  be  set  aside 
by  any  improved  carrying  out  of  this  theory.  It 
can  therefore  hold  good  simply  as  a  summary  cata- 
logueing  of  spiritual  achievements,  but  not  as  an 
explanation. 

§  84.  The  unproductiveness  of  the  above-men- 
tioned theory,  and  the  slight  account  that  it  took 
of  the  connection  of  the  different  faculties,  which 
it  nevertheless  always  regarded  as  expressions  of  a 


122  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

soul  that  is  a  unity  in  the  strictest  sense,  induced 
Herbart  to  attempt  to  demonstrate  all  spiritual  ac- 
tivities and  all  these  faculties  as  a  series  of  results 
that  spring  successively  from  a  single  primitive 
activity  of  the  soul. 

The  soul,  he  held,  is  one  of  those  supersensible 
real  beings  of  perfectly  simple  quality,  which  left  to 
themselves  alone  would  always  remain  unmoved  the 
same,  but  which,  on  the  other  hand,  would  exercise 
acti\itics  of  '  self-preservation  '  as  soon  as  they  are 
exposed  to  external  stimuli  whose  influence,  if  it 
took  effect,  would  cause  a  disturbance  of  their  nature. 
And  indeed  these  acts  of  self-preservation  are  differ- 
ent in  kind,  according  as  the  disturbances  through 
which  they  are  induced  are  different.  Of  the  rest 
of  real  things,  —  for  example,  those  which  lie  at 
the  basis  of  matter,  —  we  are  not  able  to  know 
precisely  in  what  their  self-preservation  consists. 
Of  the  soul,  on  the  contrary,  we  do  know,  or  believe 
that  we  are  bound  to  assume,  that  they  are  univer- 
sally in  the  form  of  the  idea.  By  means  of  physical 
stimuli,  whose  influence  Herbart  did  not  follow 
further,  these  inducements  to  self-preservation  are 
imparted  to  the  soul,  and  the  ideas  here  originating 
—  that  is,  simple  sensations,  of  a  definite  color,  of 
a  tone,  of  a  taste  —  are  now  the  simple  elements  out 
of  whose  further  reciprocal  action  the  totality  of  the 
rest  of  the  soul's  life  is  assumed  to  originate. 


HERBART  S  THEORY  OF  THE  SOUL.       1 23 

We  here  simply  refer  with  gratitude  to  the  ex- 
planations previously  alluded  to,  which  the  course 
of  ideas  has  received,  in  accordance  with  general 
mechanical  laws,  by  means  of  the  above-mentioned 
view.  On  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  accord  with 
the  attempt  to  derive  all  the  soul's  higher  activities 
as  self-evident  mechanical  products  of  this  course 
of  ideas  without  presupposing  any  one  of  those 
faculties  that  have  not  as  yet  attained  to  an  expres- 
sion of  themselves.  This  principle  was  not  at  all 
necessary,  for  Herbart  himself  confessed  that  even 
the  simple  sensations  divide  up  into  quite  different 
classes,  —  colors,  tones,  tastes,  etc.,  —  no  one  of  which 
is  deducible  from  the  others  ;  that  the  soul,  there- 
fore, really  possesses  quite  distinct  faculties  which 
we  are  not  able  really  to  deduce  from  its  unity, 
although  we  certainly  hold  fast  by  such  unity. 
Nothing  therefore  would  have  hindered  the  as- 
sumption that  these  simple  sensations  also  and  their 
relations  to  each  other  acted  as  new  stimuli  upon 
the  whole  soul,  and  then  called  forth  in  it  wholly 
new  reactions  which  could  by  no  means  be  derived 
from  the  aforesaid  inducements  alone. 

Such  an  assumption  as  the  foregoing  could  be 
refuted  only  by  the  demonstration  that  it  is  unnec- 
essary, and  that  in  reality  all  higher  spiritual  activi- 
ties are    perfectly  self-evident  consequences  of   the 


124  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

mutual  impact,  as  it  were,  of  the  simple  ideas.  Such 
demonstration  has  not  succeeded;  —  on  which  point 
reference  may  be  made  to  the  following  examples. 

§  85.  We  have  already  in  previous  articles  found 
it  to  be  impossible  that  a  soul,  were  it  simply  an 
ideating  being,  should  apprehend  the  relations  be- 
tween its  ideas  otherwise  than  they  are,  and  there- 
fore as  spatial  while  they  are  really  non-spatial. 
If  it  nevertheless  does  so,  then  it  manifestly  adds 
out  of  its  own  nature  to  this  matter  of  fact  something 
new  which  does  not  follow  of  itself. 

Just  as  impossible  was  it  to  regard  attention  as 
mere  intensity  of  the  idea  itself  ;  for  then  the  subject 
would  be  wanting,  which  exercises  all  those  relating 
activities  in  which  every  actual  work  of  attention 
consists. 

Just  now  we  found  it  quite  as  impossible  to  con- 
sider feelings  of  pleasure  or  pain  as  self-evident 
results  of  the  different  situations  in  which  the  ideas 
can  come  to  be  toward  each  other  during  their 
course.  Were  the  soul  simply  an  'ideating  being' 
then  it  would  only  ideate  all  these  facts,  even  if 
they  contained  its  own  destruction,  with  accuracy 
and  complete  indifference.  That  it  takes  an  inter- 
est therein,  is  a  new  fact  which  must  flow  from 
another  peculiarity  of  its  essential  being. 


HEKBART  S  THEORY  OF  THE  SOUL.       1 25 

Finally,  no  one  will  be  persuaded  that  what  we 
mean  when  we  say,  "  I  will,"  has  no  other  sig- 
nificance than  the  arising  in  consciousness  of  an 
idea,  in  a  struggle  with  forces  which  seek  to  hin- 
der it.  However  obscure  and  mysterious  the  other 
thing  which  we  mean  by  that  expression  may  be, 
—  namely,  that  in  this  case  not  a  mere  occurrence 
but  a  deed  is  before  us,  which  is  accomplished  by 
ourselves  as  the  one  subject  of  our  entire  world  of 
ideas  ;  still  the  fact  itself,  which  we  do  thus  des- 
ignate and  discover  in  immediate  in,ner  experience, 
cannot  be  got  out  of  the  way  by  this  hypothe- 
sis, utterly  failing  as  it  does,  to  explain  how  even 
the  simple  appearance  of  such  acting  (in  contrast 
with   mere  happening)  can  originate  in   our  view. 

We  accordingly  conclude  with  the  following  con- 
viction :  It  was  possible  and  necessary  to  entrust 
to  the  soul  as  a  unity  much  more  than  the 
bare  capacity  for  having  ideas ;  and  even  those 
acts  of  self-preservation  of  the  primary  order,  which 
arose  as  'ideas'  in  consequence  of  external  stim- 
uli, could  subsequently  by  means  of  their  relations 
and  combinations  come  to  be  new  internal  stimuli 
by  which  the  other  capacities  of  the  soul,  not  pre- 
viously taken  into  account,  were  induced  to  express 
themselves. 


126  OUTLINES    OF    PSVCHOLOGY. 

§  86.  We  should  therefore  be  compelled  to  sur- 
render the  attempt  to  comprehend  the  origin  of  the 
higher  spiritual  activities  from  the  lower.  Instead 
of  such  a  mechanical  construction,  however,  an- 
other way  of  apprehending  the  matter  admits  of 
being  substituted,  —  a  way  which  would  show  that, 
in  any  case,  the  collective  whole  of  spiritual  expres- 
sions —  let  them  originate  as  they  will  —  fit  into 
one  another,  and  are  collectively  necessary  in  order 
perfectly  to  actualize  the  Idea  which  expresses  the 
soul's  destiny.  Such  an  attempt  did  the  idealistic 
systems  make  ;  and,  last,  that  of  Hegel. 

The  world  in  general,  they  held,  is  no  mere  fact, 
but  has  also  a  meaning.  In  this  totality  every  in- 
dividual has  its  definite  place  ;  and  the  essence  of 
each  Thing  consists,  strictly  speaking,  only  in  the 
partial  idea  whose  actualization  is  committed  to  it, 
and  by  means  of  which  it  makes  its  own  contribu- 
tion to  the  uninterrupted  fulfilment  of  the  highest 
or  total  Idea  of  the  world.  Could  we  now  formu- 
late for  this  highest  Idea  an  accurate  and  exhaus- 
tive expression,  then  we  should  be  able  to  deduce 
from  it  the  shape  of  each  Thing,  the  collective 
whole  of  the  capacities  necessary  to  it,  and,  finally, 
the  general  laws  according  to  which  these  must  act 
in  order  to  attain  the  aforesaid  destiny. 

But  since  the  foregoing  presupposition    does  not 


PLACE    OF    THE    HIGHEST    IDEA.  12/ 

admit  of  fulfilment,  instead  of  a  scientific  deduc- 
tion that  is  accessible  to  proof  and  counter-proof, 
only  such  an  one  can  be  secured  as,  with  more  or 
less  of  taste,  greater  or  less  of  aesthetic  justifica- 
tion, places  the  individual  spiritual  activities  in  con- 
nection with  a  more  or  less  profoundly  apprehended 
expression  which  is  thought  to  have  been  discovered 
for   the   aforesaid    highest    Idea. 

The  ingenious  conceptions,  which  are  after  all 
still  possible,  and  which  have  not  been  wanting, 
have  moreover  been  rendered  one-sided  by  an  his- 
torical circumstance.  The  inquiry  into  the  kind 
and  truth  of  our  cognition,  or  into  the  relation 
between  subject  and  object,  had  so  much  riveted 
all  attention,  that  the  process  by  which  the  Exist- 
ent attains  to  the  apprehension  of  itself  —  that  is 
to  say,  the  development  of  self-consciousness  —  was 
held  to  be  the  genuine  goal  or  ultimate  content  of 
the  entire  ordering  of  the  world.  And  now  the 
soul,  too,  appeared  destined  to  solve  this  problem 
of  'self-mirroring'  within  the  bounds  of  the  earthly 
life ;  and  the  different  forms  in  which  this  problem 
of  pure  intelligence  is  progressively  more  and  more 
completely  solved,  occupied  pretty  nearly  the  whole 
space  in  psychology.  But  the  content  of  that 
which  is  known  by  sense,  intuited,  or  conceived, 
withdrew    on    the    other   hand,    as    much    into    the 


128  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

background,  as  all  the  rest  of  the  soul's  life, — the 
feelings  and  efforts  ;  and  the  latter  themselves  came 
again  into  consideration  only  in  so  far  as  they  also 
could  be  put  into  relation  with  the  aforesaid  for- 
mal problem  of  self-objectifying. 


CHAPTER   VI. 

THE    CHANGEABLE    STATES    OF    THE    SOUL. 

§  87.  The  life  of  the  soul  does  not  consist  in 
the  uniform  possession  but  in  the  changeable  ex- 
ercise of  its  capacities.  In  this  regard  we  find  it 
in  manifest  dependence  on  the  body ;  but  for  the 
most  part  attain  the  possibility  of  more  accu- 
rately defining  this  dependence  only  on  occasion 
of  definite  disturbances  of  the  body. 

The  observations  which  may  be  made  on  this 
subject  admit,  however,  of  three  interpretations. 
In  the  first  place,  it  might  be  that  an  organ  now 
destroyed  has  been  the  productive  cause  of  the 
spiritual  function  which  becomes  impossible  after 
the  destruction  of  the  organ.  It  might  be  in  the 
second  place,  that  this  organ  has  been  the  exclu- 
sive medium  of  those  stimuli  of  which  the  soul 
has  need,  in  order  that  it  may  be  induced  to  the 
exercise  of  a  function  that  is  otherwise  comprehen- 
sible only  from  the  soul's  own  nature.  Lastly,  and 
in  the  third  place,  it  might  be  that  the  destruction 
of  the  organ,  either  immediately  or  by  virtue  of  the 
alteration  by  which  it  is  followed  in  other  organs, 
exercises    upon  the  soul  a  positive  effect,  although 


130  OUTLINES  OF  I'SVCHOLOGY, 

of  an  iiihibito)-)'  kind  ;  and  thereby  prevents  for  a 
time  the  expression  of  a  capacity  which,  in  itself 
considered,  continues  to  exist. 

Only  the  first  of  these  interpretations  appears  to 
us  in  itself  untenable,  on  account  of  the  impossi- 
bility of  comprehending  psychical  functions  as  self- 
evident  products  of  physical  processes.  But  if  we 
desired  to  know  how  both  are  to  be  understood 
simply  as  united  in  fact,  then  one  of  the  two  other 
interpretations  besides  would  be  necessary  in  each 
individual  case.  Only  the  latter,  therefore,  need  be 
tested  further. 

§  88.  If  by  Consciousness  we  understand  what 
we  yet  more  clearly  call  our  '  waking  state,'  then 
the  question  arises,  first  :  Upon  what  does  its 
opposite,  namely,  unconsciousness,  depend,  —  the 
primary  example  of  which  is  normal  sleep. 

Now  in  relation  to  this  it  is  perfectly  manifest 
that,  in  general,  both  the  above-mentioned  modes 
of  explanation  are  admissible  ;  but  that,  still  the 
occurrence  of  sleep  (which  in  the  case  of  healthy 
persons  results  very  quickly,  and  after  having  found 
them  only  a  moment  since  in  the  full  possession 
of  their  spiritual  powers),  and  the  possibility  of  its 
interruption,  does  not  argue  an  exhaustion  of  the 
nervous  forces,  which  would  now  be  unable  longer 


CONDITIONS    OF    UNCONSCIOUSNESS.  I3I 


to  supply  the  stimuli  necessary  for  the  maintenance 
of  the  waking  condition,  but  rather  a  positive  inhi- 
bition consisting  in  all  manner  of  minute  feelings 
of  weariness,  that,  in  the  aggregate,  diminish  the 
interest  of  the  soul  in  the  carrying-on  of  the  life 
of  thought,  and  that  have  attained  a  heightened 
effectiveness  just  on  account  of  this  surrender  of 
the  soul  to  them. 

Sudden  unconsciousness  from  fright  appears  to 
originate  in  like  manner.  Considered  as  a  mere 
physical  stimulus,  the  frightful  sight  or  report  is 
very  insignificant  and  harmless.  It  is  only  our  re- 
flection, which  interprets  the  significance  thereof  in 
its  total  connection  with  our  life,  that  gives  to  what 
is  perceived  this  power  to  frighten  us.  From  this 
point  on,  the  course  of  our  spiritual  functions  may 
immediately  be  disturbed,  and  the  bodily  powerless- 
ness  which  follows  thereupon  may  simply  be  the 
reaction  of  the  psychical  disturbances. 

Even  unconsciousness  in  sickness,  or  after  in- 
juries of  the  brain,  does  not  wholly  exclude  this 
view  of  the  subject.  The  inhibitory  influences 
are  partially  observable  in  the  form  of  pain  ;  this 
is  not,  however,  necessary.  Just  as  we  observe 
nothing  whatever  of  the  states  prevailing  in  our 
nerves  previous  to  sensation,  but  only  the  latter 
itself   appears    in    consciousness,   so  may  conscious- 


132  OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 

ness  also  vanish  without  the  work  of  the  forces 
which  inhibited  it  needing  previously  to  become 
an   object   of   perception. 

§  89.  Manifold  thought  has  been  bestowed  in  re- 
cent times  upon  the  effectiveness  of  certain  stimuli 
in  maintaining  the  state  of  waking,  or  of  their  ab- 
sence in  producing  unconsciousness. 

From  experiments  in  hypnotism  it  has  been  con- 
cluded that,  by  the  complete  exclusion  of  external 
sense-stimuli,  and  by  the  prevention  of  motion,  the 
whole  spiritual  movement  becomes  so  depressed 
that  the  waking  state  cannot  be  maintained,  but 
complete  unconsciousness  takes  place,  —  a  process 
which  in  a  few  cases  has  been  observed  even  in 
human  beings,  but  which  affords  no  trustworthy 
conclusions. 

As  for  the  rest,  we  know  that  if  our  inner  move- 
ment of  thought,  which  is  maintained  by  some  in- 
terest or  other,  does  not  take  place,  —  therefore, 
in  states  of  ennui, — even  the  influence  of  exter- 
nal stimuli  that  do  still  actually  take  place,  does 
not   prevent   our  falling  asleep. 

Positive  influences  too  are  known,  which  dispose 
us  to  falling  asleep ;  such  as  a  number  of  regu- 
larly recurring  rhythmic  movements  of  the  body, 
rocking,   stroking,  combing  the  head,  constant  look- 


CONDITIONS    OF    UNCONSCIOUSNESS.  1 33 

ing  at  large  illuminated  uniform  surfaces,  the  con- 
vergence of  the  axes  of  the  eyes  in  squinting,  etc. 
Finally,  the  manipulations  of  the  mesmerist  be- 
long under  this  head.  But  all  these  methods  are 
not  a  fit  basis  for  critical  judgment,  on  account  of 
the  fact  that  the  instances  of  their  inefficacy  are 
extraordinarily  frequent,  and  they  consequently  ad- 
mit of  the  assumption  of  some  adjunct  condition 
of   their  result   as  yet  unknown. 

But  in  all  cases,  at  the  very  most,  only  the 
external  means  on  the  one  hand,  and  its  effect  on 
the  other  hand,  are  known  to  us  ;  the  intermediate 
processes  which  connect  the  former  with  the  latter 
are  quite  obscure. 

§  90.  If  the  minimum  of  the  waking  state  —  that 
is,  the  sensation  of  external  impressions — be  pres- 
ent, it  is  not  necessary  on  this  account  that  the  next 
higher  activity,  —  that  is,  the  consciousness  of  the 
relations  between  the  single  impressions,  —  should 
also  be  connected  therewith.  It  is  well  known  that, 
in  our  quite  ordinary  experience,  this  latter  action 
is  often  wanting  ;  for  example,  in  cases  when  the 
impressions  are  foreign  to  a  train  of  thought  which 
we  are  attentively  following,  or  in  cases  when  our 
mind  is  moved  with  painful  emotions  Moreover, 
there  are  also  pathological  disturbance  ,  of  a  nature 


134  OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGV. 

indeed  as  yet  unknown,  which  form  the  conditions 
(§  25)  of  this  incapacity  (recently  called  'soul-blind- 
ness ')  for  reflective  combination  or  for  the  under- 
standing of  impressions  perceived  by  the  senses, 

§  91.  The  unconsciousness  of  sleep  is  in  general 
of  varied  depth,  which  admits  of  being  measured  by 
the  magnitude  of  the  excitations  that  are  necessary 
for  waking.  It  is,  however,  very  frequently  imper- 
fect in  so  far  as,  for  example,  excitements  of  the 
sense  of  hearing  and  of  touch  still  act  on  the  con- 
sciousness and  occasion  the  corresponding  sensa- 
tions. 

Nevertheless,  since  in  sleep  there  is  an  absence 
of  the  attention  guided  by  design,  which,  during 
waking  hours  and  principally  by  the  help  of  the 
sense  of  sight,  is  conscious  of  the  entire  connection 
of  the  surrounding  reality,  those  sensations  now  re- 
produce, without  any  selection  of  what  is  probable, 
such  others  as  they  cohere  with  in  respect  to  their 
bare  content,  or  as  have  been  brought  into  coher- 
ency by  means  of  some  earlier  train  of  ideas. 

Accordingly,  that  phantastic  character  dreams 
have  is  set  agoing,  which  very  frequently  gather 
close  around  some  small  nucleus  of  an  actual  sen- 
sation details  of  scenery  that,  although  in  accord 
with  it,  have  no  connection  at  all  with  the  reality. 


CORPOREAL    BASIS    OF    MEMORY.  1 35 


Such  activity  of  consciousness  in  sleep  admits  of 
being  heightened  so  that  questions  may  be  answered 
correctly ;  and  it  is,  therefore,  so  far  forth  made  pos- 
sible for  the  spirit  of  one  who  is  awake  to  direct  to 
some  extent  the  course  of  the  dreamer's  thought, 
and  perhaps  even  his  actions.  For  in  such  a  case 
no  collective  consciousness  of  actual  surroundings, 
and  of  one's  personal  situation  in  them,  stands  in 
the  way  of  the  immediate  transition  of  the  idea  of 
an  action,  when  once  aroused,  into  actual  accom- 
plishment. 

§  92.  For  the  retention  of  ideas  onee  acquired 
and  therefore  for  the  fact  of  Memory,  we  should  not 
suppose  that  a  corporeal  basis  is  needed ;  since  even 
in  the  case  of  material  elements  we  are  unable  to 
demonstrate  how  far  it  is  exactly  their  materiality 
which  is  the  basis  of  the  observed  persistence  of 
their  states.  On  this  account  we  might  as  well 
ascribe  this  property  to  every  immaterial  subject 
which  is  at  all  capable  of  acting  and  being  acted 
upon. 

But  the  necessity  for  thinking  of  innumerable 
different  impressions  as  enduring  unmixed  in  the 
perfect  unity  of  the  soul  would  favor  the  other 
thought,  that  this  problem  could  be  much  better 
satisfied   by  a  great  multiplicity  of  elements.     We 


136  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

should  not  think  of  it  as  though  the  impressions  left 
behind  them  a  state  of  qiiiescoice  as  an  after-effect. 
We  should  rather  follow  the  analogy  of  the  vibrations 
of  light  and  sound,  and  conceive  of  motions  which 
extend  over  many  elements  and,  in  spite  of  single 
disturbances,  are  further  transplanted  after  their 
intersection.  Only  it  would  be  impossible  to  make 
this  general  analogy  of  any  value  in  detail.  Each 
image  of  an  approaching  object  would  at  every 
instant  be  the  source  for  new  vibrations  which  are 
not  covered  by  the  preceding  ones.  How  one  idea 
of  the  object  is  to  originate  from  these  ;  again,  how 
two  simultaneous  motions  arc  to  be  associated  with 
one  another  in  such  manner  tliat  the  renewal  of  the 
one  sets  the  other  agoing  again,  without  resulting  in 
a  special  new  impact  for  the  latter ;  finally,  how  it 
comes  about  that  a  motion  which  belongs  to  a 
partial  impression  of  a  composite  image  re-awakens 
exactly  those  others  which  belong  with  it  as  other 
parts  of  the  same  image;  —  for  the  answer  to  all 
these  questions  there  is  a  complete  lack  of  physical 
analogies. 

If,  accordingly,  a  corporeal  basis  of  memory 
appears  unnecessary,  still  pathological  observations 
show  that  such  a  basis  nevertheless  exists  in  some 
manner  or  other.  The  fact  that  those  events  which 
immediately    precede    an    attack    of    illness    easily 


DOCTRINE    OF    TEMPERAMENTS.  1 3/ 

remain  forgotten  may  be  put  upon  the  ground  that 
their  mental  picture  has  been  associated  with  a 
general  feeling  of  illness,  which  no  longer  exists 
after  recovery,  so  that  such  recollections  want  the 
lever  that  could  reproduce  them.  But  other  facts, 
such  as  the  incapacity  for  recalling  certain  groups 
of  ideas  that  are  substantially  similar  —  for  example, 
surnames  or  single  parts  of  speech — have  hitherto 
been  inaccessible  to  explanation. 

§  93.  We  ascribe  considerable  influence  over  the 
course  of  all  the  spiritual  states  to  the  Tempera- 
ments ;  —  by  which  we  understand  nothing  more 
than  the  differences,  in  kind  and  degree,  of  excit- 
ability for  external  impressions  ;  the  greater  or  less 
extent  to  which  the  ideas  excited  reproduce  others  ; 
the  rapidity  with  which  the  ideas  vary  ;  the  strength 
with  which  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  are  asso- 
ciated with  them  ;  finally,  the  ease  with  which  ex- 
ternal actions  associate  with  these  inner  states 
themselves. 

Immeasurably  different  as  the  temperaments,  in 
this  meaning  of  the  word,  are,  nevertheless  the  four 
well-known  ones  may  be  mentioned  as  the  most 
definite  types  :  the  sanguine  with  its  great  rapid- 
ity of  change  and  lively  excitability ;  the  phleg- 
matic, with    slightly   varied    and    slow,   but    not   on 


138  OUTLINES    OF    PSVCIIOLOUY. 


this  account,  weak  reactions ;  the  choleric,  with 
one-sided  receptivity  and  great  energy  in  single 
directions  ;  instead  of  the  melancholic  and  prefera- 
bly, the  sentimental,  —  distinguished  by  special  re- 
ceptivity for  the  feeling  of  the  value  of  all  possible 
relations,  but  indifferent  toward  bare  matter  of  fact. 
One  must  guard  one's  self  against  confusing  the 
temperaments  with  various  pathological  conditions 
or  peculiarities  of  character ;  although  it  is  perfectly 
obvious  that  each  has  its  own  peculiar  strong  and 
weak  sides,  for  moral  culture  and  bodily  health. 
Concerning  the  corporeal  basis  of  temperaments  we 
know  nothing:  decisive. 


't> 


§  94.  Phrenology  or  cranioscopy  has  believed  that 
it  could  demonstrate  a  series  of  organs  for  the  indi- 
vidual  spiritual  functions.  Its  belief  is,  indeed,  with- 
out any  foundation  in  so  far  as  it  separated  these 
organs  in  space  and  sought  to  define  their  position  ; 
on  the  contrary,  it  was  certainly  not  entirely  base- 
less, when  it  regarded  certain  external  formations  — 
for  example,  of  the  skull  —  merely  as  indications 
which  betray  and  guarantee  the  fact  that  conditions, 
otherwise  wholly  unknown,  exist,  on  which  depend 
the  realization  or  the  particular  intensity  of  the 
aforesaid  t unctions,  in  a  manner  not  further  de- 
monstrable but  given  as  matter  of  fact. 


LOCALIZATION    OF    FUNCTION.  1 39 

It  was  moreover  prevented  from  making  such  a 
useful  collection  of  facts,  by  another  fault.  Only 
those  functions  or  talents  could  profitably  be  taken 
into  account,  the  meaning  of  which  is  unambigu- 
ous, and  which  can  neither  well  be  concealed  when 
present,  nor  counterfeited  when  absent  —  for  exam- 
ple, musical,  artistic,  mathematical  talents  ;  of  all  of 
which  we  have  examples  enough  as  inherited  within 
a  family.  On  the  contrary,  characteristics  which 
can  on.iy  be  estimated  by  a  refined  knowledge  of 
men,  and  even  then  never  with  certainty,  and  which 
in  a  given  case  may  be  the  product  not  merely  of 
natural  disposition  but  of  education  and  of  accident, 
are  not  at  all  adapted  for  being  determined  in  this 
way,  although  they  have  been  most  frequently  so 
employed. 

§  95.  A  sensorwm  commune,  and  in  more  recent 
times,  a  motorium  commune  have  been  distinguished. 

A  necessary  function  for  the  first  of  the  two  might 
perhaps  be  found  in  this,  that  the  individual  impres- 
sions do  not  as  such  become  an  object  for  the  soul's 
cognition,  but  only  after  combinations  or  other 
adjustments  have  taken  place.  This  work  of  elabo- 
ration the  organ  would  have  to  accomplish  ;  a  mere 
collecting  of  the  impressions  in  one  place  would 
seem    superfluous.      Now   how   far   such   a   process 


140  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

extends  we  do  not  know  ;  apparently  it  accords  with 
what  was  previously  said  in  reference  to  our  space- 
intuitions, —  to  which  perhaps  a  greater  part  of  the 
brain  is  appropriated. 

It  would  be  required  of  the  vwtoriicm  commune 
that  it  should  combine  the  individual  motor  nerve- 
roots  with  each  other  in  such  various  ways  that  a 
series  of  subordinated  centres  originates,  each  of 
which  needs  only  a  single  excitation  in  order  simul- 
taneously to  set  agoing  several  motions  that  are  com- 
bined in  a  purposeful  way.  But  the  nature  of  the 
influence  which  the  soul  itself  exercises  upon  these 
points  is  certainly  incorrectly  represented,  if  we  con- 
ceive of  impulses  as  proceeding  from  the  soul,  that 
are  of  the  same  species  and  distinguished  in  their 
effects  merely  by  the  direction  which  they  take, 
and  hence  by  the  different  terminal  points  which 
they  reach.  To  determine  such  a  direction  would 
be  impossible  for  the  soul  without  a  knowledge  of 
the  structure  of  the  brain,  with  which  we  cannot 
credit  it.  We  therefore  assert,  on  the  contrary, 
that  every  idea  of  a  motion  a,  which  originates  in 
the  soul,  is  a  qualitatively  different  state  from  the 
other  idea  of  a  motion  b.  To  a,  accordingly,  be- 
longs a  resulting  state  a,  to  b  another,  p.  These 
two  states  could  only  originate  in  those  points  of 
the  nervous   mass,  which    by  their  organization  are 


THE    ORGAN    OF    SPEECH.  I4I 

exactly  capable  of  being  stimulated  to  produce  them ; 
just  as  a  glass,  for  example,  resounds  only  to  those 
tones  which,  on  its  being  struck,  it  would  produce 
by  virtue  of  its  own  tension.  The  impulses  of  the 
soul  do  not  therefore  need  to  be  directed,  but  spon- 
taneously find  the  places  where  they  are  effective  ; 
naturally,  when  the  case  is  rightly  understood,  in 
such  a  way  that  they  do  not  have  to  traverse  a 
certain  distance  from  a  given  point  to  that  place. 

In  similar  manner  should  we  conceive  of  the  func- 
tion of  the  organ  of  speech  —  the  only  one  which  has 
thus  far  been  discovered  with  any  great  certainty  at 
a  definite  spot  in  the  hemispheres  of  the  large  brain. 
Extirpation  of  this  spot  destroys  the  capacity  for 
combining  the  representative  '  sound-pictures '  of  a 
word  with  the  excitement  of  the  motions  in  the 
muscles  of  speech,  as  would  be  required  for  the 
actual  utterance  of  the  word.  Although  we  can  in 
this  case  form  but  little  conception  of  the  kind  of 
action  which  constitutes  the  function  of  this  organ, 
we  are  yet  more  in  the  dark  as  to  how  such  a  dis- 
turbance of  its  action  can  be  brought  about  as  is 
presented  to  us  in  the  type  of  disease  called 
*  aphasia.' 

§  96.  For  all  the  higher  spiritual  capacities,  which 
consist  in  judgment  of  the  relations  of  given  concep- 


142  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

tions,  wc  neither  know  liow  empirically  to  demon- 
strate a  definite  bodily  organ,  nor  should  we  know 
how  to  conceive  precisely  what,  that  is  of  any  use, 
such  an  organ  could  contribute  toward  the  solution 
of  the  most  essential  part  of  this  problem  —  that  is, 
the  pronouncing  of  the  judgment  itself.  It  is  con- 
ceivable, on  the  other  hand,  that  these  higher  activi- 
ties might  presuppose  the  complete  and  clear  repre- 
sentation of  the  content  about  which  the  judgment 
is  to  be  passed;  and,  consequently,  also  the  undis- 
turbed function  of  those  organs  which  contribute 
first  to  perception  by  the  senses,  then  1;o  its  repro- 
duction and  combination  with  other  perceptions, 
and,  finally,  to  the  appropriate  attachment  of  feel- 
ings of  value  to  each  of  them. 

§  97.  There  remains  a  large  number  of  narratives 
concerning  extraordinary  spiritual  activity  in  states 
of  bodily  ailment.  The  various  points  thereof  are 
not  all  alike  unworthy  of  belief. 

The  assertion  that  there  are  cases  of  an  imme- 
diate (without  the  agency  of  any  physical  medium) 
'rapport'  between  consciousness  and  distant  parts 
of  the  external  world,  docs  not  admit  of  refutation 
a  priori ;  for  all  effects  through  media  must,  in  the 
last  analysis,  be  based  upon  immediate  effects.  Only 
experience   can   teach    us   where    such    effects   are 


FAR-SIGHT    AND    MIND-READING.  I43 


met  with,  and  where  not ;  and  it  certainly  does 
teach  us  that  the  entire  spiritual  life,  awake  and 
healthy,  and  so  accessible  to  safe  experiment,  is 
universally  connected  with  the  external  world  only 
through  physical  media. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  assumption  is  at  all  events 
senseless,  that  the  precise  phenomena  which  are  sup- 
posed to  be  perceived  can  be  explained  in  the  lump 
by  the  efflux  and  influx  of  an  animal  magnetism. 

Again,  it  is  not  impossible  that  the  same  sim- 
ple sensation  —  for  example,  that  of  light  —  may  also 
originate  in  other  nerves  which  are  not  specifically 
designed  for  it  ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  quite  impos- 
sible that  an  orderly  apprehension  of  a  multiplicity 
of  sensations  —  for  example,  the  reading  of  a  letter 
—  should  result  through  the  nerves  of  the  skin, 
which  are  not  (like  the  optic  nerve)  constructed 
for  such  a  combination  of  impressions. 

It  is  possible,  finally,  that  all  manner  of  spir- 
itual functions  take  place  with  more  liveliness 
in  such  pathological  conditions  as  diminish  the 
regular  intercourse  with  the  external  world,  and 
thereby  remove  all  the  minute  circumspection  and 
timorousness  which  in  ordinary  life  oppose  the 
exercise  of  a  given  capacity.  In  such  cases  —  for 
example,  when  problems  previously  insoluble  are 
solved    in    somnambulance  —  this    achievement    is 


144  OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 

never  accomplished  except  with  the  help  of  the 
capacities  which  have  been  gained  in  waking  life. 
Finally,  that  in  such  states  nothing  higher  is  at- 
tained than  would  be  attainable  to  ordinary  human 
nature,  is  shown  by  the  insignificant  content  of  all 
the  revelations  alleged  to  be  received  in  them  ;  as 
well  as  by  the  fact  that  the  many  examples  of  such 
cases  in  history  have  never  been  allied  with  any 
advance  in  our  knowledge. 


CHAPTER   VII. 


THE    REALM    OF    SOULS. 


§  98.  The  requirement  that  we  should  speak  of  a 
'  soul '  is  of  course  first  made  upon  us  at  the  point 
where  facts  would  be  incomprehensible  without  this 
assumption.  In  reality,  however,  the  endowing  of 
things  with  a  soul  may  extend  further  than  this 
requirement. 

In  fact  all  Things  have  been  spoken  of  as  though 
endowed  with  souls  ;  but  this  thought,  for  which  we 
may  have  good  grounds,  has  thus  far  been  unfruitful 
for  the  explanation  of  individual  phenomena.  With 
still  greater  predilection  have  '  plant-souls '  been 
spoken  of  (Fechner,  "  Nanna  or  the  soul-life  of  plants." 
Leipzig,  1848).  And  certainly  the  possession  of  a 
soul  is  by  no  means  bound  to  the  centralized  struc- 
ture which  we  observe  in  the  animal  and  find  wanting 
in  the  plant.  Nevertheless,  the  more  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  plant  and  consequently  also  the  expres- 
sions by  means  of  which  it  might  make  intelligible 
to  us  whatever  inner  life  it  happens  to  have,  vary 
from  such  structure,  so  much  the  less  is  it  possible 


146  OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 

to  construct    from    this    fancy,  however  correct,  an 
object  of  science. 

The  animal  kingdom  alone  remains,  therefore,  as 
affording  us  an  ascending  series  of  spiritual  life. 

§  99.  It  would  be  an  error  to  regard  all  animal 
souls  as  beings  of  originally  the  same  sort,  which 
were  merely  afterwards  either  equipped  with  more 
or  fewer  faculties,  or  else  adapted  for  their  greater 
or  less  elevation  and  for  the  peculiarities  of  their 
spiritual  culture,  by  the  variety  of  the  external  im- 
pressions made  upon  them.  As  before,  so  now  we 
consider  the  word  '  Soul  '  simply  as  a  title  which 
belongs  to  all  beings  that  have  an  experience  of 
their  own  inner  states  and  reactions  upon  stimuli, 
in  the  form  of  ideas,  feelings,  and  acts  of  will.  But 
what  is  expressed  in  this  common  term  —  that  is, 
the  peculiar  essence  of  the  soul — may  be  as  radi- 
cally different  as  we  conceive  gold,  silver,  and  lead 
originally  to  be,  although  they  all  have  the  power 
of  expressing  themselves  only  by  differences  in  de- 
gree of  the  same  i)hysical  transactions,  —  gravity, 
cohesion,  hardness,  etc. 

The  question  may  arise  as  to  where  we  begin  to 
deal  with  the  Instinct  of  animals  ;  under  which  is 
to  be  reckoned  not  merely  certain  wonderful  artistic 
impulses,  but,  properly  speaking,  the   entire  typical 


NATURE    OF    ANIMAL    INSTINCT.  I47 

mode  of  life  of  each  species  of  animals.  Perhaps, 
especially  in  the  lower  classes  of  animals,  the  souls 
are  by  no  means  destined,  to  the  same  extent  as 
human  souls,  for  learning  from  experience ;  but,  in 
accordance  with  their  bodily  organization,  have  an 
original  content  of  consciousness,  by  which  they  are 
controlled  just  as  we  sometimes  are  by  an  idea  that 
has  arisen  perchance  in  a  dream.  But  this  assump- 
tion cannot  be  turned  to  further  profit.  As  an  ad- 
ditional aid  in  explanation  it  is  to  be  said  further, 
that,  in  case  of  a  wholly  different  structure  of  the 
nervous  system,  the  vegetative  processes,  of  which 
we  remain  entirely  unconscious,  are  in  the  lower  ani- 
mals permanent  objects  of  perception  and  points  of 
starting  for  acts  which  appear  to  us  groundless. 
And  not  less  may  there  be  sensations  of  external 
circumstances  for  which  we  lack  the  requisite  or- 
gans,—  for  example,  sensations  of  minute  electrical 
changes  in  the  environment,  from  which  the  sensi- 
tiveness to  changes  of  weather  results  not  as  fore- 
sight of  the  future  but  as  perception  of  what  has 
already  occurred. 

It  would,  nevertheless,  be  incorrect  to  limit  all  the 
soul-life  of  animals  to  such  '  instinct  '  ;  the  rather 
does  an  accommodation  to  the  circumstances  take 
place  in  their  actions,  so  that  obviously  the  same  in- 
terpretation and  use  of  experience  as  that  on  which 


148  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY'. 

our  cvery-day  life  is  based,   must  have  taken  place 
in  their  case  also. 

§  100.  If  the  IiitcUect  and  its  function  —  namely, 
thinking  —  be  considered  as  characteristic  of  man, 
what  we  mean  by  this  is,  that  the  intellect  does  not 
simply  suffer  the  course  of  ideas  to  occur  of  itself 
as  it  occurs  when  regulated  by  mechanical  laws,  but 
that  it  exercises  an  activity  which  separates  again 
the  ideas  that  do  not  belong  together ;  and  not 
merely  permits  those  that  belong  together  to  re- 
main so,  but  is  likewise  conscious,  in  the  form  of 
general  notions  or  principles,  of  those  valid  rea- 
sons on  account  of  which  they  belong  together. 
We  have  no  reason  to  credit  the  animals  with  such 
a  far-reaching  reflection,  in  order  to  make  possible 
their  purposeful  behavior  and  the  way  they  adapt 
themselves  to  circumstances.  For  them  the  ordi- 
nary course  of  ideas  is  quite  suflficient  (since  even 
in  it  what  belongs  together  is  gradually  more  firmly 
associated  than  aught  else)  ;  just  as  man  also  in  a 
great  part  of  his  every-day  life  entrusts  himself  to 
it  alone. 

If  therefore  the  intellect,  or  thinking,  is  held  to  be 
a  distinguishing  talent  of  man,  then  among  the  cir- 
cumstances which  favor  its  cultivation  the  following 
may  be  adduced  as  pre-eminent  :  the  long  helpless 


REASON    CHARACTERISTIC    OF    MAN.  I49 

childhood,  which  induces  the  accumulation  of  many 
experiences  before  it  makes  conduct  possible ;  the 
skillfulness  of  the  hand  which  makes  man  the  born 
experimenter  and  permits  a  multitude  of  coherent 
observations;  finally,  speech  —  partly  because  the 
articulate  sounds  as  symbols  for  ideas  fix  their  con- 
tent, and  serve  to  make  the  combination  of  many 
ideas  into  the  object  of  an  inner  intuition  ;  partly, 
and  principally,  because  communication  develops 
further  the  course  of  each  individual's  ideas  by 
means  of  the  stimulating,  enriching,  and  correcting 
intervention  of  another's  course  of  thought. 

§  101.  Most  definitively  is  Reason  regarded  as  the 
characteristic  of  man  ;  and  by  this  is  understood  the 
capacity  for  perceiving  eternal  verities  immediately 
per  se,  as  soon  as  external  experiences  have  furnished 
consciousness  with  the  matter  of  fact,  about  which 
these  same  verities  have  to  express  a  judgment,  — 
principally  one  of  moral  approbation  or  disappro- 
bation. 

We  know  nothing  about  a  primary  psychological 
origin  for  these  simplest  principles  of  Conscience ; 
and  we  accordingly  have  reason  to  consider  them  as 
one  of  those  reactions  of  the  original  nature  of  the 
spirit,  that  are  never  explicable  —  however  often,  to 
be    sure,    the    attempt    is    made  —  by   the   external 


150  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 

inducements  which  they  certainly  require  in  order  to 
be  awakened.  It  is,  moreover,  an  indifferent  matter 
whether  they  are  regarded  as  endowment  inborn  or 
as  gained  by  the  experience  of  life ;  if  only  it  be 
admitted  that,  after  they  have  originated  within  us, 
they  are  the  expressions  of  a  truth  which,  although 
it  is  discovered  by  experience,  is  with  respect  to  its 
content  and  its  value  quite  independent  thereof. 

§  102,  Moral  truths  exist  in  order  to  determine 
the  will.  Of  this,  too,  we  speak  only  in  the  case  of 
men  ;  to  the  animals  we  do  not  impute  what  they  do, 
because  we  consider  it  as  the  natural  result  of 
instinct,  but  not  as  the  actions  of  a  will. 

Instincts  are  primarily  nothing  but  feelings  ;  and 
that,  chiefly,  of  pain  or  at  any  rate  uneasiness.  They 
are  wont,  however,  to  be  connected  with  motor 
impulses,  that,  in  the  manner  of  reflex  motions,  lead 
to  all  kinds  of  movements  by  which,  after  more  or 
less  of  error,  the  means  are  discovered  for  doing 
away  with  the  aforesaid  pain.  It  is  only  after  the 
idea  of  that  action  by  which  the  pain  is  relieved, 
has  combined  with  feeling,  that  an  instinct,  strictly 
speaking,  has  been  formed,  such  as  has  a  goal  to 
reach  and  such  that  the  soul  of  the  animal  is  in- 
stinctively moved  by  it. 

In    the    same    manner   do    innumerable    so-called 


THE    MEANING    OF    "l    WILL."  151 


'actions'  of  the  human  life  occur,  of  which  we  say, 
incorrectly,  —  They  are  '  ivilled.'  But  the  fact  simply 
is,  that  there  has  been  no  will  active  in  order  to 
prevent  their  occurrence. 

It  is  correct  to  speak  of  'willing,'  only  in  case 
the  motives  for  different  actions,  and  their  values, 
have  been  compared  with  full  consciousness,  and 
then  a  decision  for  one  of  them  has  been  reached. 
It  is  utterly  groundless  to  assert  that  we  even  then 
express  by  the  proposition,  "  I  will,"  nothing  more 
than  the  foresight  of  the  future  tense,  "I  shall." 
This  would  hold  good  only  in  case  the  verb,  whose 
future  tense  we  employ,  has  itself  the  significance 
of  an  action  in  the  very  conception  of  which  there 
is  inherent  an  antecedent  volition.  Otherwise,  un- 
prejudiced observation  will  admit  that  the  peculiar 
approval  of  the  action  conceived,  or  the  adoption 
of  a  decision  that  proceeds  from  the  personal  ego, 
—  however  impossible  it  may  be  to  construe  such 
a  thing  further,  —  is  nevertheless  a  process  in  our 
inner  life  that  is  given  in  fact  and  is  explicable  by 
no  mechanism  of  ideas. 

§  103.  Even  if  such  a  nature  of  the  will  be 
recognized,  we  should  still  be  able  to  conceive  of 
it  as  determined  in  every  one  of  its  expressions 
according  to  definite  laws,  in  case  we  rely  solely 
upon   explanatory  science. 


152  OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY, 

Now  if  Ethics  believes  that  it  needs  freedom  of 
the  will  for  establishing  its  views,  then  Psychol- 
ogy must  at  least  not  be  misused  in  the  attempt 
to  decide  about  the  possibility  of  such  an  assump- 
tion, on  grounds  of  so-called  experience. 

It  is  not  true  that  we  find  in  our  self-observa- 
tion the  determining  causes  for  all  our  actions. 
Very  frequently  we  find  nothing  of  the  kind.  But 
even  where  we  suppose  we  find  such  a  thing,  the 
matter  is  ambiguous.  For  if  the  motives  for  two 
opposed  actions,  a  and  h,  have  been  for  a  long  time 
compared  in  reflection,  and  then  a  decision  for  a 
has  taken  place,  it  must  always  afterward  appear 
as  though  the  reasons  for  a  had  prevailed  over 
those  for  1>  by  their  very  strength  in  a  mechani- 
cal way ;  and  such  an  appearance  would  have  to 
originate  in  exactly  the  same  manner,  if  the  deci- 
sion for  a  were  in  fact  accomplished  by  means  of 
a  perfectly  undetermined  freedom. 

To  MetapJiysic  must  the  question  be  relegated, 
whether  in  other  regards  the  conception  of  such  a 
freedom  is  capable  of  being  harmonized  with  our 
entire  way  of  regarding  the  world  ;  and  to  Prac- 
tical PJtilosopJiy,  the  question  whether  it  promises 
the  advantages  for  the  sake  of  which  we  venture 
to   make   it. 


INDEX. 


INDEX. 


A. 

Affections,  nature  of,  'jj. 

Animals,  souls  of,  145  f ;  instinct  of,  146  i. 

Aphasia,  141. 

Association  of  Ideas,  fact  of,  35  f. ;  law  s  of,  36  f. 

Attention,  40  ff. ;  degrees  of,  45  f. 


Body,  picture  of  how  formed,  64  f.;  action  of  on  soul,  98  f ;  bonds  of  loi. 
Brain,  as  seat  of  soul,  no  f. 

C. 

Color,  prismatic  arrangement  of,  11  f;  stimuli  of  sensations  of,  23;  blind- 
ness to,  25  ;  fundamental  forms  of  25  ;  impressions  of  52  f. 

Comparison,  act  of,  40  f. ;  of  sensations,  69. 

Consciousness,  ideas  in,  29  f.,  35  f;  meanings  of  43f. ;  degrees  of  44  ;  of 
self,  78  f.;  psychical  unity  of,  93f,  95f. ;  feelings  of  126  f.;  as  waking 
state,  130  f  ;  loss  of  131,  133  f. ;  abnormal  phenomena  of  142. 

Corti,  organ  of,  24. 

E. 

Ego,  the,  in  self-consciousness,  79  f,  81  f. 

Eye,  structure  of,  24,  47  f.,  59;  use  in  intuiting  space,  53  f,  55  f.,  59  f. 

F. 

Faculties  of  the  soul,  120  f 

Feelings,  of  double  contact,  71  f. ;  definition  of  the,  73  ;  always  specific,  75  ; 

of  sense,  75  f. ;  aesthetic,  76 ;  ethical,  76  f.;  of  self-consciousness,  124  f. 
Freedom,  fact  of,  151  f. 

G. 
God,  omnipresence  of,  105,  108  f. 

H. 

Hegel,  doctrine  of  the  soul,  126, 

Herbart,  on  attention,  45;  and  faculties  of  the  soul,  122,  123  f. 


156  INDEX, 


I. 

Ideas,  nature  of,  28 ;  course  of,  28  ff.,  31  f.,  35  f. ;  relation  to  consciousness, 
28  f.;  mechanics  of,  31  f.,  34;  simple  and  obscure,  32  f. ;  opposition  of 
33  f. ;  association  of,  35  f.,  37  f. 

Immortality  of  the  soul,  112,  114,  118. 

Instinct,  146  f.,  150. 

Intellect,  characteristic  of  man,  148  f. 

K. 

Knowledge,  relative,  40  f. 

L. 

Leibnitz,  monad  of,  96. 

Likeness,  origin  of  idea  of,  41  f. 

Local  signs,  theory  of,  52,  53  ff.,  61  f. ;  of  the  eye,  53  f. ;  of  the  skin,  62  t. 

Localization,  of  the  eye,  53  f. ;  of  the  skin,  62  f. ;  in  the  whole  body,  64  f. 

M. 

Materialism,  assumptions  of,  92  f.,  loi,  118. 

Matter,  incapable  of  psychical  stales,  92  f. 

Mechanics,  psychical,  31  f.,  34. 

Mechanism,  and  force,  106. 

Memory,  phenomena  of,  29  f. ;  physical  basis  of,  135  f. 

Motion,  concepts  of,  58  f. ;  judgments  of,  70  f. 

Motions,  tlie  bodily,  83;  the  reflex,  84  f. ;  the  mimetic,  85  f.;  the  imitative, 

86  f. ;  voluntary  and  involuntary,  87. 
Motorium  commune,  139  f. 

N. 

Nerve-fibre,  excitement  of,  6,  12;  propagation  in,  7f. ;  specific  energy  01, 

22  f. ;  kinds  of,  in  the  eye,  25. 
Nerve-process,  nature  physical,  6  f. 
Notion,  the  general,  42  f. 

O. 

Organs,  the  bodily,  as  related  to  consciousness,  129  f. ;  none,  for  higher 
faculties,  141  f. 

P. 
Phrenology,  138  f. 

Place,  of  a  Thing,  108  ;  of  a  spiritual  Being,  108  f. 

Plants,  psychical  life  of,  145.  •    - 

Psychology,  definition  of,  1 ;  kinds  of,  i  f. 

R. 

Reason,  characteristic  of  man,  149  f. 

Retina,  relation  of,  to  intuitions  of  space,  49  f.,  52  f.,  55  f.,  59;  local  signo 
of,  54  f.,  61  f. 


INDEX,  157 


S. 

Sensation,  simple,  5  ff. ;  processes  of,  5  f. ;  a  psychical  experience,  7  f.,  9  f. ; 
elements  of,  8  f. ;  classes  of,  10  f. ;  intensity  of,  11  f.,  14  f.,  16  f.,  19  f. ;  dur- 
ation of,  12  f. ;  quality  of,  16  f.,  52 ;  repetition  of,  20  f. ;  subjective,  21  f  ; 
subjectivity  of,  25  f. ;  in  contrast  to  ideas,  27,  31  f. ;  comparison  of,  69; 
differs  from  feelings,  73. 

Senses,  apprehension  of  world  by,  66;  errors  of,  66  f. ;  feelings  of,  75. 

Sensorium  commune,  139  f. 

Sentiments,  nature  of,  77. 

Skin,  localization  of  sensations  in,  62  f. ;  Weber's  investigations,  63. 

Sleep,  causes  of,  132,  134  f. 

Somnambulism,  143. 

Soul,  life  of,  I ;  relation  of,  to  ideas,  29  f. ;  unity  of,  30  f.,  42,  93  f. ;  extension 
in,  48  f.;  as  subject,  91 ;  connection  with  body,  91  f.,  98  f.,  loi ;  states 
of,  96 f.,  129  f.,  132  f. ;  as  monad,  96 ;  immaterial  essence,  98  f.,  102, 119  f. ; 
seat  of,  105  f.,  iiof. ;  time-relations  of,  112  f. ;  immortality  of,  112  f.,  118  ; 
origin  of,  117;  faculties  of,  120  f.;  destiny  of,  126. 

Sound,  impressions  of,  16  f. 

Space,  intuitions  of,  47f.,  49f.,  51  f.,  55  f-".  deductions  of,  51;  construction 
of  world  in,  57  f.,  64  f. ;  depth  of,  58f.;  mental  picture  of,  65;  magni. 
tudes  in,  67  f. 

States,  unconscious,  29 ;  as  related  to  ego,  79  f.,  96  f. ;  not  separable  from 
soul,  100. 

Stimuli,  external,  5  f. ;  relations  of,  to  sensations,  10,  14  ff.,  18  f.;  sensitive- 
ness to  differences  in,  13  f.,  18  f.,  63  f. ;  internal,  21  f. ;  of  color  sensations, 
22  f. ;  influence  of,  24 ;  feelings  due  to,  75. 

Substance,  the  soul  a,  112  f. ;  meaning  of  a,  113  f, 

T. 

Temperaments,  doctrine  of,  137 ;  kinds  of,  137  f. 

Tilings,  objective  properties  of,  26  f. ;  relation  to  space,  47 ;  and  to  one 
Being,  115;  essence  of,  119. 

U. 
Understanding,  work  of,  66. 

V. 

Vision,  after-images  of,  12  f.  ;  quality  of  sensations  in,  17;  causes  of,  22 f.; 
organ  of,  24,  47  f. ;  use  of  eye  in,  47  f.,  55  f. ;  image  of,  48,  59  f. ;  of  \e- 
verse  objects,  60  f. ;  reasons  for  single,  61. 

W. 
Weber,  the  law  of,  15  ff.,  19  f. ;  investigations  of  skin  sensations,  63. 
"Will,  relation  to  bodily  motions,  87  f. ;  meaning  of  the,  125  f.,  150  f. 

1891 


ADVERTISEMENTS 


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